

LATER MOHIST TREATISES ON ETHICS AND LOGIC
RECONSTRUCTED FROM THE TA-CH'Ü 大取 CHAPTER
OF MO-TZÜ 墨子

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ABBREVIATIONS

- M Morohashi Tetsuji 諸橋 徹次 *Dai Kan-Wa jiten* 大漢和辭典
Tokyo 1955-1960.
- SPPY *Ssü pu pei yao* 四部備要
- TC *Ta-ch'ü* 大取
- HC *Hsiao-ch'ü* 小取
- EC *Expounding the Canons*.
- NO *Names and objects*.
- <A> Insert A.
- [A] Delete A.
- (A)*B Read B for A.
- [A]B Transpose A, B.

FINDING LIST

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The text of *Mo-tzu* followed is that of the Chia-ching Kuei-ch'ou 嘉靖癸丑 (A.D. 1553) edition reproduced in the *Ssü-pu ts'ung-k'an*. References to the *Ta-ch'ü* and *Hsiao-ch'ü* are to page and line in *chüan* 11.

References to the *Canons* and *Explanations* are to

(1) The numbering in T'an's edition (also usable for other modern editions, allowing for discrepancies caused by occasional disagreement over division of *Canons*). T'an's interpretations and divisions between *Canons* are not of course necessarily the same as my own.

(2) Page and line in *chüan* 10 of the *Ssü-pu ts'ung-k'an* edition.

I am indebted to Prof. Liu Ts'un-yan and Prof. D. C. Lau for detailed criticisms of the present reconstruction of the *Ta-ch'ü*.

PART I. INTRODUCTION

1/1. The reconstitution of the *Ta-ch'ü* fragments

The *Ta-ch'ü* is one of the six dialectical chapters of *Mo-tzu*, the Ching 經 "Canons" (ch. 40, 41), the *Ching shuo* 經說 "Explanations of the Canons" (ch. 42, 43), the *Ta-ch'ü* "Bigger pick" (ch. 44) and the *Hsiao-ch'ü* "Smaller pick" (ch. 45). All these chapters except the *Hsiao-ch'ü* present serious difficulties, but the *Ta-ch'ü* is the only one which has so far defied all attempts at interpretation. It is a random collection of fragments, some concerned with logical problems in the manner of the *Hsiao-ch'ü*, others with ethical questions raised by the Mohist doctrine of universal love. On both topics the argumentation is very sophisticated, and since the later Mohists advanced further than any other Chinese philosophical school in both logic and the rationalization of ethics there can be no doubt that we have in our hands the *dissecta membra* of one or more treatises of great importance in the history of Chinese thought; but even the longer fragments break off before we can catch the drift of the argument, with the result that almost the whole chapter remains virtually unusable. Of the many modern editors of the *Canons* and *Explanations* only T'an Chieh-fu (in his admirable *Mo-pien fa-wei*) and Chang Ch'i-huang have ventured to attack the problems of the *Ta-ch'ü*, and commentators on the whole text of *Mo-tzu* have offered only minor contributions.

Two of the fragments¹ start with phrases which look like titles or headings (語經, 名實), the former already recognized as a heading by the great 19th century commentator Sun Yi-jang.² It is therefore likely that the *Ta-ch'ü* contains the mutilated remains of more than one document. The similarities of content and contrasted titles of the *Ta-ch'ü* and *Hsiao-ch'ü* also suggest the possibility that they are the "bigger pick" and the "smaller pick"³ from a single corpus, the "smaller pick" consisting of more homogeneous material sufficiently well preserved to be recognized as an entity. If so there is danger that bits of the *Hsiao-ch'ü* source may have slipped into the rag-bag of the *Ta-ch'ü*, and the lacunae stuffed with material which might

¹ TC 3A/7, 4B/6.

² Sun 255/6.

³ For the meaning of *ta ch'ü* and *hsiao ch'ü*, cf. *Kuan-tzu* 管子 ch. 38 (13, 7B/4-6) 此謂道矣。小取焉則小得福，大取焉則大得福，盡行之而天下服。 "This is called the Way. If you take a little from it you win a little good fortune, if you take much from it you win much good fortune, when you practice the whole of it the Empire submits." I previously followed Pi Yüan in supposing that the chapters "were evidently misnamed by someone who read no further than a discussion of choosing the greater benefit and the lesser harm early in the *Ta-ch'ü*" (Graham (1) 1, cf. Pi 11, 1A/3). But in that passage the order of words is reversed: *ch'ü ta* "choosing the greater" *ch'ü hsiao* "choosing the lesser" (EC 8 below), and the resemblance to the title is probably accidental.

ethical questions, each with the concluding formula *lei tsai* 類在 *X* "the analogy is in *X*" which survives intact at the very end of the chapter. The formula resembles the *shuo tsai* 說在 *X* "the explanation is in *X*" at the end of each *Canon* in *Mo-tzü* ch. 41, referring to the *Explanations* assembled in ch. 43. Commentators have therefore speculated that originally the 13 propositions must also have had written explanations.⁸ Now there are many close similarities in content and phrasing between the propositions and fragments earlier in the chapter, nine of which were already noticed by Sun Yi-jang.⁹ Is it possible that the fragments concerned with ethics are the remains of the missing explanations? A simple way to test this possibility is to write out the propositions in sequence on different pages of an exercise book, cut up a xerox copy of the *Ta-ch'ü* at the points where fragmentation is most evident, and group the pieces under the relevant propositions, making further cuts and rearrangements as the experiment progresses. It must be admitted that the fragments seldom if ever connect with the analogies provided in the *lei tsai X* formula, as the *Explanation* of a *Canon* connects with its *shuo tsai X* formula; this consideration indeed deterred me from trying the experiment for many years after the possibility first occurred to me. But if we decide that it is worthwhile to test the possibility in spite of this difficulty (to which we shall return later),¹⁰ we find that all the fragments concerned with ethics quickly begin to sort themselves out like pieces of a jigsaw puzzle, revealing themselves to be a series of expositions of the 13 propositions, some apparently almost complete, others badly mutilated, and in the same sequence as in the list of analogies (evidence of mutilation increases towards the end, and the exposition of No. 13 seems to be entirely lost). Such a reconstruction must of course be uncertain in detail, and a student of pre-Han philosophy with a taste for this kind of game might be advised to put aside his *Asia Major* at this point and try the experiment for himself; an independent try without a knowledge of my results might well hit on an arrangement at some points demonstrably superior. But several considerations confirm that the general principle is sound and that the success of the experiment is not accidental:

(1) The consideration which seems decisive is that in five cases expositions follow on to each other inside a single fragment, and that in each case the order is that of the list of the 13 analogies:

Propositions 3, 4	TC 6A/2-6	66 characters
6, 7	1B/6-2A/2	63
7, 8	1A/3-1B/6	201
8, 9	2A/7-2B/5	102
9, 10	3A/4-7	35

⁸ Cf. Sun 259/-5, Wu 11, 9B/-3.

⁹ Sun 259/13-260/8.

¹⁰ Cf. pp. 163-4 below.

These five fragments (the fourth of which actually quotes Proposition 9 verbatim) provide a firm framework for the reconstruction.

(2) The three parallel definitions scattered near the beginning of the *Ta-ch'ü*, which tantalize us by implying some principle of organization which we cannot grasp,¹¹ as well as a fourth disguised by the corruption of one character,¹² turn out to be the introductions to four successive expositions (Nos. 7-10). Each stands in the middle of a fragment:

- Proposition 7 (TC 2A/1), in TC 1B/6-2A/2,
8 (TC 1B/1, 2), in TC 1A/3-1B/6,
9 (TC 2B/2), in TC 2A/7-2B/5,

as well as the corrupt

- 10 (TC 3A/67), in TC 3A/4-7.

It can now be seen that the compiler recognized the parallelism of the first three definitions and therefore juxtaposed the fragments (we shall consider shortly the single interruption, TC 2A/3-7),¹³ but in the wrong order.

(3) The exposition of the first proposition turns out to begin with one of the two embedded headings which we have already noticed, *Yü ching* 語經.¹⁴ Sun and T'an took this as an adjunct/head construction ("The canon of sayings"), but we can now see that the 18th century commentator Pi Yüan was right in analysing it as verb/object ("Expounding the canons"). We do in fact find the verb *yü* "expound" in the exposition of the first proposition. So *Yü ching* is the title of the whole document, and the "Canons" are the 13 propositions themselves, which have the same form as the *ching* "Canons" of *Mo-tzü*, ch. 40, 41.

(4) Having established the starting-points of Nos. 1, 4, 7-10 and the conclusions of Nos. 3, 6-9 one finds that all remaining fragments concerning ethics (but not those concerning logic) can be fitted comfortably into the gaps. They do not however fill them; much of the text is irretrievably lost. Indeed if it were complete we should expect all the 12 transitions between expositions to be inside single fragments, apart from any cases in which transitions happened to coincide with the ends or breaks of writing strips. The evidence for placing the fragments inside the framework will of course be of variable weight, and the critical reader, if he accepts the argument up to this point, may still make other choices in dividing and distributing the fragments. But even when the content of a fragment does not at first sight connect with any of the 13 propositions it is reasonable to postulate that it belongs somewhere in the document. In general the connexions in matter and phrasing are as close as between the *Canons* and their *Explanations*; this

¹¹ Cf. p. 141 above.

¹² EC 10 n. 1 below.

¹³ Cf. pp. 144-5 below.

¹⁴ Cf. p. 139 above.

point being granted, the fact that all ethical fragments *can* fit into a context in one or other of the 13 sections becomes evidence that they *do*. If we tried to distribute all the ethical fragments among any sequence of 13 in the *Canons* we might have a few fortuitous successes, but we would not find plausible positions for all of them.

Having secured a foothold in the apparent chaos of the *Ta-ch'ü*, let us reconsider the question of whether at the time of the dislocation the number of characters to a strip was 40, as elsewhere in *Mo-tzü* at some stage in its transmission. There are grounds for thinking that this question is answerable, although for reasons which will soon emerge we shall take no further account of it in the present reconstruction. When listing the five framework fragments above¹⁵ we noted the number of characters to each, 66, 63, 201, 102, 35. It is remarkable that all these figures¹⁶ are within or very close to the multiples of 33/34. Now there is a well-known transposition of two sequences in the *Canons*, as well as a passage which seems to be misplaced from some other document;¹⁷ the numbers of characters are as follows:

Canons A 90, 91 (2B/3-6) 32 characters

B 14b-20, 21-23 (4A/4-4B/7) 66, 35

It would seem then that in a certain damaged copy of the dialectical chapters the number to a strip was 33/34, amounting to 100 characters to every three strips. But unfortunately there is reason to suspect a further dislocation at the stage when *Mo-tzü* was written on 40-character strips. There are two fragments with approximate multiples of 40 characters, and these are suspiciously close together in the text as we reconstruct it;

EC 1	Fragment A (26) characters	TC 3A/7, 8
	B 80	2A/3-7
EC 2	C (19)	3A/2, 3
	D (12)	4B/5, 6
	E 119	5B/3-6A/2
	F (9)	3A/8-3B/1

One explanation of the dislocation could be that C and D are scraps of a broken strip and that BCDE were a sequence of six 40-character strips dispersed by the snapping of the bands at this point, leaving nothing between A and F. As a matter of fact F does follow immediately on to A in the present text of the *Ta-ch'ü* (TC 3A/8). Moreover if we look at the present position of Fragment B in the *Ta-ch'ü* we find that this suggestion accounts for the anomaly at the beginning of the chapter which we have

already noticed.¹⁸ The compiler started off with the very longest fragment at his disposal, followed by the two which are related to it by parallel definitions. In between the latter he found a place for two scraps related in subject matter. But in the text as we have it there is also a longer interruption which we cannot account for on grounds of content, the 80 characters of Fragment B:

TC 1A/3-1B/6	201 characters	} 276 characters
1B/6-2A/2	63	
2A/2	5	
2A/2, 3	7	
(2A/3-7)	(80)	
2A/7-2B/5	102	

It would seem that after the chapter was transferred to 40-character strips Fragment B (two strips) intruded after the first seven strips of the chapter (276 characters).

But if at one stage there were transpositions of 33/34 character and at another of 40-character strips, not to mention the fragmentation of strips and the compiler's apparent reluctance to copy incomplete phrases, the practical application of these hypotheses becomes extremely complicated. We can no longer take it for granted even that sequences of short scraps must have resulted from the assembling of broken strips; the same effect might follow from dislocation at the 33/34 and 40 character stages happening to overlap (although under very limited conditions, the fulfilment of which would be significant in itself). The present reconstruction is based on the content of fragments, and ignores the problem of recovering their position at different stages in the history of the text. But the problem may not be insoluble for an inquirer stronger in mathematics than myself; if successful, he would be able to reduce the possibilities of arbitrary choice indulged in the present reconstruction.

There remain the fragments which discuss logical problems in the manner of the *Hsiao-ch'ü*. Some of these can be arranged in a sequence with the aid of a resumptive passage, "In the first case we say that it is this thing and is so, in the second that it is this thing but is not so, in the third that it has changed in place, in the fourth . . .".¹⁹ At the beginning of this sequence one is gratified to find the other of the two embedded titles, *Ming shih* 名實 "Names and objects". We have then the opening passage of a second document. Examining the remaining fragments we find our suspicions increasing that the compiler could not distinguish between the *Names and Objects* and fragments detached from the *Hsiao-ch'ü* source. Two

¹⁵ Cf. p. 142 above.

¹⁶ As emended in the present edition the numbers become 67, 66, 200, 102, 35; all except the last are within the range of multiples of 33 and 34. But there may of course have been corruption before the transposition of the strips.

¹⁷ Cf. pp. 146-7 below.

¹⁸ Cf. p. 143 above.

