

Ricci, the Chinese, and the Toolkits of Textualists

MODERN RICCI STUDIES

Two recent historical works concerning the late-sixteenth to eighteenth-century program of Christian proselytization in China have inspired the following investigation and have served as points of departure. Jacques Gernet's *China and the Christian Impact* and Jonathan Spence's *The Memory Palace of Matteo Ricci* are two of the most ambitious—and most influential—modern historical works that have sought to interpret that famous crosscultural mission.¹ These heavily armored books have noticeably stirred what was previously a quieter field. The field thus has been challenged and spurred toward further discussions.

Both books typify the academic cultures from which their authors come. Gernet's study of Western failures to come to grips with China and the justifiably scornful response of the Chinese takes the form of a traditional European monograph. It moves in small precise steps from one block quotation to the next, reconstructing doctrines rather than personalities. Spence's study of Ricci's efforts to use Western skills to master Chinese culture and to convert Chinese intellectuals to his cause is an admirable example of modern American micro-history. It travels in leaps rather than steps, and uses the most disparate of pigments, located in varied and obscure sources, to paint an icon of a single haunted saint of cultural contact.² Both books are brave, Gernet's in its willingness to engage in debate and Spence's in its effort to investigate at first hand both sides of the variably permeable membrane through which Western and Chinese ideas slowly moved. Both must be read by anyone interested in the field.

¹ See Gernet, *China and the Christian Impact: A Conflict of Cultures*, trans. Janet Lloyd (French edn. Paris: Gallimard, 1982; Cambridge: Cambridge U.P., 1985), and Spence, *The Memory Palace of Matteo Ricci* (New York: Viking Penguin, 1984).

² Simon Leys, *The Burning Forest: Essays on Chinese Culture and Politics* (New York: Henry Holt, 1985), pp. 35–46, however, scores Spence rather severely for having taken an out-of-the-way element of Ricci's work (four disparate explanations of Chinese ideographs buried inside his mnemonic handbook) to construct a life story. "When Picasso . . . turned a broken bicycle into a Minotaur . . . we marveled at his ability to make monuments out of junk. It would be unfair to say that Professor Spence does the exact opposite. Still, one deplores that he wasted such noble and inspiring material" (*ibid.*, p. 46).

China and the Christian Impact will for decades to come be a major contribution to the field of seventeenth-century Chinese reactions against Christianity. It is the first attempt by a mature reader of traditional Chinese culture to place the Jesuit enterprise in the context of China, not of Paris or the Vatican. However, Gernet works within a comparatively rigid structure of assumptions, which earlier historians of the same Jesuits escaped.³ *The Memory Palace*, too, is unlike the studies of previous historians in this field. Spence attempts a great deal and often succeeds. He makes imaginative and insightful remarks about reading, exegesis, hermeneutic problems, and social networks in both Ricci's Europe and the Chinese literati's late-Ming China. Yet he does not use one of these insights systematically enough to show exactly how visiting humanists (the Jesuits) may or may not have affected native Chinese humanists' own tools and materials of reading and interpreting.

In this article we concentrate on the texture and detail of Western and Chinese textual scholarship as practised by both Ricci and his hosts. We use evidence about the history of reading and interpretation to challenge as well as to clarify several points in Gernet's and Spence's arguments. For we believe that both books stop short of providing the full analysis of textual interpretation that yielded Ricci's versions of Western scholarship and that determined Chinese reactions to them. We also believe that such a two-pronged analysis is necessary in this field: in fact only this approach allows us to understand the intricate textual negotiations that preoccupied Jesuits on the one hand, and the Chinese literati on the other. This is important because the two cultures' humanist textual trends and methods headed toward one another at various moments, with occasional friction and occasional congruence.

Our article begins with a discussion of Ricci's and other early Jesuits' habits of Western scholarship (especially in relation to the use of the classic *Enchiridion*) and the fact that their type of allegorical reinterpretation had

extremely old roots. We show that Gernet in particular misunderstood an important aspect of both Ricci's textual skills and his larger vision of the history of Chinese classical exegesis. Gernet and other, but not all, historians, as shown following this, have paid too little attention to historical philology, the bedrock of humanism in the West and China. We next give examples of Gernet's and Spence's attempts to explain the social history of texts and text reading that emerges from the particular documents they adduce. We identify several specific texts and shades of interpretation that can, we hope, be profitably reexamined. After this part of the discussion one of the Chinese classics—the *Book of Changes* (*I-ching* 易經)—serves as a bridge over which to cross from the Jesuit textual world into the Chinese one. We analyze that particular classic's uses and textual challenges among some of the Chinese whom Ricci and his missionary successors met directly, or who can be seen as having had intellectual concerns and methods that paralleled those of the Jesuits. The *Book of Changes* was known by Ricci and discussed and probably studied by him, even though he left no record of having translated or interpreted it. Yet important Jesuits after him made enormous and even grandiose uses of it and claims for it in their proselytization. We close by suggesting that other aspects of intellectual life and psychology may be particularly good counterpoints to the kind of social history of reading and exegesis in which we are engaged.

In studying a case of intercultural proselytization, one must recognize that religious and cultural assumptions intruded between the missionaries and their audience and intrude between us and both groups. Yet this does not prevent an investigation from being cheerful and charitable. The fact that apostles traveled aggressively into spiritual "target markets" need not imply that their contacts with potential converts were always tainted or superficial. People's traveling and forcing open markets have been hallmarks of the human race throughout its history. Had it not been so, cultures would not have come into contact.

Religious proselytizing, of course, poses special problems. How is proferring a religion different from selling silk or horses? Perhaps we can start by agreeing to leave some questions aside: whether it is immoral for one culture to try to transform the ideas of another, or whether one culture's beliefs are better than another's, or whether we can or even should measure

³ Willard J. Peterson puts aside problems of determining the nature of religious conversion in his convincing study, "Why Did They Become Christians? Yang T'ing-yün, Li Chih-tsao, and Hsü Kuang-ch'i," in Charles Ronan, S.J., and Bonnie Oh, eds., *East Meets West: The Jesuits in China, 1582-1773* (Chicago: Loyola U.P., 1988), pp. 129-30.

the success of proselytization.⁵ To solve these questions would entail quite a bit of analytical philosophy and philosophy of history, which have their own special place in historical discussions. But such speculation seems out of place when so little of the factual picture is finished. We may profit by turning from the lofty conceptual level to the low nuts-and-bolts one of scholars' tools and materials. Premodern intellectuals, Eastern and Western, did not build the mental mansions they inhabited out of all new material. They used available equipment to alter, fix, and spruce up extant mental constructions; in particular they tinkered with language, text, and exegesis. We often can identify the components they assembled, the tools they used, and the plans they followed. By doing so we can see the Jesuits as Italian humanists and counter-reformers and their hosts, the Chinese, as the early delineators of "evidential studies 考證," a major trend that shaped techniques of reading, interpreting, and historicity in China for hundreds of years.

The new generation of works on the Jesuit mission in China is implicitly motivated by the desire to leave behind the strategies of an earlier period, roughly from 1910 to 1975, when three great issues dominated. These were, first, the talent and charisma of individual Jesuits (especially Matteo Ricci, 1552–1610); next, the Jesuits' so-called accommodation of China; and, finally, the diffusion of Chinese ideas to the West. The earlier scholars have given us a scenario, as it were, in which talented Vatican proselytizers go to China, perform brilliant feats, and act as attractive human examples to the Chinese. Gradually they arouse controversy at home, as they learn to tolerate gentle

ideas and practices in order to benefit their own plans, and begin to explain these tolerated ideas and practices to their countrymen in Europe.

These older works, for all their erudition, accuracy, and insight into the Jesuits' enterprise, shed little light on the Chinese scene and drew little light from Chinese sources. Now, however, recent progress toward understanding the society of late imperial China has called for changes in the study of the Jesuits. Several of the works we mention in the following discussion have made radical shifts of agenda; all have tried new tacks. The main issues of the earlier period of historical work have been transformed to some degree by post-1980 scholars—Gernet and Spence above all. We now turn to the complex and elusive transactions they describe.