¹⁹ NO 4 below.

neatly dovetailing fragments about the *ts'ü* 辭 "sentence/proposition" seem to belong to the discussion of propositions in the *Hsiao-ch'ü*, while an apparently random series of definitions in the *Hsiao-ch'ü* turns out to have a definite sequence when related to a passage in *Names and Objects*.²⁰ At first one does not doubt that the *Hsiao-ch'ü* source was a separate document, since the long passage on disputation with which it begins has the look of a formal introduction. But this impression vanishes when one finds reason to break up the passage by inserting material from the *Ta-ch'ü* and also, as we shall see in due course, from the *Canons*. Finally one is driven to the conclusion that both chapters contain the remains of only two treatises, *Expounding the Canons* and *Names and Objects*. The "Bigger pick" is simply a scrap-heap of fragments which the compilers despaired of reducing to order (including the whole of *Expounding the Canons*). The "Smaller pick" consists of the pieces which the compilers succeeded in fitting together to make a consecutive chapter. It consists of 732 characters of *Names and Objects* (the longest fragment at his disposal), preceded by bits of the same document joined together to make an introduction.

At the very end of the *Ta-ch'ü* there is a disturbing example of the confusion caused by juxtaposition of fragments which seemed to the compiler to have something in common. The chapter concludes with the list of analogies (*lei* 類) to the 13 propositions which is the key to the reconstruction, but introduced by the word *ku* 故 "therefore" and immediately following a section from *Names and Objects* on the analogies (*lei*) of sentences. The first fragment presumably broke off at *ku*, which is appropriate at the beginning of the *Hsiao-ch'ü* sentence before which we locate it. The fortuitous sharing of the word *lei* misled the compiler into establishing an artificial continuity.²¹

The fragments from the *Canons* which may come from *Names and Objects* are the *Canons* numbered by T'an Chieh-fu as A 90, 91 (2B/3-6) and two characters in A 93 (2B/7). A 90, 91 appear in *Mo-tzü* ch. 40 as four *Canons*; T'an Chieh-fu numbers them as two because he tries to account for their oddity by treating them as two *Canons* with their *Explanations*. (But there are no other instances of *Explanations* transferred from *Mo-tzü* ch. 42, 43 to the *Canons* to which they belong in ch. 40, 41, and it is very difficult to see how this could happen.) There are strong reasons for thinking that they come from some other source:

(1) Unless we accept T'an's hypothesis, they have no *Explanations*; the sequence of the *Explanations* in ch. 42 runs straight on from A 89 to A 92.

(2) They interrupt a consecutive series on the theme of similarity and difference (A 86-96).

²⁰ TC 5B/2, 3 and 6B/4-8 (NO 9, 10 below); HC 8A/1-3 (NO 5 below).

²¹ TC 6B/4-8 (NO 10 below) 6B/8-7B/3 (EC Appendix below).

(3) Unlike any other *Canons* in A 76-96 they end in *yeh* 也, reverting in this respect to the form of the definitions in A 1-75. Yet they do not look like definitions, and the *yeh* "saying" of A 91 (2 B/5 言, 口之利也 "Saying is fluency with the mouth.") has already been given a true definition in A 32 (2A/5 言, 出舉也 "Saying" is uttering references."). Indeed they do not look like *Canons* at all, but like four successive clauses in consecutive discourse.

(4) A 90, 91 have 32 characters, approximating to the 33/34 of a single intact strip.²²

(5) We twice find the word *hsin* 心 "mind". It cannot be an accident that such an important philosophical term appears nowhere else in the *Canons and Explanations* and is absent from the 75 terms defined in the first series of *Canons*. In its place we find *chih* 知 "intelligence/consciousness" (defined in A 3), used just where we might expect *hsin* (cf. A 23 (1B/8) 臥, 知無知也 "Sleep" is the consciousness not being conscious of anything.). *Hsin* does however appear elsewhere in *Mo-tzü*, including the *Hsiao-ch'ü*.²³

It seems clear that A 90, 91 have strayed into the *Canons* by the displacement of a single strip. The use of *hsin* shows that the fragment did not come from elsewhere in the *Canons and Explanations*, and that if it belongs to the dialectical chapters at all its place must be among the *dissecta membra* assembled in the *Ta-ch'ü* and *Hsiao-ch'ü*.

A little further on in the *Canons*, in A 93 (2B/7), we find after the unknown graph 說 (assumed by Sun to be 說 *na*) two characters which in the Taoist Patrology and all other early editions are printed small in the form of a gloss, 音利. One might take them as a phonetic gloss ("Pronounced *li*"); but the reading *li* seems not to fit the graph, and there are no other notes printed as glosses in the dialectical chapters. Sun and T'an emend one graph and try to fit them into the text (the latter placing them in A 46). We may suspect that they are a scrap from the same source as A 90, 91 (in which we have just noticed a curiously similar phrase, 口之利), mistaken for a phonetic gloss and therefore written in after the next obscure graph. Since the 32 characters of A 90, 91 are one or two short of the average for a strip (33/34), they could even be from the broken off end of the same strip.

Evidence of fragmentation in the *Hsiao-ch'ü* is confined to the introductory passages; the remaining three-quarters of the chapter is unquestionably homogeneous and consecutive, constituting about half of what remains of *Names and Objects*. For the first half, we have the resumptive passage which provides the key to the opening sequence; otherwise we can only shuffle and re-shuffle the pieces until they assume a plausible order, and any arrangement must be largely conjectural.

²² Cf. p. 144 above.

²³ HC 9B/4, 10A/3 (translated NO 15, 16 below).

1/2 Syntactic problems

The syntax of the *Ta-ch'ü* presents some difficulties.²⁴ A point which deserves close attention is the presence or absence of the particle *yeh* 也 after nominal units at the head of the sentence, which seems at first sight to be quite arbitrary. Throughout the six dialectical chapters, in spite of the damaged state of the text, the use of this particle nearly always conforms to strict rules, an understanding of which clears up many obscurities. When not final the particle appears in only four constructions:

(1) *Yeh* is common after a nominalized verbal phrase with "X *chih* 之" or *ch'i* 其 before the verb: EC 7 天之愛人也... 其利人也 "Heaven's loving man... Its benefiting man...". The rare examples of *yeh* after other kinds of verbal phrase at the head of the sentence seem to be corrupt: EC 8 害之中取小[也] "choosing the lesser among harms" (the *yeh* is missing in two parallels later in the section) EC 11 <?> 利人也 "(X's) benefiting man" (the broken beginning of a fragment).

A noun head preceded by "X *chih*" or *ch'i* is not followed by *yeh*: EC 2 昔者之愛人也... 昔之知牆 "Yesterday's loving men... Yesterday's walls of the intelligence". An apparent exception is corrupt: EC 3 其<事>親也 "Their serving their parents". It may be noticed that *yen* "saying" is treated as verbal: EC 2 見日之言也... 子墨子之言也 "speaking to benefit the current situation... our master Mo-tzü's speaking".

(2) *Yeh* is used to enforce a contrast after initial temporal words (B 32, (15B/3) 前也... 今也 "Previously... now on the other hand...": there is no *Ta-ch'ü* example) and after a proper name: EC 4 藉藏也死 "Supposing that of all men Jack were to die...".

(3) A subject preceded by the demonstrative *shih* is always followed by *yeh*: A 78 (10A/2, 3) 是名也 "This name..." B 53 (18A/6) 是聲也 "This sound...". The purpose is presumably to avoid confusion with a resumptive *shih* at the head of a clause, but *yeh* is once found even after an object early in the sentence: NO 1 敗是石也 "If you destroy this stone". The following sentence is therefore textually acceptable: NO 3 是璜也是玉也 "This half-disc is this jade".

(4) The embedded "(X)Y *yeh*" (X is Y) is exceptionally frequent. The recognition of phrases of this type (which generally cannot be interpreted otherwise without violating the rules governing *yeh* in these texts) often contributes substantially to understanding. The verbs which can precede such phrases have a much wider range than in most texts:

A 88 (8A/2, 3) 俱見(是樞也) "both see that it is a pillar"

B 53 (18A/4) 舉(友富商也) "mention a friend as a rich merchant"

B 53 (18A/5) 指(是臠也) "point out this as soup"

²⁴ Cf. Graham(5).

Ta-ch'ü examples are:

EC 7 以瑟爲(其親也)... 以樂爲利其子

"Suppose that Jack is his kin... Suppose that music benefits his son..."

EC 8 權非爲(是也), 非非爲(非也)

"Re-weighing the wrong as the right, condemning the wrong as the wrong..."

NO 3 意樞非意木也... 意(獲也)乃意禽也。

"Picturing a pillar is not picturing wood... picturing as being a catch of game is however picturing the birds."

A straightforward statement in *Names and Objects* (NO 1 是一人之指乃是一人也 "This one man's finger however is this one man") twice reappears in embedded phrases:

NO 3 意(指之人也)非意人也。

"Picturing a finger as being the man is not picturing a man."

NO 7 (指之人也)與(首之人也)異。

"A finger (pictured) as being the man and a head (pictured) as being the man are different things."

When we come to consider the logic of *Names and Objects*²⁵ it will be seen that the author is much concerned to distinguish the naming of an object ("X") from making a proposition about it ("X *yeh*"), so that his fondness for the embedded "X *yeh*" is easily understood.

A second construction which deserves notice is the quantification of the object by the construction "yu/wu 有/無 - verb - yü 於 - noun" (the words *huo* 或 "some" and *mo* 莫 "none" being confined to the subject). This is regular throughout the dialectical chapters (Cf. A 95 (12A/8) 有愛於人, 有不愛於人 "love some men and not love other men"), and accounts for the following extraordinary sentence:

NO 2 有有於秦馬, 有有於馬也

"To have some Ch'in horses is to have some horses."²⁶

Names and Objects contains the unique instance in the dialectical chapters of the conjunction *yen* 焉, not uncommon elsewhere in *Mo-tzü*. It generally appears to be synonymous with *jan-hou* 然後 and *erh-hou* 而後 "only then". But it seems that it is the same word as the final *yen* "in it", and that its basic sense is "only in it":

Mo-tzü ch. 46 (Sun 271/10) 夫倍義而鄉祿者, 我常聞之矣。倍祿而鄉義者, 於高石子焉見之也。

"I have often heard of men who did an about-face from duty to salary; only in Kao Shih tzü have I seen a man who did an about-face from salary to duty."

²⁵ Cf. p. 181 below.

²⁶ Cf. Graham(1) 11-14.

In general the dialectical chapters use only common particles, use them very strictly, and avoid synonyms with a rigour which I have nowhere noticed in other pre-Han philosophical texts. In the *Ta-ch'ü* example it therefore seems preferable to give *yen* the sense in which it is not synonymous with *jan-hou*, "only in it" (NO 2).

Finally we may notice that since the Mohist logicians are much concerned with the relations between X and Y in propositions of the form "X Y *yeh*" (X is Y), "X *fei* Y *yeh*" (X is not Y), "X *wei* Y" (X is deemed Y), they use certain words in a highly abstract way: *shih* 是 "being (this)" *fei* 非 "not being (it)" *wei* 爲 "being deemed (it)". Both *fei* and *wei* are common without complements: A 66 (9A/2) 相非, 是相外也 "Not being each other is excluding each other." A 96 (3A/1, 2) 正無非 "The exact has no respects in which it is not." A 83 (10A/8) 咸之爲 "Jack being deemed such-and-such" A 89 (11A/3) 鶴爲 "The crane is deemed such-and-such." (Cf. NO 2, 4, 5, 6.)

1/3 Dating

There is little evidence for the absolute dating of the dialectical chapters; as with *Lao-tzū* 老子 and much of *Chuang-tzū* and *Kuan-tzū* we can at present say little more than that their place in the development of pre-Han thought forbids us to date them much earlier or later than 300 B.C. But the relative dating of the documents is a different matter. It will be shown in Part 3/3 below that *Names and Objects* criticizes the logic of names in the *Canons* and *Explanations* and develops a logic of propositions. But it is not so obvious that *Expounding the Canons* is also later in date. The facts that its title does not distinguish its canons from those of *Mo-tzū* ch. 40, 41, and that the example of a canon in EC 1 is the "Will of Heaven" (one of the 10 theses of early Mohism), suggest the possibility that this may be the earliest Mohist essay in the form of codified propositions followed by expositions.

We can find support for this suspicion in the organization of the *Canons* and *Explanations*. Their division into two parts (*Mo-tzū* ch. 40 and 41, 42 and 43) is arbitrary, since A 88-B 12 make a consecutive sequence in which A 95b pairs with B 1. The natural break is between the definitions and analyses of ambiguities (A 1-87) and the theses (A 88-96, B 1-82). Within the two major divisions we can recognize subdivisions in which one topic is maintained with a consistency which editors have not always recognized. (When, for example, T'an Chieh-fu explains the obscure B 11 as a proposition in mechanics, we are entitled to object that the theme throughout A 88-B 12 is logic, and that mechanics is discussed only in B 24-29). Now it is remarkable that there is no sequence of theses on what for Mohists is the most important topic of all, ethics. We can even point out the place where we should expect such a sequence, between B 12 and

B 13; for the two major divisions appear to treat the same topics in the same order:

Definitions		Theses	
A 1-6	"Reason", "knowing", "thinking"	A 88-B 12	Logic
A 7-38	Ethics	—	—
A 39-51	Space, time and change	B 13-15	Space, time and change
A 52-69	Geometry	B 16-31	Optics, mechanics, economics
A 70-75	Disputation	B 32-82	Problems in disputation

It would seem that ethics is omitted in the second division because it has already been treated in *Expounding the Canons*, just as the first division ignores terms already dealt with in the lost definitions of words in the 10 theses of Mo-tzū.²⁷ We may notice also that *Expounding the Canons* itself contains a series of four definitions (EC 7-10), all of terms undefined in the *Canons*. Two are of single words, *ch'iu* 求 "seeking" and *ch'üan* 權 "weighing". *Ch'üan* is used in the *Canons* in A 84 in the analysis of *yü* 欲 "desire" and *wu* 惡 "dislike", the two terms on which the entire ethical system is based.²⁸ Would it have been left undefined unless the definition in *Expounding the Canons* was already available? *Ch'iu* is used in one of the first definitions in the *Canons*:

A 4 (1A/4) 慮, 求也。

"Thinking" is seeking."