RICCI'S HUMANIST TOOLKIT

Shortly after 1600 Matteo Ricci offered some wise counsel to Chinese scholars:

When a man is proud because he can understand and explain the *Book of Changes*, you listen and say to yourself quietly: if Fu Hsi 伏羲 had not written obscurely about the principles of the philosophy of nature and had not enveloped them in trigrams and hexagrams, this man would have nothing to be proud of.⁶

As we should expect where Jesuits and Chinese scholarship are concerned, we encounter boxes within boxes. The outermost layer—the lacquer of language and allusion—is convincingly Chinese. But the structure of the argument underneath is strictly Western. As Ricci explained to his

⁵ Gernet raises a warning about defining conversion in his review of Spence's *Memory Palace*, TP 72.4–5 (1986), p. 332, and about overestimating the size of the Jesuit success in his review of Douglas Lancashire's and Peter Hu Kuo-chen's translation of Ricci, *The True Meaning of the Lord of Heaven (T'ien-chu shih-i)*, TP 72.4–5 (1986), pp. 336–38. Gernet's *China and the Christian Impact*, as discussed below, attempts to prove that a Christian impact was logically impossible. Earlier, Heinrich Busch warned against believing early Jesuits' reports about the size of their proselytizing successes. See his "The Tung-lin Shu-yüan and Its Political and Philosophical Significance," MS 14 (1949–54), pp. 1–163, esp. pp. 159–61; but he does not attempt to disprove any possibility of meaningful impact, as does Gernet. Erich Zürcher, "The Jesuit Mission in Fujian in Late Ming Times: Levels of Response," in W. L. Idema and E. Zürcher, eds., *Thought and Law in Qin and Han China: Studies Dedicated to Anthony Hulst* (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1990), shows that converts in a province far from Peking were generally more numerous than and unlike converts from other regions and that they were eager to adapt and make operable Christian tenets and genres of thought. He draws on fascinating Dutch sources and modern scholarship to describe the architecture and decoration of the Jesuit church in Fu-chou in the 1660s (p. 425, n. 16), making a case for a substantial Chinese Christian population in Fukien by the 1640s (p. 428). Richard Madsen's "The Catholic Church in China," in Perry Link, ed., *Unofficial China: Popular Culture and Thought in the People's Republic* (Boulder, Col.: Westview Press, 1989), pp. 103–18, shows that the continued existence of small Catholic communities for 300 years is historically significant despite today's small numbers. Chinese Catholics have adopted processes like lineage fulfillment and tradition to the ever-changing universalistic issues of the Catholic church.

⁶ Christopher Spalatin, S.J., trans., *Matteo Ricci's Use of Epictetus* (Waegwan, Korea: Pontificia Universitas Gregoriana, 1975), p. 45. Here Spalatin misses a weighty internal quotation from the Chinese tradition. The line beginning with "If Fu Hsi . . ." should be translated: "If Fu Hsi, in making known 'hsing ming chih li' 性命之理, had not covered over his meaning with graphs and lines" (cf. Li Ma-tou 利瑪竇 [Matteo Ricci], *Erh-shih-wu yen* 二十五言, in Li Chih-tsao 李之藻, comp. *T'ien-hsiieh ch'u-han* 天學初函 [1629; rpt. Taipei: Taiwan Student Book Co., 1965], p. 8b [p. 346]). "Principles of the philosophy of nature," while not lexically incorrect, might be left untranslated, since it was a much-debated core phrase in the 550 years of neo-Confucianism before Ricci's arrival. The Chinese phrase is taken directly from *I-ching* (i.e., *Book of Changes*, "Shuo-kua" 說卦, sect. 2; see *A Concordance to Yi Ching*, Harvard-Yenching Institute Sinological Index Series, Suppl. 10 [rpt. Taipei: Chinese Materials and Research Aids, 1966]), p. 49, rt. Otherwise Spalatin could have used Richard Wilhelm's translation, which would reveal orthodox neo-Confucian interpretation; R. Wilhelm, trans. Cary F. Baynes, *The I Ching or Book of Changes*, 3d rev. edn. (Princeton: Princeton U.P., 1967), p. 264: "the order of their (the holy sages') nature and of fate." Spalatin is careless about important terms like *shang-ti*, which he inexplicably changes from "God" (p. 33) to "Sovereign Ruler" (p. 36).

student Hsü Kuang-ch'i 徐光啓, he drew his teachings from the Christian and ancient classics he had brought with him—classics whose doctrines seemed to him to complement the dazzling morality and religion of the Confucian classics, themselves a "clear blue sky" in an ugly pagan cosmos. In the above case, the *Enchiridion* of the slave-philosopher Epictetus was Ricci's source. A millennium and a half before Ricci, Epictetus had warned against obsessive pride on the part of exegetes of obscure Western texts:

When a man is proud because he can understand and explain the writings of Chrysippus, say to yourself, if Chrysippus had not written obscurely, this man would have nothing to be proud of.⁷

Epictetus' classic manual of Stoic moral philosophy, translated from Greek to Latin by Italian humanists in the fifteenth century,⁸ in fact provided most of the material for Ricci's Chinese *Twenty-five Sayings* (*Erh-shih-wu yen* 二十五言), as Christopher Spalatin showed fifteen years ago.⁹ When Ricci offered classic Western counsel to a Chinese audience, he did so more as a translator than an author.

Yet Ricci's role in bringing Greek Stoicism to the Chinese was anything but passive. Again and again he adapted his ancient Western text to his new Eastern context. Epictetus warned that one who could interpret texts but could not put their precepts into practice would be merely a *philologos*, a grammarian, not a *philosophos*.¹⁰ In China, where literati traditionally both transmitted and interpreted texts, the purely professional distinction could not be made easily. Accordingly, Ricci's *Twenty-five Sayings* threatens the exegete with becoming "an actor and not a philosopher of life"¹¹—a member of an inferior social order (actor) rather than a practitioner of an inferior cultural genre (*philologos*).¹² Elsewhere, Ricci transforms Epictetus' Greek command to "desire philosophy" into a Chinese sermon about how to "prac-

tice virtue."¹³ He reworks the Greek myth of Eteocles and Polynices, the brothers who fought over Thebes, into the Chinese tale of Wei Che 衛軫 and K'uai K'uei 蒯瞶, the father against whom Wei Che rebelled "because he believed that his happiness consisted in being master in place of his father."¹⁴ And he adds flavor and texture to Epictetus' insistence on the triviality of slander by telling a story of that archetypal Western mandarin, St. Francis, and his disciples.¹⁵

Even passing phrases vividly evoke the Chinese world that Matteo Ricci knew so well. If Epictetus described the world as a theater and life as a play, Ricci used the imperial court itself as the most striking and concrete imaginable symbol of the theatrical side of worldly power and eminence: "The emperor, public ministers, grand officials, functionaries, servants, the empress and her attendants are all a fleeting and passing show. The costumes they wear are not their own."¹⁶

This chapter in the history of the Western classical tradition demands attention from historians of East and West alike. Ricci's magnificent rhetorical Chinoiserie, at once the most original and the most bizarre of Renaissance commentaries on a Greek philosophical text, deserves at least as close a study as the efforts of his Italian and northern contemporaries to make ancient texts relevant to normal European conditions.¹⁷ But until recently

¹³ *Enchiridion*, 22 (Spalatin, *Ricci's Use of Epictetus*, p. 33). Epictetus' phrase in Ricci's Chinese might be better rendered as "set your life's mission on cultivating learning." On the professional divisions among literate men in the early medieval West, see Kaster (n. 12).

¹⁴ *Enchiridion*, 31 (Spalatin, *Ricci's Use of Epictetus*, pp. 37–38). Ricci (perhaps assisted) used the story of Wei Che in *Tso-chuan* (Ai 2.5); see James Legge, trans., *The Ch'un T's'u with the Tso Chuen*, vol. 5 of *The Chinese Classics* (rpt. Hong Kong: Hong Kong U.P., 1960), pp. 798–99.

¹⁵ *Enchiridion*, 33 (cf. Spalatin, *Ricci's Use of Epictetus*, p. 30).

¹⁶ *Enchiridion*, 17. Here, Spalatin's translation of Ricci's Chinese version (*Ricci's Use of Epictetus*, p. 42) might be revised to read: "The men of this world are like actors on a stage. The commonplace jobs they do are like the dramatic roles actors perform. Emperors, public ministers, grand officials, functionaries, servants, the empress and her attendants are all momentary decoration. The costumes they wear are not their own" (*Erh-shih-wu yen*, p. 7a [343]). The implicit warnings in Epictetus' sayings were relevant in Ming China; for recent works that touch on the withdrawn, and often debased, world of entertainments and lifestyles in the Ming palace, see James Geiss, "The Leopard Quarter during the Cheng-te Reign," *Ming Studies* 24 (1987), pp. 1–38; Ray Huang, 1587: *A Year of No Significance* (New Haven: Yale U.P., 1981), pp. 27, 31, 96–99; and Frederick W. Mote and Howard L. Goodman, *A Research Manual for Ming History* (Princeton: Princeton U. Chinese Linguistics Project, 1984), pp. 79–83, and 87.