This looks like a very vague definition; but it is a very precise one (of a word narrower than the English "thinking" in that it is used in the context of practical rather than theoretical problems), if it is assuming the definition of *ch'iu* in EC 7, "Weighing light and heavy in the sphere of conduct is what is meant by 'seeking'".

A further argument for the earlier date of *Expounding the Canons* depends on linguistic evidence assembled in *Grammar of the Mohist dialectical chapters*.²⁹ The *Canons* and *Explanations* avoid synonyms in the use of particles, with a regularity which implies deliberate policy (using for example *yi* 已 "already" but not *chi* 既, *erh-hou* 而後 "only then" but not *jan-hou* 然後); the *Ta-ch'ü* and *Hsiao-ch'ü* show a few divergences, some of which suggest a further refining of the system. But when the usages of *Expounding the Canons* and *Names and Objects* are separated (in *Grammar of the Mohist dialectical chapters* they are not) it can be seen that the possibility of later refinement is real only for the latter. In *Expounding the Canons* we find examples of *chi* "already" (EC 1, 8) and *jan-hou* "only then" (EC 2), but nothing to suggest even a general adherence

²⁷ Cf. p. 164 below.

²⁸ Cf. p. 165 below.

²⁹ Graham(5).

to the system. We may conclude that this document was written earlier than the decision to establish a perfectly uniform use of particles, which we may suppose to have been a by-product of the great enterprise of co-ordinating definitions and systematizing the principles of disputation in the *Canons* and *Explanations*.

PART 2. THE 13 CANONS AND THE *Yü ching* 語經
"EXPOUNDING THE CANONS"

2/1. Text, notes and translation

EC 1

(a) *Chinese Text*, see p. 180

(b) *Textual Notes*

1. *Ch'in-yin* "soak in by degrees" (M.17505/5).
2. *Yü ching yeh* "expound as being a canon"; for the syntax cf. Part 1/2 above.
3. "Reject the 'white horse' in it but uphold the 'colt' in it." The reference is to two sophisms, "A white horse is not a horse" (白馬非馬 *Kung-sun Lung tzü* 公孫龍子 ch. 2) and presumably a parallel "A colt is not a horse" (unattested, but cf. 狗非犬 "A whelp is not a dog", *Chuang-tzü* ch. 33 Kuo 1106/3, 4).
4. Transpose on grounds of parallelism.
5. Sun emends *wu* "dance" to *wu* 無 "there is not" (Sun 255/8); but with the reconstitution of the passage it can be seen to connect with the *ko* "sing" of the next fragment. Apparently the debater's "song" is his main thesis, his "dance" the secondary thesis which "soaks into it" and changes its significance.
6. *NGIO may be the *NGIO "expound" which is elsewhere in EC 1 written with its regular graph 語 (but the interchange is unattested).
7. *T'ien-chih* "Will of Heaven", *chih* 志 (originally 志) written without the radical as 之, as sometimes in the *T'ien-chih* chapters (Sun. 123/2).
8. Although the verb *chih* "uphold" of the first sentence of the exposition is common (cf. *Mo-tzū* ch. 31, Sun 144/3 執無鬼 "hold that there are no spirits") a nominal use ("what one upholds, thesis") is unattested in most of *Mo-tzū*; but there seem to be examples in the obscure *Canon* and *Explanation* of A 93 (11A/6 求執之法 "seek a standard for the thesis").
9. Restored on grounds of parallelism.
10. *Wei wo* "egoism", the teaching of the individualist Yang Chu 楊朱 (*Mencius* 7A/26).
11. *Jen fei* "other men's disapproval" (M.344/410).

(c) *Translation*

("Propositions which soak in insidiously.")

Expounding the Canons. When I expound something as being canonical, if I reject "A white horse is not a horse" for it but uphold "A colt is not a horse" for it, when I seek to prove it my "dance" (the secondary thesis) proves what I reject, when the exposition magnifies it my "dance" magnifies what I reject. If on behalf of a criminal I expound the Will of Heaven as being the right thing, but also that it is his nature to be a criminal, I "sing" (present as the main thesis) the Will of Heaven as being the wrong thing. If among the proposed theses there is already one that he is for, and I propose the theses on behalf of him, the thesis that he is for will find a basis in the one that I am for. If among the proposed theses there is not yet one that he is for, but I propose the theses on behalf of him, the proposed theses will find a basis in the one which I am for. The criminal will think that "every man for himself" is the Will of Heaven and that what men condemn is the right thing, and his nature will be incorrigible.

(d) *General Note*

Judging by the exposition, propositions which "soak in by degrees" (*ch'in-yin*) are tenets which one accepts as innocent but which turn out to alter the significance of doctrines in which one believes. For example, to admit that it is someone's nature to be a criminal implies that Heaven intended him to be a criminal (since our nature is what we receive from Heaven), and justifies his criminality as obedience to the Will of Heaven, prescribed in one of the ten basic doctrines of Mo-tzū. It is like undermining one's defence of common sense against Kung-sun Lung's "A white horse is not a horse" by conceding that a colt is not a horse. This is the only reference in *Mo-tzū* to the problem of human nature which so obsessed Confucians. But there is other evidence of Mohist concern with the "egoism" (*wei wo*) of Yang Chu, who taught that one should "keep one's nature intact and protect one's genuineness" (全性保真 *Huai-nan tzü* 淮南子 13, 7A/12-7B/1). The story of a debate between Yang Chu and Mo-tzū's chief disciple Ch'in Ku-li 禽骨簾, apparently from a Mohist source (Graham (4) 296 f.) survives in *Lieh-tzū* 列子 (7, 4B-5A), and *Mo-tzū* contains stories of the founder himself refuting egoism in ch. 46 (Sun 272/5-14) and at the beginning of ch. 47 (Sun 275/1-5).

To "expound the Will of Heaven as being the right thing" is presented as an example of "expounding something as being canonical". Although the author is expounding the 13 propositions themselves as *ching* "canons" (the *Canons* of *Mo-tzū* ch. 40, 41 on our hypothesis did not yet exist), what he recognized as canonical would be above all the ten basic doctrines of Mo-tzū developed in the ten triads of chapters which are the core of the book (ch. 8-37). If we look at the three *T'ien-chih* chapters we do in fact

find that the last ends with the sentence "The Will of Heaven is the canon of righteousness" (Sun 141/5 天之志者義之經也). Yü "expound" also appears in a five times repeated formula in a story of Mo-tzü describing how he expounds his ten doctrines (*Mo-tzü* ch. 49, Sun 299/4-7: one example is 則語之尊天事鬼 "... then I expound to them reverence for Heaven and service to the spirits.").

EC 2

(a) *Chinese Text*, see p. 183

(b) *Textual Notes*

1. Emended on grounds of parallelism.
2. *Ch'ing* 情 (here written with radical 149, as in NO 9 and often in *Mo-tzü* cf. Sun 50/6) is what X genuinely is in itself, what is conveyed by its definition, that without which it would not be X; it has a precise sense in pre-Han philosophy surprisingly close to the Aristotelian essence (Graham (3) 259-265).

3. Here and in EC 3 *chih* appears to be used nominally as equivalent to the phrase 人之所執 ("what is under others' control") in EC 8. Cf. the nominal use of *chih* "uphold" in EC 1 (n. 8).

4. ? = 育撫 (T'an 221).

5, 6. Tsang ("Jack") and Huo ("Jill") were abusive names for bondsman and bondswoman (*Fang yen* 方言 3, 1B), used as typical names of the humblest people ("any Tom, Dick or Harry") in the dialectical chapters as elsewhere (*Han Fei tzü* 韓非子 7, 3B/12 *Huai-nan tzü* 9, 14B/1).

7. *Chih*, noun "the intelligence". The *Canons* (A 3-6) distinguish by successive definitions a noun *chih* 知 "the intelligence, the consciousness", a transitive verb *chih* 智 "know" and a stative verb *chih* 愜 "wise" (the word commonly written 智). Admittedly the second word is written without the radical like the first in the surviving texts, not only in A 3-6 but throughout the first three dialectical chapters (*Mo-tzü* ch. 40-42), from which point however the radical regularly appears, in most Part B Explanations and in the *Ta-ch'ü*. Evidently it had been eliminated by graphic standardization, by a scribe who gave up the task half way through.

8. *Ch'iang* "wall" does not require emendation, as has been supposed (Sun 258/-5). The significance of a wall or house as an illustration in pre-Han thought is commonly that one does not know by observation what lies beyond or inside (*Analects* 19/23, *Lao-tzü* 47 *Hsün-tzü* ch. 12, Liang 171/8). The later Mohists, with a more sophisticated interest in problems of knowing, use "inside the house", or "beyond the wall" to illustrate what can and what cannot be known "a priori": *Explanations* B 70 (20B/3) 外, 親智也。室中, 說智也 "What is outside is known by experience, what is within the house is known by explanation": A 75 (9B/4) 廟外之利害未可知也

"The benefit or harm beyond the wall is not yet knowable": A 70 (11A/4) 超城, 員止也。相從相去, 先知是可 "When you go over the wall the circle remains as determined. By what it agrees with or departs from one may know beforehand that a circle is this." Here similarly what the sage "desires beforehand" for man is contrasted with the desires which arise in the concrete situations outside the "walls of the intelligence".

9. "Three things": love, thought and benefit. (For the use of *wu* "thing" cf. *Mo-tzü* ch. 15, 19 (Sun 70/5, 95/-1), where objectors describe universal love as "an impracticable thing" 不可行之物 and aggressive war as a "profitable thing" 利物).

10. = 見? (unattested). The reading would be *hsien* (later distinguished by the graph 現), in the sense of "present, at hand" (M 34796 def. 7).

(c) *Translation*

("The sage's concern being for the whole world.")

That the sage dislikes critical illness but not dangers and difficulties, and sits straight without moving, is because he desires the benefit of others, not because he dislikes losing his own health. Anything that the sage desired or disliked beforehand on behalf of men, men necessarily learn about from him by considering what it is in itself; but in the case of a desire or dislike born from the conditions they encounter, they do not necessarily learn from him by considering what it is in itself. The sage's fostering care is benevolent but without the loving which involves benefiting. The loving which involves benefiting is born of thinking. Yesterday's thinking is not today's thinking, yesterday's love of man is not today's love of man. The love of man involved in loving Jill is born from thinking about Jill's benefit, not from thinking about Jack's benefit; but the love of man involved in loving Jack is the love of man involved in loving Jill. Even if to get rid of the love of them would benefit the world one cannot get rid of it. Yesterday's "walls of the intelligence" are not today's "walls of the intelligence". Only when the three things ("love", "thought", "benefit") are present together are they sufficient to generate the enjoyments of benefit in the world. The sage has love but does not have pronouncements which benefit current situations, that is, pronouncements about the transient. If there were no men at all in the world, our master Mo-tz's pronouncements would still stand.

EC 3

(a) *Chinese Text*, see p. 184

(b) *Textual Notes*

1. The syntax of *yeh* requires restoration of a verb at this point (Part 1/2 above), which might however be *li* 利 "benefit" (preferred T'an 222 Chang Ch'i-huang 3A/3).

(c) *Translation*

("The one who lives long and the one who dies young are equally beneficial to the world.")

In the matter of righteousness being beneficial and unrighteousness harmful, one must distinguish between aim and achievement. Aim and achievement cannot be assumed to coincide.

One exalted to the throne of the Empire is not more beneficial to man than any ordinary fellow. Of two sons serving their parents, if one chances on a good harvest and the other on a bad but they serve their parents equally, it is not that the former's conduct is improved, nor that anything is added to it. No external condition can make me more beneficial.

EC 4

(a) *Chinese Text*, see p. 184

(b) *Translation*

("Even if a million were born in one day there would not be more love.")

Supposing that the whole world would be harmed if of all men Jack were to die, I would make a point of caring for Jack 10,000 times more, but would not love Jack more.

EC 5

(a) *Chinese Text*, see p. 184

(b) *Textual Notes*

1. Delete following Sun 255/-2.
2. *Yu* 又 "also" is regularly written with this graph in the dialectal chapters.
3. This is a *Names and Objects* fragment, accidentally written in here but also preserved in its proper place and uncorrupted in the *Hsiao-ch'ü* (NO 18).
4. Restored from what seems to be a parallel phrase in the next sentence.
5. Restored on grounds of parallelism (Sun 254/-2).

(c) *Translation*

("In loving two generations we love some men more or less than others, yet we love the two generations equally.")

Love of many generations and love of few are equal, and equal also to the collective love of them. Love of past and future generations are alike equal to love of the present generation.

To think Yü important for the sake of the world is to be for the kind of man Yü was; loving Yü more for the sake of the world is loving for the

sake of the kind of man Yü was. We think it important that Yü was added to the world but do not extend the importance from Yü to the world, just as we dislike robbers being added to the world but do not extend the dislike from robbers to the world.

(d) *General Note*

Love of a man is "for the sake of the man he is" (EC 11 爲其人也); we therefore love the sage Yü more than other men, "for the sake of the man Yü was" (爲禹之人). But this does not imply that we love the men of Yü's age more than we love contemporaries. Our love is not extended to the other men of his time, any more than our dislike of a robber is extended to all other men.

EC 6

(a) *Chinese Text*, see p. 184

(b) *Textual Notes*

1. Delete, following Sun (257/1).
2. *Chuan sha* "kill on one's own authority" cf. *Mencius* 6B/7.
3. Restore on grounds of parallelism.

(c) *Translation*

("Loving them equally, we choose one among them and kill him.")

We know that there are robbers in this generation, but love the whole of this generation; we know there is a robber in this family, but he is not all this family; we know that one of two men is a robber, but he is not both the men; and even the one of them who is a robber, if we do not know where he is . . .

. . . is not to kill Jack, to kill a robber on your own authority is not to kill a robber. Speaking in general, when we learn to love men, if they are equally beneficial to the world there is nothing to choose between them; if a man's life or death are equally beneficial there is nothing to choose between them. Killing one man to save the world is not killing one man to benefit the world; giving one's own life to save the world is giving one's life to benefit the world.

(d) *General Note*

According to the Mohist doctrine love should vary with the worth of its object (EC 5, 7), so that the man we kill although we love him as much as others can hardly be the robber (as supposed in Graham (1) 29). The issue appears to be the problem of killing innocent individuals, oneself or others, for the sake of the rest (as in self-sacrifice or the execution of a robber's whole family; that the Mohists approved the latter for serious crimes is confirmed by the list of prohibitions and penalties in *Mo-tzü* ch. 70). But

the text is so mutilated that the sequence of the argument is lost. Possibly the point was that it is beneficial to the world for the ruler to kill the kinsmen of a robber who has escaped but harmful for a private person to defy authority by killing the robber, so that it may be better to kill the innocent than the guilty; but this is no more than a guess.

Since self-love and love of others are granted quite equal status (EC 10) it is at first sight hard to understand why "killing one man to save the world is *not* killing one man to benefit the world" although "giving one's own life to save the world is giving one's own life to benefit the world". But it appears from the second of the three fragments that the theme at this point is "killing a robber on your own authority". A private person may sacrifice his own life to benefit the world; but if he kills another man to save the world (instead of handing the criminal over to the proper authorities) he is harming the world by disrupting public order.

EC 7

(a) *Chinese Text*, see pp. 184-5

(b) *Textual Notes*

1. Restore on grounds of parallelism (Sun 254/5).
2. The parallelism of the last pair of arguments requires this deletion (Sun 253/-6).

(c) *Translation*

("The conduct of the slightly benevolent and the highly benevolent are of equal worth.")

Weighing light and heavy in the sphere of conduct is what is meant by "seeking how to act". To seek to do something is not to do it, to seek to act righteously is not to act righteously. Heaven loves man less than the sage does, but benefits him more than the sage does. The great man loves the small man less than he is loved by the small man, but benefits the small man more than he is benefited by the small man. Loving Jack on the assumption that he is one's kin is loving one's kin, but benefiting Jack on the same assumption is not benefiting one's kin. Desiring music for one's son on the assumption that it benefits him is loving one's son, but seeking music for him on the same assumption is not benefiting one's son.

(d) *General Note*

Sun Yi-jiang took the *jen* 仁 of the proposition as equivalent to *jen* 人 "man". But the reconstructed exposition does not seem to be defending the claim that "The conduct of the small man and the great man are of equal worth". It may be noticed that although *jen* "benevolence" is a virtue for Mohists as for Confucians, the single instance of the word elsewhere in the *Ta-ch'ü* is in a reference to being "benevolent but without the loving which involves benefiting" (EC 2). The Mohist judges a man, not by his degree

of personal benevolence, but by the extent to which his benevolence is realized in effective action. He therefore points out that there is no necessary proportion between loving and benefiting. Thus a man is not really benefited by music (an art which Confucians valued but Mohists condemned); to desire music for one's son is to be benevolent without effectively benefiting.

EC 8

(a) *Chinese Text*, see p. 185

(b) *Textual Notes*

1. Unless this *yeh* is emended to *che* 者 (Sun 253/-1) we must delete it on syntactic grounds (cf. Part 1/2 above).
2. The sequence of the argument suggests that the sacrificed limb should be not the finger but the arm (*wan*, written in this section with both the graphs 腕 and 𦵏 = 𦵏).
3. The two scraps which we have fitted in at this point will completely fill the gap if we make this and another minor emendation (n. 5 below). But we can have no confidence that the text is not more seriously mutilated.
4. Deleted following Sun 256/6.
5. Cf. n. 3 above. The same two characters are confused in EC 5, Appendix 5, NO 9.

(c) *Translation*

("Promoting the beneficial is eliminating the harmful.")

Weighing light and heavy among the factors between which one chooses is what is meant by "weighing". The wrong when weighed turning out to be the right, and the wrong condemned as the wrong, are the judgment after weighing and the judgment which is direct. Cutting off a finger to save an arm is choosing the larger among benefits and the smaller among harms. Choosing the smaller among harms is not choosing the harmful but choosing the beneficial; the choices open to you are under the control of others. When you encounter a robber, to save your life at the cost of an arm is beneficial, the encounter with the robber is harmful. Cutting off a finger and cutting off an arm are choosing the smaller among harms; one desires them because one has no alternative, it is not that one desires them directly. Choosing the larger among benefits is not a matter of having no alternative, choosing the smaller among harms is a matter of having no alternative. Choosing between things you do not yet have is choosing the greater among benefits; renouncing one or other of things you already have is choosing the smaller among harms.

(d) *General Note*

The weighing of relative benefits and harms was a common concern of the Mohists and of individualists such as Yang Chu; its typical illustration

is generally the sacrifice of one member of the body to save another (*Explanation A* 75 (9A/8-9B/7) *Mo-tzu* ch. 47 (Sun 253/7-254/3) *Lü-shih ch'un-ch'iu* ch. 21/4 (Hsü 1011/6-8, 1014/5-1015/2) *Lieh-tzu* ch. 7 (Yang 146/2-11). Mencius uses this illustration when he describes moral development as a matter of preferring the "major member" to the "minor" (大體, 小體 *Mencius* 6A/14 cf. Graham (3) 243); and in the present passage it is already implied in the opening words *so t'i* 所體 "the factors one chooses between" (lit. "what one treats as the members"). The passage also assumes a distinction between desires which are "direct" (正) and desires after "the weighing of benefits" (權利), laid down in *Canon A* 84 (cf. p. 165 below).

EC 9

(a) *Chinese Text*, see p. 185

(b) *Textual Notes*

1. *Ch'iang* "encourage" (M. 9815 def. 2/4).
2. *Wang* (=忘) "forget" (Sun 255/4). Cf. *Chuang-tzu* ch. 14, 29 (Kuo 498/-1, 990/2) 忘親 "forget parents".
3. *Li* (=禮), "ceremony" (M. 45291 def. 23); we find the reverse substitution of graphs in *Explanations A* 45 (8A/6).
4. *Chieh* (=竭) "exhaust" (M. 17788 def. 2/2).

(c) *Translation*

("Do not justify doing more for parents than for others by their conduct, but do pay attention to their conduct.")

Doing more for those for whom duty requires more, less for those for whom duty requires less, is what is meant by "arranging according to grade". Men whose acts deserve gratitude, rulers, superiors, the aged, one's elders, are all persons for whom one does more. Doing more for a man because he is elder, one does not do less for a man because he is younger. One does more or less according to degrees of kinship, as far as the remotest degree which does not impose a duty. "Do not justify doing more for parents by their conduct, but do pay attention to their conduct" encourages sons to recognize what is deep or shallow in their parents, to improve them where they can be improved, honour them where they deserve honour.

By the standard laid down by the sage you forget your parents when they die, for the sake of the world. Doing more for parents than for others is your portion, and finishes with the rites of death and farewell.

EC 10

(a) *Chinese Text*, see p. 186

(b) *Textual Notes*

1. Emended on grounds of parallelism with the introductory definitions of EC 7-9.

2. *Fei hsien yeh* "is not for the sake of one's worth" cf. *Shih-tzu* 尸子 SPPY, A 10A/8f 父母之所(以)畜子者, 非賢強也. "Parents' care for children is not for the sake of their worth or strength."

(c) *Translation*

("That one may learn not to be concerned for oneself alone.")

To do more for some than for others in promoting the beneficial, but without arranging according to grade, is what is meant by "benefiting being for the sake of oneself".

Love of men does not exclude myself, I am myself among those I love. Being myself among those I love, my love being extended to myself, is the love of self and others which arranges according to grade . . . Jack's love of of himself is not for the sake of the others who love him. Those for whom one does more do not exclude oneself, but the love is neither more nor less; giving special attention to oneself is not on account of one's worth . . .

Knowing one thing of benefit to one's parents is not sufficient to be judged filial; it falls short of knowing the benefiting of parents which is not for the sake of oneself.

(d) *General Notes*

From EC 10 onwards the expositions are more and more seriously mutilated. The introductory passage can be fixed, because it follows on to EC 9 on one fragment. Three more fragments appear to belong with it; the last has a parallel in EC 11 with which it was juxtaposed by the compiler of the *Ta-ch'ü*. It may be guessed that they were parallel conclusions of the two adjacent expositions.

Apparently the Mohist is arguing that one can learn from self-love how to love others; it is a pity that textual mutilation allows us only a glimpse of this important argument. It seems that self-love serves as a model for love of others in the following respects:

- (1) Self-love is not for the sake of others who love one (and similarly love of others should not be for the sake of oneself).
- (2) The special care owed to one's person does not imply greater love (any more than the greater care owed to ruler or parents, EC 9-12).
- (3) Special care of oneself is not on account of one's excellence (just as the care of parents is independent of their moral conduct, EC 9).

EC 11

(a) *Chinese Text*, see p. 186

(b) *Textual Notes*

1. The first words of the phrase are lost (cf. p. 148 above).
2. Transpose on grounds of parallelism (Sun 256/-2).
3. Delete the two repeated graphs.

4. = 遺, as in *Canon B* 39 (6A/2). Cf. also *A* 75 (9B/1, 2) 無遺於其害也 "overlook none of the harm in it".

(c) *Translation*

("Love of men is not for the sake of praise.")

... benefiting a man is for the sake of the man he is. Enriching a man is not for the sake of the man he is, one enriches him for some special purpose; and governing men is partly for the sake of the spirits. Benefiting one man for the sake of reward or praise is not benefiting men for the sake of reward or praise; it falls short of applying to men without exception.

EC 12

(a) *Chinese Text*, see p. 186

(b) *Textual Notes*

1. We arbitrarily restore a missing verb (which may equally well have been *sha* 殺 "kill" cf. EC 6).

(c) *Translation*

("Love is as much for others' parents as for one's own.")

... is because he dislikes harm to other men. The sage's concern is not for his own family, the reason for (loving?) Jack resides in Jack. The sage does not get to perform the services of a son ...

EC 13

(a) *Chinese Text*, see p. 186

(b) *Translation*

("Collective love and love of an individual are equal.")

(c) *General Note*

The worst damage was evidently to the last strips of the document. There is only one fragment which is plausibly placed among the last two expositions. Even this is so disjointed that one is tempted to divide it further and distribute the bits among earlier sections.

EC (Appendix)

(a) *Chinese Text*, see pp. 186-7

(b) *Textual Notes*

1. Emended (following Chang Ch'i-huang, 7B/1) on the evidence of the syntax of *yeh* (Cf. p. 148 above).

2. Emended following Sun 259/-3.

3. Emended following Sun 259/-3.

4. = 變 (Sun 260/4).

5. Emended from the parallel in EC 9.

6. For the phrase *lieh t'u* "hunter" in a Mohist fragment, cf. Sun 491/2.

7. Repetition deleted with Sun 260/8.

8. 也=蛇, attested here as a variant (Sun 260/8). Cf. *Canon B* 39 (6A/2) 春也 "the spring snakes", where the second graph is convincingly identified as *she* "snake" by Kao Heng (Kao 158).

(c) *Translation*

1. Propositions which soak in insidiously: analogy, "..."

2. The sage's concern being for the whole world: analogy, "going after someone who has lost his way".

3. The one who lives long and the one who dies young are equally beneficial to the world: analogy, "the poisonous stone".

4. Even if a million were born in one day there would not be more love: analogy, "disliking harm".

5. In loving two generations we love some men more or less than others, yet we love the two generations equally: analogy, "the markings on a snake".

6. Loving them equally, we choose one among them and kill him: analogy, "the rat down a hole".

7. The conduct of the slightly benevolent and of the highly benevolent are of equal worth: analogy, "..."

8. Promoting the beneficial is eliminating the harmful: analogy, "the leaking pot".

9. Do not justify doing more for parents than for others by their conduct, but do pay attention to their conduct: analogy, "the well by the river".

10. That one may learn not to be concerned for oneself alone: analogy, "the hunter".

11. Love of men is not for the sake of praise: analogy, "the inn".

12. Love is as much for others' parents as for one's own: analogy, "..."

13. Collective love and love of an individual are equal: analogy, "the dead snake".

(d) *General Note*

The list of analogies was put by the compiler of the *Ta-ch'ü* at the end of the chapter. This suggests that it was either the conclusion of *Expounding the Canons* or an independent document; the compiler would recognize the final strip, if intact, by the fact that it was not filled, and perhaps by some scribal note. It is not likely that this is the list of the 13 propositions which we would expect at the head of *Expounding the Canons*, since the expositions have nothing to do with the analogies. Presumably it was a memorandum of analogies useful for defending the propositions in debate. There is evidence

that the illustrations introduced by *jo* 若 "like, for example", which are scattered throughout the *Explanations* of the *Canons* and often seem to be misplaced, come from a memorandum of the same kind, noting analogies to concepts and propositions in both *Canons* and *Explanations*. I formerly assumed that they were glosses (Graham (1) 24 n. 1), but have since noticed that in most cases there is a word or phrase shared by the present and the original context which looks as though it may have served as the reference. Thus we find the word *hsi* "shift" in both B 13-14 (13A/3, 4) 南北在*旦, 有(=又)在莫, 字徙久。("The North and the South are present at dawn and again at sunset; the shifting of Space has duration") and three sections later in B 16 (4B/2, 3) 景不*徙 ("A shadow does not shift"); and in the *Explanation* of the latter we find an illustration which surely belongs to the former: 13A/6 若在盡古息 "For example, when presence is finished the past ceases".

It would seem that *Expounding the Canons* did not contain the 13 propositions themselves (just as the *Explanations of the Canons* in *Mo-tzū* ch. 42, 43 are separated from the *Canons*). But very fortunately for us the propositions had to be quoted (possibly in abridged form) in the appended list of analogies. These analogies remain mysterious; in the absence of further information there is little point in discussing them.

2/2. The ethical system of the later Mohists

The later Mohist ethic is an achievement quite without parallel in Chinese philosophy, a highly rationalized ethical system in which all key terms are defined and their implications developed with lucidity and ruthless consistency. Confucianism throughout the whole of its history never achieved, or indeed wanted to achieve, a comparable systematization of its ethic. Among points of especial interest we may note its radical utilitarianism, combined with an attitude to the individual curiously suggestive of the Kantian conception of men as ends in themselves, its concern with the relative value of aim and performance, and its doctrines of the "equality" (相若 "being as much as each other") of the love owed to men and of the worth of action irrespective of the social position of the agent.

The ethical definitions are scattered over the series which occupies most of the first half of the *Canons* (A 1-75), followed by lists of the senses of ambiguous words (A 76-87). Studying these one notices that the *Canons* never define words in the 10 theses of Mo-tzū, which are the titles of the 10 triads of chapters in *Mo-tzū* ch. 8-37,¹ although these include such key terms in Chinese philosophy as *t'ien* 天 "heaven" and *ming* 命 "destiny". From the Mohist point of view these would be the words in most urgent

¹ Cf. *Mo-tzū* ch. 49 (Sun 299/5-7), where Mo-tzū mentions in turn all 10 theses, only twice diverging from the wording of the chapter titles.

need of definition; we must conclude that they had already been defined in a source now lost. The most remarkable of the omissions are *chien* 兼 "collective" and *ai* 愛 "love" (combined in *chien ai*, the title of ch. 14-16). The *Canons* and *Explanations* frequently use *chien* in contrast with *t'i* "member, individual"; near the beginning of the series they define the latter in terms of the former (A 2 (1A/3) 體, 分於兼也 "A member is a portion in a collection"), but do not define *chien* itself. Only a little later they define *jen* "benevolence" in terms of *ai* (A 7 (1A/6) 仁, 體愛也 "Benevolence is loving individually", making a contrast with *chien ai* "loving collectively"), without ever defining *ai*. The only other ethical term we may assume to have had a lost definition is *chih* 志 "aim, purpose" (in *T'ien chih* 天志, title of ch. 26-28); its counterpart *kung* 功 "achievement" is defined in A 35.

The entire system is built on one pair of undefined terms, *yü* "desire" and *wu* "dislike". Although undefined, these are among the ambiguous words uses of which are listed in A 76-87:

A 84 (2A/7) 欲。正, 權利, 且。惡。正, 權害。

"To desire. Directly. Having weighed the benefit. To be about to."

"To dislike. Directly. Having weighed the harm."

Benefit and harm are defined in terms of desire and dislike (although because of the inconvenience that desire unlike dislike necessarily precedes achievement the word used in the former case has to be *hsi* "be pleased"):

A 26, 27 (2A/2, 3) 利, 所得而喜也。害, 所得而惡也。

"Benefit is what one is pleased to get. Harm is what one dislikes getting."

The terms "direct" and "weighing" appear in EC 8, which discusses the evaluation of benefit and harm; we have a direct dislike of losing a finger, but will sacrifice it to save the arm. The ultimate choice in the weighing of benefit and harm is the choice of ends, of what one "is for" (*wei* 爲). The falling-tone *wei* "be for" recurs throughout *Expounding the Canons* without at first attracting one's attention (EC 5, 10, Appendix 2 爲天下 "be concerned for the whole world", EC 12 不爲其室 "his concern is not for his own family"), but it has a precise technical sense and is defined:

A 75 (2A/2) 爲, 窮知而縣 (=懸) 於欲也。

"To be 'for' is to accord the most weight among desires, in the light of all that one knows."

The *Explanation* discusses the loss of a finger to avoid greater harm and uses the phrase *so wei* 所爲 "what one is for". We may compare the *Shen wei* 審爲 "Being aware of what one is for" chapter of the *Lü-shih ch'un-ch'iu* ch. 21/4, which takes an individualist position: 身者所爲也, 天下者所以爲也。審所[以]爲而輕重得矣。"The self is what one is for, the whole world is the means to what one is for. Be aware of what you are for, and you can tell the heavy from the light." The man who sacrifices the heavier for the lighter, for example cutting off his head in exchange for a hat, "does not know what he is for" 不知其所爲矣。

The moral concepts are derived in turn from the concepts of benefit and of love. The loss of the definition of "love" is not as serious as might be feared, since the place of love in the system is clear; a reference to "loving men" can always be reduced to a description in already defined terms, "desiring men's benefit and disliking harm to them, for their own sakes" (Love as an emotion was not recommended by the Mohists, who distrusted all the passions. Cf. *Mo-tzu* ch. 47, Sun 277/8 必去喜去怒, 去樂去悲, 去愛而用仁義 "Be sure to get rid of rejoicing, anger, joy, sadness, love, and employ benevolence and righteousness.")

I may desire to benefit another "for my own sake" (爲己 EC 10), for example for reward or praise, in which case the desire to benefit will not extend to all men (EC 11). But this self-interested concern for a person is not to be confused with loving him, which is "for the sake of the man he is" (爲其人也 EC 11); "the reason for <loving(?)> Jack resides in Jack" (EC 12). The plainest example of wishing to benefit someone purely for his own sake is my own self-love, which is not for the sake of my utility (A 7 (6B/5) 愛己者非爲用己也。不若愛馬 "Love of oneself is not for the sake of putting oneself to use." *Illustration*: "It is not like loving a horse"), nor is it for the sake of anyone else (EC 10 "Jack's love of himself is not for the sake of the others who love him").

It follows that we cannot love men simply as men without loving all men in the same way that we love ourselves. "Love of man" is a concept unlike, for example, the riding of horses in that I can be said to ride horses however few I have ridden, but cannot be said to love men unless I love them all (NO 17). Love, being simply the desire to benefit any person for his own sake, does not vary quantitatively with the number of its objects; there is no more love in me when I love all men than when I love one (EC 13, cf. EC 5). Several *Canons* answer objections, based on misunderstandings of the Mohist position, that one cannot love men without knowing their location, their number, whether their number is finite (B 73-75). A remarkable feature of the Mohist system is the rigour with which it refuses to recognize any grounds for loving men other than their value as men, and any grounds for loving one more than another except their relative worth as men (which is equated, as we shall see, with their will and ability to benefit others). Loving men "for the sake of the men they are" we shall love the sage Yü more "for the sake of the man Yü was" (EC 5). The sage on his side will love us less than we love him, because of our lesser moral worth (EC 7 "The great man loves the small man less than the small man loves him, but benefits the small man more than the small man benefits him").

No other grounds for loving unequally are recognized. Love is equal for kin and stranger, self and other, men past or present or not yet born (EC 4, 5, 12). It is laid down specifically that we owe no more love to our own parents than to the parents of others (EC 12). Kinsmen belong to

certain categories of people to whom we owe special care (*hou* 厚) but not greater love (*hou ai*), among which are included creditors, the ruler, superiors, the aged, one's elders (EC 9. The list does not include friends, as it would for a Confucian). Such duties are irrespective of the other person's moral worth (EC 9), just as my special care for my own person is not on account of my own excellence (EC 10).

The basic moral virtues, *jen* "benevolence" and *yi* "righteousness", are defined in terms of loving and benefiting:

A 7 (1A/6) 仁, 體愛也。

"Benevolence is loving individually."

A 8 (1A/6) 義, 利也。

"Righteousness is benefiting."

Filial piety is subordinated to righteousness:

A 13 (1B/1) 孝, 利親也。

"Filial piety is benefiting parents."

At first sight one is surprised that benevolence should be identified as individual rather than as collective love. But collective love is treated by the Mohist as a principle obliging us to extend the love of one to all, not as a virtue; it is "loving Jack" and "loving Jill" which have moral value (cf. EC 2). Benevolence is not necessarily practically effective, and how much or little the agent desires to benefit others is irrelevant to the judgment of his actions (EC 7 "The conduct of the slightly and the greatly benevolent are of equal worth"). The love which effectively benefits is born from thinking about the needs of persons, which are not the same for Jack as for Jill, for the people of yesterday as for the people of today (EC 2).

The vaguest of the definitions is that of righteousness, which is simply equated with benefiting. The *Canon* does not tell us whether to judge a man by the amount of benefit he actually achieves (which will vary with his opportunities) or by whether he is the kind of man who benefits others. The *Explanation* however is quite explicit:

A 8 (6B/6) 志以天下爲芬 (=分) 而能能利之。不必用。

"As for his aim, he takes the whole world as its portion; as for his ability, he is able to benefit it. He is not necessarily employed."

Cf. A 13 (7A/2, 3) <志> 以親爲芬而能能利親。不必得。(Filial piety.) "As for his aim, he takes his parents as its portion; as for his ability, he is able to benefit them. He does not necessarily succeed."

Thus a man is judged righteous not by his success in benefiting others, nor by his desire to benefit (which is benevolence), but by whether he has both the aim and the ability. Similarly we are told in EC 3 that "In the matter of righteousness being beneficial and unrighteousness harmful, one must distinguish between aim and achievement", and that "no external condition can make me more beneficial". A consequence of this is that righteousness is independent of opportunity or social position; "One

exalted to the throne of the Empire is not more beneficial to man than any ordinary fellow."

A refutation of the doctrine that benevolence is internal and righteousness external (defended by Kao-tzū 告子 in *Mencius* 6A/4) is deduced immediately from the two definitions:

B 76 (21A/8) 仁愛也，義利也。愛利此也，所愛所利彼也。

"Benevolence is loving, righteousness is benefiting. Loving and benefiting are here, the loved and the benefited are there."

A remarkable innovation of the Mohist ethic is that it conceives morality in terms, not of relations between ruler and subject, father and son, but of individuals benefiting other individuals and "the world" (*t'ien-hsia* 天下). We are expressly warned against loving man only in the abstract (EC 2); "the world" is the totality of individuals, each of whom, however humble his social position, is to be estimated according to his will and capacity to benefit the rest. It is recognized that men must be allotted for their mutual benefit special duties to superiors, elders, parents, but these "portions" (*fen* 分) are merely instrumental to the good of the whole (EC 9 "You forget your parents when they die, for the sake of the world.") We should benefit a man "for the sake of the man he is"; and although the degree of love owed to him depends on his moral worth, even the worthless individual is to be loved simply as a man (EC 2 "Even if to get rid of the love of them would benefit the world, we cannot get rid of it.") At the same time there is a tone of intellectual ruthlessness about the Mohists (with their utterly dispassionate use of the word "love") which warns one against saying too easily that they conceive men as Kantian "ends in themselves". Moral worth is independent of external conditions (EC 3), but nothing in the system forbids us to sacrifice an individual for reasons external to himself. The crucial passage on this question (EC 6) is badly mutilated, but is explicit that "if a death and a life are equally beneficial there is nothing to choose between them." Such a sacrifice would be made however to benefit others as individuals. The entire system is based on the desires and dislikes of individuals, and all morality reduces itself finally to the benefiting of "Jack and Jill" (*Tsang* and *Huo*, the most plebeian proper names).

Early Mohism had identified morality with conformity to the Will of Heaven, which rewards the good and punishes the wicked. Later Mohism on the contrary develops a utilitarian ethic from the concepts of desire and dislike, without any appeal to the authority of Heaven. We do find a few references to Heaven and to the spirits in *Expounding the Canons* (EC 1, 7, 11), but only in illustrations to arguments, and in the *Canons* and *Explanations* there are none at all. This remarkable change of viewpoint may be understood as an effect of the great metaphysical crisis in the 4th century B.C., when individualists such as Yang Chu proclaimed the doctrine of *ch'üan hsing* 全性, "keeping one's nature intact". The uncovering of the

conflict between morality and man's nature, which is given him by Heaven, undermined the Confucian and Mohist assumption that morality has the authority of Heaven.² If Heaven is on the side of Yang Chu, by what are benevolence and righteousness to be justified? Within Confucianism, Mencius tries to solve the problem by showing that moral inclination is at the basis of human nature; later Hsün-tzū accepts the conflict between morality and nature and concludes that morality is not the "Way of Heaven" but a Way instituted by man for his own survival. The Taoist Chuang-tzū on the other hand takes the side of Heaven, but goes beyond Yang Chu in claiming that man diverges from Heaven, not only in his moral conventions, but in the selfish calculations of benefit and harm by which he loses the spontaneity of everything generated by Heaven. That the Mohists did not escape this crisis can be seen from EC 1, which admits that for anyone who believes that it is his nature to be a tyrant the doctrine of the Will of Heaven turns into an argument for egoism. But instead of arguing over the goodness or badness of *hsing* 性 "human nature" (a word which appears nowhere else in the whole of *Mo-tzū*) they preferred to develop the practical utilitarianism of Mo-tzū into a theoretical system requiring no metaphysical justification.

If we are right in suggesting that it was the threat of Yang Chu's conception of human nature which changed the course of Mohist as well as Confucian thought, we can understand a puzzling feature of the 13 Canons. All except the first are about problems in ethics; why does the series begin with a canon about propositions which "soak in insidiously"? From the newly reconstituted exposition it appears that it refers primarily to the proposition that a man may be an egoist by nature. We can now appreciate that it might be very much to the point to introduce the new ethical system (of which *Expounding the Canons* is the earliest surviving document) by calling attention to the danger that advocacy of the Will of Heaven may be degraded into a justification of egoism; reaction to this danger was the start of the whole enterprise. We can also see a connexion with the new emergence of the individual in Mohist thought. Yang Chu has forced the Mohists to pose the central problem of ethics in his own terms; shall I benefit only myself, or other individuals as well as myself?

PART 3. THE MING SHIH 名實 "NAMES AND OBJECTS"

3/1. Text and notes on the *Ta-ch'ü* sections of the *Ming shih*

NO 1-3

(a) *Chinese Text*, see p. 187

(b) *Notes*

1. Emended following Chang Ch'i-huang (*op. cit.*, 5B/5). Cf. *Explanation* A 80 (10A/6) 名實耦, 「合」也 "Name and object fitting is 'going together'".

² Cf. Graham (2) 222-6.

2. *Sui* "although" (M. 3761 def. 2/3), variously written 雖, 唯, 惟 throughout the dialectical chapters. For other examples, cf. NO 2, 8, below.
3. For the syntax of *yu yu yü* X "have some X", cf. p. 149 above.
4. For the syntax of conjunction *yen* ("only in it?") cf. p. 149 above.
5. Emended following Sun 257/8.
6. For *yi* "idea, image", cf. *Explanation A 70* (9A/5) 意規員三也俱可以爲法 "The idea, the compasses, the circle, all three can serve as standard". *Yi* may be used verbally ("conceive, have a mental picture") cf. *Hsün-tzū* ch. 22 (Liang 312/-4) 凡同類同情者, 其天官之意物也同。 "With everything the same in kind and in *ch'ing* (what it is in itself) the senses present the same picture of the thing".
7. *Huo* "catch" (of game), M. 20758 def. 1/3.
8. For the syntax of *shih huang yeh* "this half-disc", *yi chih chih jen yeh* "visualise the finger as being the man", *yi huo yeh* "visualise as being a catch of game", cf. pp. 148-9 above.

NO 4, 5

(a) *Chinese Text*, see pp. 187-8

(b) *Notes*

1. This resumptive passage provides the basis for the reconstruction of NO 1-3. The missing last word (*hsiao* "exemplify") is conjecturally restored from NO 5.
2. The definition of *huo* "some" links with the definition of *chin* "all" in *Canon A 42* (2B/5) 盡, 莫不然也 "All is none not being so" (Cf. Graham(1) 11).
3. For *chia* "so-called, loan-named" (also *Canon B 8*), cf. Graham(1) 14.
4. *Hsiao* "imitate, exemplify" is used in conjunction with *fa* "model, standard" also in the *Great Appendix* of the *Changes*, where we find both *hsiao fa* "imitate the model" and *hsiao* used parallel with verbal *fa* "take as model". In a previous attempt to make sense of this passage I resorted to the unnatural assumption that the use of *hsiao* "stretches its meaning to cover the application of the standard as a test; I therefore translate it by the non-committal word 'apply'" (Graham(1) 18, n. 2). But the translation that I offered (ut sup. 3. "'Applying' is imposing a certain standard. What is applied is the standard imposed") now seems to me syntactically untenable. When it is understood that the Mohist logicians use level-tone *wei* 爲 without a complement for a thing being deemed to be such-and-such (cf. p. 150 above) the syntax becomes clear: "An example is a standard for being deemed such-and-such; the thing exemplified is the standard by which it is deemed such-and-such". The point is that every example of X can itself serve as a standard for identifying further examples of X, cf.

Explanation A 70 (quoted NO 1-3, n. 6 above): "The idea, the compasses, the circle, all three can serve as standard."

5. NO 5 is one of the *Hsiao-ch'ü* sets of definitions which seem irrelevant in their traditional context. It gains greatly in significance if located after NO 1-4. The distinguishing of "some" and "all" refers back to NO 1; the "Ch'in horse" of NO 2 (a horse originally from Ch'in) would be an instance of the "so-called" which is "now not so"; in NO 3 a pillar would exemplify wood and a catch of game would exemplify birds.

NO 6-8

(a) *Chinese Text*, see p. 188

(b) *Notes*

1. We begin NO 6 with a pair of *Hsiao-ch'ü* definitions inappropriate to their traditional context. They are more naturally placed here at the head of the various fragments concerned with similarity and difference. I formerly took the first of the two as a definition of the formula "*shih yu* . . ." "This is like . . ." (Graham(1) 4, n. 2), but in its newly identified context it seems better to explain it as a reference to synonymous expressions implying sameness ("This is synonymous with calling it . . ." implies sameness", with *yu* indicating synonymy as in *Mencius* 4A/1 泄泄猶沓沓也 "Yi-yi means t'a-t'a").

2. At first sight NO 6 seems to list as many as 10 kinds of similarity. But on closer inspection one sees that it consists of two sets of four (Nos. 1-4, 6-10), summed up in Nos. 5 and 10 respectively. Originally no doubt this was shown by the layout of the text (as with the titles of *Expounding the Canons* and *Names and Objects*, which have likewise become assimilated to the rest of the text). The first four, which are "sameness with the same name", are the four kinds already distinguished in the *Canons* (A 86, 87), as Sun already recognized (Sun 257/9, 10): (1) *Ch'ung* "identity", one object with two names. (2) *Chu* (具=俱 Sun), "association". The *Canon* calls this *ho t'ung* "the same in being together", but the *Explanation* uses the word *chü* in its definition: A 86 (10B/4) 俱處於室, 合同也 "All residing in the house is sameness in being together". (3) *Lien* "continuity". The *Canon* calls this *t'i t'ung* "sameness in being members" (of one whole), but the next *Explanation* uses the word *lien* to define the corresponding type of difference: A 87 (10B/5) 不連屬, 不體也。 "Discontinuity is not being members (of one whole)". (4) *T'ung lei* "of the same kind", having respects in which they are the same. *Names and Objects* supplements the four kinds of "sameness with the same name" by four kinds of "sameness with the same root" (we shall argue later that by "root" is meant the predicate of the sentence cf. p. 182 below): (1) *Ch'iu* 丘 **K'üÜG* = *ch'ü* 區 **K'üÜ* (M. 33, def. 9), "separately grouped", as proposed by Sun. *Ch'ü* is used in

the *Canons* and *Explanations* (with the graph disguised by various additional radicals) of the grouping of objects, not on grounds of similarity, but in contrast with other objects: A 73 (9A/6) 凡牛，樞非牛，「兩」也 "All oxen, and non-oxen separately grouped, are the two sides". B 12 (4A/1) 歐物一體也 "Things grouped separately are one unit." (2) *Fu* 附 = 附? (unattested except in a proper name, Sun 257/-4), "accessory" (?), nowhere used in the *Canons* and *Explanations*. (3) Sameness in "being this thing" (*shih*). (4) Sameness in "being so" (*jan*).

3. Only two kinds of difference are recorded (after eight kinds of similarity), but there is no need to postulate mutilation of the text. The writer is preparing to discuss these two kinds in detail, "being this thing" in NO 7 and "being so" in NO 8.

4. Emended on grounds of parallelism.

5. Emended following Yü Yüeh (Yü 206/-3). Yü (followed by Sun, 259/2) also emends the second *chih* 之 to *yeh* 也; but I agree with T'an (T'an 230) in finding this unnecessary.

6. *Chih chih jen yeh* "The finger's being the man", cf. p. 149 above.

7. Chang Ch'i-huang (*op. cit.* 7A/1) is probably right in taking *chiang chien* and *t'ing chien* as types of swords different in shape. But the ordinary meaning of *t'ing chien* is "draw a sword" (M. 12106/13), and Sun understands *chiang chien* as "support oneself on a sword" (Sun 259/4).

8. *Yeh* must either be omitted or else supplied in the preceding phrase also; the latter solution ("Willow-wood being wood and peach-wood being wood are the same thing"; cf. the observations on the use of *yeh* in pp. 148-9 above) is hard to reconcile with the earlier "The finger being the man and the head being the man are different things."

9. Emended following Sun 256/8.

NO 9-11

(a) *Chinese Text*, see pp. 188-9

(b) Notes

1. Emended on grounds of parallelism (Sun 199/-1).

2. These two words are the mysterious fragment which survives as a gloss written in small characters in *Canons* 2B/7, only a little later than the longer passage (2B/3-6) which we believe to belong to NO 9 (cf. p. 147 above). They fit very neatly at this position, where the parallelism implies two missing words. *Li* "unobstructed" (M. 1932, def. 2) is used as in the *k'ou chih li* ("fluency of the mouth") of the longer passage (*yin li* "the sound is uninterrupted").

3. *Ts'ü* "the next" and *tuan* "starting-point" (the graph here partly obliterated, but surviving in the next sentence) are Mohist geometrical terms, defined in *Canons* A 61 (1A/8, 1B/1) 端，體之無*厚而最前者也

"The 'starting-point' is the dimensionless unit which precedes all others" A 69 (1B/6) 次，無間而不*相攪也 "Next is without interval but not coinciding." I propose, as a hypothesis which makes sense of this obscure passage, that the Mohist is using these geometrical terms to refer to the phrase-positions and pauses of the sentence.

4. Cf. NO 12 辭之侔也有所至而正 "The matching of propositions is exact only as far as it extends". *Chih* would seem to refer to the extent to which sentences are parallel. For its nominal use as a technical term, cf. Liu Hsiang 劉向 (79-8 B.C.), *Pie lu* 別錄 ap. *Shih-chi chi-chieh* 史記集解 ch. 76 (*Shih-chi* 2370 n. 2) 彼天下之辯有五勝三至，而辭正爲下。 "The dialecticians of the world have 'five victories and three degrees of extent', and propositional exactness (exact parallelism of sentences?) is the lowest" (from an answer by Tsou Yen 鄒衍 to Kung-sun Lung's "A white horse is not a horse"; it unfortunately fails to enumerate the categories of "victory" and "extent").

5. *Fu* 復 (= 複) M. 10183, def. 24) "double, compound". Cf. Kung-sun Lung's *White Horse* (Graham(2) 146) 合馬與白，復名「白馬」 "Putting together 'white' and 'horse' one compounds the name 'white horse'" *Canon* B 11 (3B/8) 合與一，或復<或>否。 "Together or one: in the former case one compounds, in the latter not". Cf. also Graham(2) 147.

6. *Ch'ing* "what a thing is in itself", cf. p. 154 above.

7. *Fu cheng* "compound or simple". The familiar expression *cheng ming* 正名 "giving things their right names" (of which there is an example in *Explanation* B 68) would make *cheng* a suitable word for referring to the single name which is the right one, although I do not know other examples. Hsün-tz'ü also distinguishes between compound and single names, but with a different terminology: *chien* 兼 "double", *tan* 單 "single" (ch. 22, Liang 314/4).

8. Invert *yeh che*, following Sun (259/8), on grounds of parallelism with the next sentence beginning *fu tz'ü* "The proposition . . ."

9. *So sheng* < *chang* > "that from which it is engendered and becomes full-grown"; the restoration is required by the two phrases to which it refers, *yi ku sheng*, *yi li chang* "is engendered according to a reason, becomes full-grown according to a pattern". *Sheng chang* "be born and grow up" is a common phrase (M. 21670/275).

3/2. Complete translation of the *Ming shih*

(What on the present hypothesis is the second half of *Names and Objects* has already been translated and annotated in *The logic of the Mohist Hsiao-ch'ü*. We now retranslate the whole; but for the text and annotation of the second half readers are referred to the earlier article.)

NO 1 *Names and Objects*. Name and object do not necessarily go together. If this stone is white, when you break up this stone all of it is the same as

the white thing; but although this stone is big, it is not the same as the big thing. In all cases of naming otherwise than by reference to number or measure, when you break up the object all of it is the thing in question. Therefore one man's finger is not one man, but this one man's finger is this one man; one side of a cube is not a cube, but one side of a wooden cube is the wooden cube.

NO 2 . . . To have a certain Ch'in horse is to have a certain horse and to know that it is the horse of someone coming from there. In this ("Ch'in horse") there is a term of convenience ("Ch'in"). In cases of naming by reference to shape and characteristics ("horse") we must know that this thing is "X", and only in it do we know "X"; in cases where naming cannot be by reference to shape and characteristics ("Ch'in") we may know "X" even if we do not know that this thing is "X". In all cases of naming by reference to residence and migration, if they are things which have entered its confines all are of this place; if they have left this place, it follows that they are not. Of naming by reference to residence or migration, district and village names, "Ch'i", "Ching" and the like are all instances; of naming by reference to shape and characteristics, "mountain", "hill", "house", "shrine" and the like are all instances.

NO 3 Knowing is different from having a pictorial idea. . . . but this half-disc is this jade. Picturing a pillar is not picturing wood, it is picturing the wood of this pillar. Picturing a finger as being the man is not picturing a man; picturing as being a catch of game is however picturing the birds.

NO 4 In the first case we say that being this ("stone") it is so ("white"), in the second that being this it is not so ("big"), in the third that it has changed in place ("Ch'in horse"), in the fourth that it <exemplifies(?)> ("pillar").

NO 5 "Some" is not all ("stone" when broken up). The loan-named ("Ch'in horse") is not now so. An example ("pillar") is a standard for being deemed such-and-such ("wood"); the thing exemplified is the standard by which the example is deemed such-and-such. Therefore if something coincides with an example, it is this thing, and if it does not it is not; this is exemplifying.

NO 6 "This is synonymous with calling it . . ." implies sameness, "How can I call it . . . ?" implies difference.

The sameness of the identical,
the sameness of the associated,
the sameness of the continuous,

the sameness of the same in kind:

——sameness with the same name.

The sameness of the separately grouped,
the sameness of the accessory,
sameness in being this thing,
sameness in being so:

——sameness with the same "root".

There is the difference of not being this thing, there is the difference of not being so. Sometimes the different is to be deemed the same and the same is to be deemed the different.

NO 7 The sameness of a tall man and a short man is their characteristics being the same, therefore they are the same thing. A finger as being the man and a head as being the man are different things; a man's members are not things which are as one in their characteristics, therefore they are different things. A *chiang* sword and a *t'ing* sword are different things; a sword is something named according to shape and characteristics, their shapes are not as one, therefore they are different things. The wood of willow-wood and the wood of peach-wood are the same thing . . .

NO 8 . . . the circularity of a big circle and the circularity of a small circle are the same. What a measurement which reaches just one foot does not reach, and what a measurement which does not reach 1000 miles does reach, are not different; as for their being the same in not reaching, it is to the longer and shorter distances that it refers.

NO 9 The purpose of disputation is to clarify distinctions between "this" and "not this", inquire into the successions of good government and misrule, clarify points of sameness and difference, discern the patterns of names and objects, and to settle what is beneficial or harmful and make decisions about the doubtful and confusable among them.

Hearing is the sensibility of the ear; to attend to what you hear so that you grasp the idea is discernment by the mind. Saying is a facility of the mouth; to make a case for what you say so that the idea can be seen is disputation by the mind. <When the sound is consecutive(?)>, discern the sequence-positions and starting-points; comparisons depend on their reach to amplify the meaning. Where sequence-positions are compounded, discern the starting-points of the voice; names depend on the facts to be compound or simple.

NO 10 The proposition is something which is engendered according to reasons, becomes full-grown according to a pattern, and proceeds according to its kind. It is irresponsible to set up a proposition without being clear

about what it is engendered and grows up from. Now a man cannot proceed without a route; even if he has strong thighs and arms, if he is not clear about the route it will not be long before he gets into trouble. The proposition is something which proceeds according to its kind; if in setting up a proposition you are not clear about its kind you are certain to get into trouble. Therefore one uses names to indicate the objects, propositions to express the ideas, explanations to bring out the reasons, and one accepts according to the kind, proposes according to the kind. What is present in one's own case is not to be rejected in the other man's, what is absent from one's own case is not to be required from the other man's.

NO 11 In representing them summarize what is so of the myriad things, in assorting them explore which are comparable among the various sayings. "Illustrating" is indicating another thing in order to throw light on something. "Matching" is comparing propositions and allowing them to proceed together. "Adducing" is saying "If it is so in your case, why should it not be so in mine too?" "Inferring" is using what is the same in something which he refuses to accept and something which he does accept in order to propose the latter.

(From this point we translate the last 732 characters of the *Hsiao-ch'ü* (Mo-tzu 11, 8A/7-12A/2) as edited in Graham (1) 4-10.)

NO 12 When things are the same in some respects, it does not follow that they are altogether the same. The matching of propositions is valid only as far as it extends. If matters are so there are reasons why they are so; but although they are the same in being so, they are not necessarily so for the same reasons. If claims are accepted there are reasons why they are accepted; but although they are the same in being accepted, they are not necessarily accepted for the same reasons. Therefore propositions which illustrate, match, adduce and infer become different as they proceed, become dangerous when they change direction, fail when carried too far, become detached from their base when we let them drift, so that we must on no account be careless with them, and must not use them too rigidly. Hence saying has many methods, separate kinds, different reasons, which must not be looked at only from one side.

NO 13 A thing in some cases

(1) is this, and the matter is so;

In others the thing

(2) is this, but it is not so;

or (3) is not this, but it is so;

or (4) one case applies without exception, the other not;

or (5) the thing in one case is this and in the other is not.

NO 14 A white horse is a horse——To ride a white horse is to ride a horse.

A black horse is a horse——To ride a black horse is to ride a horse.
Jill is someone——To love Jill is to love someone.

Jack is someone——To love Jack is to love someone.

These are cases where it "is this, and the matter is so".

NO 15 Jill's parent is someone——Jill's serving her parent is not "serving someone" (having a husband).

Her younger brother is a handsome man——Loving her younger brother is not loving a handsome man.

A carriage is wood——Riding the carriage is not riding the wood.

A boat is wood——Entering the boat is not entering the wood.

Robbers are people——Abounding in robbers is not abounding in people, being without robbers is not being without people.

How shall we make this clear?

Disliking the abundance of robbers is not disliking the abundance of people, desiring to be without robbers is not desiring to be without people.

The whole world agrees that these are right; but if such is the case, there is no longer any difficulty in allowing that, although robbers are people,

loving robbers is not loving people,

not loving robbers is not not loving people,

killing robbers is not killing people.

The latter claims are the same in kind as the former; the world does not think itself wrong to hold the former, yet thinks the Mohists wrong to hold the latter. Is there any reason for it but being, as the saying goes, "clogged within and closed without"? (Gloss: "Having no empty space within the heart; it is indissolubly clogged".)

These are cases where it "is this, but the matter is not so".

NO 16 Moreover reading a book is not a book——To like reading books is to like books.

Cockfights are not cocks——To like cockfights is to like cocks.

Being about to fall into a well is not falling into a well——To stop someone being about to fall into a well is to stop someone falling into a well.

Being about to go out of doors is not going out of doors——To stop someone being about to go out of doors is to stop someone going out of doors.

If such is the case, there is no longer any difficulty in allowing that: being about to die prematurely is not dying prematurely——To stop someone being about to die prematurely is to stop someone dying prematurely.

The existence of Destiny is not Destiny——To deny the doctrine of the existence of Destiny is to deny Destiny.

The latter claims are the same as the former; the world does not think itself wrong to hold the former, yet condemns the Mohists as wrong for holding the latter. Is there any reason for it but being, as the saying goes, "clogged within and closed without"? (Gloss as in NO 15.)

These are cases where it "is not this, but the matter is so".

NO 17 "He loves men" requires him to love all men without exception; only then is he deemed to love men. "He does not love men" does not require that he does not love any men at all; he does not love all without exception, and so is deemed not to love men.

"He rides horses" does not require him to ride all horses without exception before being deemed to ride horses; he rides some horses, and so is deemed to ride horses. On the other hand "He does not ride horses" does require that he does not ride any horses at all; only then is he deemed not to ride horses.

These are cases of which "one applies without exception, the other not"

NO 18 If you inhabit somewhere in the state you are deemed to inhabit the state——When you own one house in the state you are not deemed to own the state.

The fruit of the peach is the peach——The fruit of the bramble is not the bramble.

Asking about the man's illness is asking about the man——Disliking the man's illness is not disliking the man.

The ghost of a man is not a man——The ghost of your elder brother is your elder brother. Sacrificing to a man's ghost is not sacrificing to a man——Sacrificing to your elder brother's ghost is sacrificing to your elder brother.

If this horse's eyes are blind we say that this horse is blind——Though this horse's eyes are big, we do not say that this horse is big. If these oxen's hairs are yellow we say that these oxen are yellow——Though these oxen's hairs are many, we do not say that these oxen are many.

One horse or two horses are both horses. "Horses have four feet" implies four feet to one horse, not to a pair of horses. "One-or-other of the horses is white" implies not one horse but two horses one-or-other of which is white.

These are cases where it "is this in one case and in the other is not".

3/3. The treatment of the proposition and the predicate in later Mohist logic

In a study of the logic of the *Hsiao-ch'ü* (which on the present hypothesis contains the greater part of *Names and Objects*) I pointed out that in one

respect it differs radically from the logic of the *Canons* and *Explanations*.¹ The earlier documents discuss logical problems solely in terms of fitting names to objects, the *Hsiao-ch'ü* makes the forward step of introducing the *ts'ü* 辭 "sentence/proposition". Reasoning is conceived as the derivation of one proposition from another by the addition or substitution of words. No attempt is made to establish deductive forms like the Greek syllogism; instead the problem of deciding which additions or substitutions are legitimate in any particular case is solved by grouping examples according to their "kind" (*lei* 類). Thus it is legitimate to take the proposition

NO 14 "A white horse is a horse",

and by adding "To ride . . ." before both terms draw the conclusion

"To ride a white horse is to ride a horse."

But is the following argument also legitimate?

"Robbers are people——Killing robbers is killing people."

This is an important issue for the Mohist, for reasons at which we can only guess. (Part of the Mohist case against aggressive war was that rulers forbid *sha jen* 殺人 "killing people" within their states, yet kill thousands in war and honour those who kill most,² to which a plausible answer would be that the Mohists themselves approve of the execution of robbers by the ruler, which is also "killing people"). A modern reader will perceive that what makes the argument disturbing is a shift in the meaning of words in combination; it is common justice to execute criminals, but *sha jen* "killing people" has assumed a pejorative meaning, not only for Mohists,³ and suggests murder or indiscriminate slaughter incompatible with the Mohist

¹ Graham(1) 22.

² *Mo-tzu* ch. 17, 28 (Sun 85/-2, 140/-3).

³ Cf. the examples of *sha jen* in *Mencius* 1A/6, 1B/8, 4A/15, 6B/8, 7A/35. In a previous analysis of the 'Robber' argument (Graham(1) 52f) I failed to appreciate this point, and supposed that the Mohist was claiming that to kill someone *as* a robber is not to kill him *as* a man, but unfortunately he put his claim in an abbreviated form which looked sophistical ("To kill a robber is not to kill a man") and tried to defend it by offering such parallels as "To love her younger brother is not to love a handsome man" (that is, to love him *as* a brother is not to love him *as* a handsome man). I went to some trouble trying to explain why the Mohist did not simply dispose of the misunderstanding by rephrasing his thesis. But when we recognize that *sha jen* (like "killing people" in English) has a suggestion of inhumaneness, and re-translate as "Killing robbers is not killing people", it ceases to look sophistical; this denial would be to the point if enemies of Mohism were offering "Killing robbers is killing people" as a proof that inhumane actions incompatible with "loving people" are sometimes inevitable. Since even with the tools of modern linguistics, philosophy and literary criticism we still have trouble analyzing the minute meaning-shifts of words in combination, we can appreciate that it would not have been easy to put one's finger on exactly what is wrong with "Killing robbers is killing people", and that the Mohist's technique of offering parallels in which similar meaning-shifts have similar effects did provide a genuine solution to his problem. Most of these parallels may be rephrased in English in the form "Doing it to them as X is not doing it to them as Y" (as suggested in the earlier article); but the only interest of the observation is that it may help one to notice that the Mohist has produced truer parallels than appears at first sight.

obligation to "love people". The Mohists were aware that a single word does not always mean the same thing, and had analysed the meanings of twelve in *Canons* A 76-87, but were not fully equipped to attack the problem from this angle. The *Hsiao-ch'ü* makes the point by proposing that the case is not parallel with

NO 14 "A white horse is a horse——To ride a white horse is to ride a horse",

but with other examples in which a modern reader will notice that words in combination show a similar shift of meaning:

NO 15 "Her younger brother is a handsome man——To love her younger brother is *not* to love a handsome man."

By substituting other words for "kill" it is shown that through all permutations "To . . . robbers" is of the same kind (*lei*) with "To love her younger brother", not with "To ride a white horse".

The present reconstruction enables us to supplement the earlier account of the *Hsiao-ch'ü* logic at several points. It would appear from a newly identified fragment that the derivation of one proposition from another (which in terms of our own logic is "deduction") has a technical name, which is *hsing* 行 "proceeding" (NO 10 "The proposition is something which 'proceeds' according to its kind". Cf. also NO 11, 12). If we are right in our interpretation of NO 9 the Mohist also has a terminology for dealing with the formal parallelism of sentences which is his principal operational device. He uses two terms from the geometrical definitions of the *Canons*, *tuan* 端 (starting-point of a measurement) and *ts'ü* 次 (the next in a series), apparently for pause and sentence-position. It can hardly be a coincidence that the three words *tuan*, *ts'ü* and *pi* 比 "compare", used in successive clauses in NO 9 (which also has *chih* 至 "reach", used of measurement in NO 8), should all appear in two adjacent geometrical sections:

A 68 (1B/5) (似)* 比, 有以相摺有不相摺也。

(9A/4) 比。兩有端而后可。

Canon "'Comparable' (that is, 'commensurate') is partly coinciding and partly not.

Explanation It is possible only with a starting-point for both."

A 69 (1B/6) 次, 無間而不(摺)* 相摺也。

(9A/4) 次。無厚而(厚)* 后可。

Canon "'Next' is without interval but not coinciding.

Explanation It is possible only because of the dimensionless (that is, the point)".

The Mohists use the word *pi* both of comparing measurements (cf. A 89 (10B/7) 比度, 多少也 "Measured in comparison is 'more or less'") and of comparing parallel sentences (NO 11 比辭 "comparing propositions"). They seem to have distinguished the former by the "man" radical (as in A 68) and the latter by the "mouth" radical (cf. B 6 (3B/2) 異類不毗

"Different kinds are not comparable"), although elsewhere in the text as we have it the radicals are missing. It would therefore be as natural for them to borrow terms from their geometrical vocabulary as it is for us (when in English we call sentences "parallel").

With the reconstruction of *Names and Objects* it becomes clear that the introduction of the proposition was a deliberate and very controversial innovation. Logic always had been the problem of 'names and objects', and the document out of which the *Hsiao-ch'ü* was assembled still carried this phrase as its title. But it began with a direct attack on the traditional assumptions that the issue in disputation is whether or not a name fits an object, and that to know is to have a mental picture or idea (*yi* 意) of an object. Its first three sections are headed by new and challenging theses, the second of which is lost: NO 1 "Name and object do not necessarily go together" NO 3 "Knowing is different from having a pictorial idea". A single object may be referred to by names which convey the ideas of different things ("stone", "the white thing", "the big thing", "finger" and "the man", "pillar" and "wood"). The assumption that an object is just one thing, and that we can decide what it is by whether it fits the standard (*fa* 法) for applying the name breaks down when we observe that any object can itself serve as standard for identifying any of the various things that it exemplifies (*hsiao* 效). In order to show the relations between the ideas, to explain how a shattered stone can remain the white thing although no longer the big thing, or why this man's finger is this man although a finger is not a man, we have to advance from the naming of the object to stating that it "is this" (*shih* 是) or "is so" (*jan* 然). "One uses names to indicate the objects, propositions to express the ideas." (NO 10). The assumption that we have only to fit names to objects presupposes that all naming is "by shape or characteristics", and overlooks such categories as naming "by measure or number" or "by residence or migration". Consequently the Mohist is no longer content with the four types of similarity distinguished in the *Canons*, which are all "sameness with the same name". He adds four more types (NO 6), of which the ones which he develops are "sameness in being this" and "sameness in being so", grouped together under a description which we shall not yet try to explain, "sameness with the same root (*ken* 根)".

This exposure of the limitations of naming is preliminary to the introduction of the proposition:

NO 10 "The proposition is something which is engendered (*sheng* 生) according to reasons, becomes full-grown (*chang* 長) according to a pattern, and proceeds according to its kind."

Immediately afterwards "proceeding" is compared to a man proceeding along a route, knowledge of which is indispensable "even if he has strong arms and thighs." This suggests an implicit comparison of the

engendering and full growth of the proposition with the development of the human body. But how are we to understand this odd organic metaphor? If we are to take it with full seriousness, it would seem that a proposition must have two or more parts:

(A) The part first engendered, "according to reasons", and therefore the part of it which can be true or false.

(B) A part or parts which complete it "according to a pattern", which is presumably the organization of pauses and phrase-positions (comparable, within the image of the man setting out on his route, to the articulation of his thighs, arms and other members). Cf. NO 9 察名實之理 "discern the patterns of names and of objects" 察次*端 "discern the sequence-positions and starting-points" 察聲端 "discern the starting-points of the voice".

But if so the part first engendered must surely be what we call the predicate. This suggestion ceases to be a mere guess when we return to NO 6, where "sameness with the same name" (the four kinds of sameness distinguished in the *Canons*, before the significance of the proposition was recognized) is contrasted with "sameness with the same root" (同根之同), the important examples of which are sameness in "being this" and in "being so" (是之同, 然之同). "Being this" is illustrated in NO 14-16, where the first example is "A white horse is a horse." The "root" of this proposition would be:

馬也

"It is a horse",
which is judged true or false "according to reasons", and comes to full growth in

NO 14 白馬/馬也

"A white horse is a horse"

"according to a pattern", which is of a compound name before a pause (NO 9 復次, 察聲端 "When sequence-positions are compounded, discern the starting-points of the voice"). It may be remembered that in a passage already quoted from *Kung-sun Lung tzü* the phrase *fu ming* 復名 "compound a name" is actually used of "white horse".⁴ We can easily understand how the uneliminable core of the Chinese sentence (expandable by the addition of dispensable units such as the subject) would be conceived by the Mohist as the "root" from which the proposition is "engendered". This would be as natural for Chinese as it was for Greeks to think of the assertion-making part of the sentence as "predicated" of the subject (from which in Indo-European languages the verb derives its person and number).

Finally the proposition "proceeds" by the addition of a word and becomes a new proposition:

NO 14 乘白馬乘馬也。

"To ride a white horse is to ride a horse."

This operation is performed "according to its kind"; the derivation is only valid because the proposition belongs to the first of the five classes of example with which the treatise ends.

CHINESE TEXTS

EC 1 (浸淫之辭)

TC 3a / 7-8 語經。語經也。非白馬焉。執駒焉。說求之舞說非也。漁大之舞大非也。2a / 3-7 爲暴人語「天之」爲是也。而性爲暴人。歌天之爲非也。諸陳執既有所爲而我爲之陳執。執之所爲因吾所爲也。若陳執未有所爲而我爲之陳執。陳執因吾所爲也。暴人(以)「爲我」爲天之。以人非爲是也。而性不可正。

EC 2 (聖人之爲天下也)

TC 3a / 2-3 聖人惡疾病。不惡危難。正體不動。欲人之利也。非4b / 5-6 惡其弱也。諸聖人所先爲人欲5b / 3-6a / 2 惡者。人(右)*必以其請得焉。諸所遭執而欲惡生者。人不必以其請得焉。聖人之拊濟也。仁而無利愛。利愛生於慮。昔者之慮也非今日之慮也。昔者之愛人也非今之愛人也。愛獲之愛人也生於慮獲之利。非慮滅之利也。而愛滅之愛人也乃愛獲之愛人也。去其愛而天下利。弗能去也。昔之知墻非今日之知墻也。3a / 8-3b / 1 三物必具。然後足以生3b / 6-8 天下之利驩。聖人有愛而無利倪日之言也。乃客之言也。天下無人。子墨子之言也猶在。

⁴ Cf. NO 9, n. 5 above.

- EC 3 (或壽或卒，其利天下相若)
- TC 3b/2-3 義利不義害。志功爲辯 4a/6 志功不可以相從也 6a/2-5 貴爲天子。其利人不厚於正夫。二子事親。或遇熟。或遇凶。其〈事〉¹ 親也相若。非彼其行益也。非加也。外執無能厚吾利者。
- EC 4 (一日而百萬生，愛不加厚)
- TC 6a/5-6 藉藏也死而天下害。吾特養賊也萬倍。吾愛賊也不加厚。
- EC 5 (愛二世有厚薄而愛二世相若。)
- TC 3b/4-6 愛[衆¹] 衆世與愛寡世相若。兼愛之有相若。愛尙世與愛後世一若今之世。[人(也)之*鬼非人也。兄之鬼兄也³]。
- 2b/5-3a/1 爲天下厚禹爲禹〈之人〉⁴也。爲天下厚愛禹乃爲禹之人愛也。厚禹之〈爲〉⁵加於天下而厚禹不加於天下。若惡盜之爲加於天下而惡盜不加於天下。
- EC 6 (愛之相若，擇而殺其一人)
- TC 4b/2-5 智是[之]¹世之有盜也。盡愛是世。智是室之有盜也。不盡是室也。智其一人之盜也。不盡是二人。雖其一人之盜。苟不智其所在。盡…… 4a/1-2 非殺賊也。專殺盜非殺盜也。凡學愛人。1b/6-2a/1 利於天下相若。無擇也。死生利若一。無擇也。殺一人以存天下。非殺一人以利天下也。殺己以存天下。是殺己以利天下〈也〉³。
- EC 7 (小仁與大仁行厚相若)
- TC 2a/1-2 於事爲之中而權輕重之謂「求」。求爲之非〈爲之〉也。2a/2-3 求爲義非爲義也。1a/3-1b/1 天之

- 愛人也薄於聖人之愛人也。其利人也厚於聖人之利人也。大人之愛小人也薄於小人之愛大人也。其利小人也厚於小人之利大人也。以賊爲其親也而愛之[非²]愛其親也。以賊爲其親也而利之非利其親也。以樂爲利其子而爲其子欲之愛其子也。以樂爲利其子而爲其子求之非利其子也。
- EC 8 (與利除害也)
- TC 1b/1-6 於所體之中而權輕重之謂「權」。權非爲是也。非非爲非也。「權」「正」也。斷指以存臚。利之中取大。害之中取小也。害之中取小[也¹]。非取害也。取利也。其所取者人之所執也。遇盜人而斷(指)*腕²以免身。利也。其遇盜人。害也。斷指與斷腕 2a/2 害之中取小〈也〉³ 3b/8-4a/1 不得已而欲之。非欲之[非欲之也⁴] 2a/7-2b/2 而正⁵(之)*也。利之中取大。非不得已也。害之中取小。不得已也。所未有而取焉。是利之中取大也。於所既有而棄焉。是害之中取小也。
- EC 9 (厚親不稱行而顧行)
- TC 2b/2-5 義可厚厚之。義可薄薄之。謂「倫列」。德行君上老長親戚。此皆所厚也。爲長厚。不爲幼薄。親厚厚。親薄薄。親至薄不至義。「厚親不稱行而顧行」 5b/1 強¹子深其深。淺其淺。益其益。尊其尊。 3a/5-6 聖人之法。死亡²親。爲天下也。厚親分也。以死亡之體³渴。

- EC 10 (不爲己之可學)
- TC 3a/6-7 興利有厚薄而毋倫列之(與)*謂「利爲己」3a/1-2愛人不外己.己在所愛之中.己在所愛.愛加於己.倫列之愛己愛人也3b/1-2 臧之愛己非爲愛己之人也.厚不外己.愛無厚薄.舉己非賢也24b/1-2 智親之一利未爲孝也.亦不至於智不爲己之利於親也.
- EC 11 (愛人非爲譽也)
- TC 4a/6-4b/1……利¹人也爲其人也.富人非爲其人²也.有爲也以富人[富人³]也.治人有爲鬼焉.爲賞譽利一人非爲賞譽利人也.亦不至無貴⁴於人.
- EC 12 (愛人之親若愛其親)
- TC 3a/3-5……惡人之害也.聖人不爲其室.〈愛〉*臧之故在於臧.聖人不得爲子之事.
- EC 13 (兼愛相若.一愛相若)
- EC (Appendix)
- TC 6b/8-7b/3
- 1 浸淫之辭.其類在於鼓栗.
 - 2 聖人(也)*之¹爲天下也.其類在於追迷.
 - 3 或壽或卒.其利天下也(指)*相²若.其類在(譽)*譽³石.
 - 4 一日而百萬生.愛不加厚.其類在惡害.
 - 5 愛二世有厚薄而愛二世相若.其類在蛇文.
 - 6 愛之相若.擇而殺其一人.其類在阬下之鼠.
 - 7 小仁與大仁.行厚相若.其類在申凡.
 - 8 興利除害也.其類在漏雍⁴.
 - 9 厚親不稱行而(類)*顧⁵行.其類在江上井.
 - 10 不爲己之可學也.其類在獵(走)*徒⁶.

- 11 愛人非爲譽也.其類在逆旅.
- 12 愛人之親若愛其親.其類在官苟.
- 13 兼愛相若.一愛相若[一愛相若]¹.其類在死也².
- NO 1
- TC 4b/6-8 名實.名實不必(名)*合¹.苟是石也白.敗是石也盡與白同.是石也唯²大.不與大同.6b/2-4 諸非以舉量數命者.敗之盡是也.故一人指非一人也.是一人之指乃是一人也.方之一面非方也.方木之面方木也.
- NO 2
- ……TC 3b/3-4 有有於臺馬.有有於馬也.³智來者之馬也.
- TC 4b/8-5a/5 是有便謂焉也.以形貌命者必智是之某也焉⁴智某也.不可以形貌命者.唯不智是之某也.智某可也.諸以居運命者苟(人)*入⁵於其中者皆是也.去之因非也.諸以居運命者若鄉里齊荊者.皆是.諸以形貌命者若山丘室廟者皆是也.
- NO 3
- 智與⁶意異.TC4a/4-6……是璜也是玉也.意楹非意木也.意是楹之木也.意指之人也非意人也.意獲⁷也乃意禽也⁸.
- NO 4
- TC 5a/8-5b/1 一曰乃是而然.二曰乃是而不然.三曰遷.四曰〈效?〉¹.
- NO 5
- HC 8a/1-3或²也者不盡也.假³者今不然也.效⁴者爲之法

也。所效者所以爲之法也。故中效則是也。不中效則非也。此效也⁵。

NO 6

HC 8a/7「是猶謂」也者同也。「吾豈謂」也者異也¹。

TC 5a/5-8重同。具同。連同。同類之同。同名之同。丘同。鮒同。是之同。然之同。同根之同²。有非之異。有不然之異³。有其異也爲其同也。[爲]其同也〈爲其〉⁴異。

NO 7

TC 6a/6-6b/2長人之(異)*與⁵短人之同。其貌同者也。故同。指之人也⁶與首之人也異。人之體非一貌者也。故異。將劍與挺劍⁷異。劍以形貌命者也。其形不一。故異。楊木之木與桃木之木[也⁸]同。

NO 8

TC 4a/2-4小圖之圖與大圖之圖同。方至尺之不至也與不至(鍾)*千*里⁹之至不異其不至同者遠近之謂也。

NO 9

HC 7b/5-6夫辯者將以明是非之分。審治亂之紀。明同異之處。察名實之理。處利害。決嫌疑焉。

Canons 10/2b/3-6聞耳之聰也。循所聞而得其意。心(也)*之¹察也。言口之利也。執所言而意得見。心之辯也。

TC 5b/2-3〈音利?〉²察次(山)*端³。比因至⁴優指。復⁵次察聲端。名因請復正⁷。

NO 10

夫辭TC 6b/4-8以放生。以理長。以類行[也]者⁸。立辭而不明於其所生〈長〉⁹忘也。今人非道無所行。唯有強股肱而不明於道。其困也可立而待也。夫辭以類行者也。立辭而不明於其類。則必困矣。故

HC 7b/7-8a/1以名舉實。以辭抒意。以說出故。以類取。以類予。有諸己不非諸人。無諸己不求諸人。

NO 11

HC 7b/6-7摹略萬物之然。論求羣言之比。

HC 8a/3-6辟也者。舉也物而以明之也。侔也者。比辭而俱行也。援也者。曰「子然。我奚獨不可以然」也。推也者。以其所不取之同於其所取者予之也。