¹⁷ Modern scholarship has revealed that 15th- and 16th-c. Neo-Platonists built from Plato and his ancient commentators and continuators a set of philosophical systems that challenged that of Aristotle in depth and consistency, if not in popular appeal or curricular acceptance. This tradition produced a rich body of speculation about the natural world, which it tended to treat (especially in the late 16th and early 17th cc.) as permeable, flexible, even protean—ideas far closer to the Chinese than Gernet allows. And its proponents normally accepted the

⁷ *Enchiridion*, 49.

⁸ For the study and translation of the *Enchiridion* into Latin and the vernaculars by N. Perotti, A. Poliziano et al., see R. P. Oliver, ed., *Niccolò Perotti's Version of the Enchiridion of Epictetus* (Urbana: U. of Illinois P., 1954), and L. Zanta, ed., *La traduction française du Manuel d'Épictète d'André de Rivaudéau au XVI^e siècle* (Paris: Champion, 1914).

⁹ Spalatin, *Ricci's Use of Epictetus*, chap. 1, with the same cautions as those raised in n. 6, above. Spalatin's translation of *yen* 言 as "paragraphs" ("Book of 25 Paragraphs") is suited, thus our "Sayings." Jonathan Spence, "Matteo Ricci and the Ascent to Peking," in Ronan and Oh, eds., *East Meets West*, p. 18, n. 30, acknowledges Spalatin's work, about which he first learned at the conference for the symposium.

¹⁰ *Enchiridion*, 49. ¹¹ Spalatin, *Ricci's Use of Epictetus*, p. 46.

¹² For a revealing view of the various social weights the term "grammarian/philologos" would have had in Epictetus' time, see Robert A. Kaster, *Guardians of Language: The Grammarian and Society in Late Antiquity* (Berkeley: U. of California P., 1988), esp. chap. 3.

little effort has been made to set Ricci's enterprise into the larger context of Renaissance culture. To be sure, many historians have told the brilliant story of his mission. Hagiographers—like George Dunne, S.J., author of the notably impartial tract *Generation of Giants*, published with full imprimatur by Notre Dame in 1962—have had nothing but praise for Ricci's humanity and open-mindedness. (We learn that Ricci's account of Chinese civilization, after all, gave twenty-one pages to China's admirable features and only eight to her shortcomings.) Theologians like Johannes Bettray and intellectual historians like John Young have studied Ricci's views on "accommodation"—essentially, in their accounts, his efforts to show the compatibility of Confucianism and Christianity.¹⁸ And erudite compilers like Donald Lach and David Mungello (the latter probably the most successful of all in relating the Jesuits to European intellectual history) have assembled published and unpublished documents about the impact of Ricci's and other Jesuits' accounts on the imaginary Chinas created by so many European intellectuals from Scaliger to Leibniz and beyond.¹⁹

Ricci was above all a humanist and a scholar. That is, he worked with texts: Confucian classics that he mastered as the price of entrance to conversations with the Chinese elite and Western classics that gave him the authority to offer an alternative to Confucianism. He interpreted both with flair and individuality, as Spalatin's monograph shows. But he also applied many established philological and hermeneutical methods that he did not devise but inherited from his Jesuit teachers and their long humanist tradition. Spence

and Gernet both advert in passing to the interpretive skills Ricci imported. But neither really sets these into their original European place and time; and neither fully grasps Ricci's subtlety in applying them in China. Here we must turn to details and juxtapositions, like those offered by Spalatin, if we are to understand what Ricci spent his life doing. When we do, we discover errors and lacunae, as well as brilliant virtues, in Spence and Gernet.

In the first place, neither author deals with the fact that the updating of classic texts—pagan and biblical alike—had concerned Western intellectuals since antiquity. It is true, as Spence suggests,²⁰ that the Stoic ethics of Epictetus, with their almost Christian burden of demands on the virtuous man, were enormously popular in Catholic Europe around 1600. Justus Lipsius, friend and pupil (but not member) of the Society of Jesus, popularized Stoicism in his brilliant dialogue *De constantia* as the best spiritual preparation for an age of tyranny and civil war.²¹ Seneca (another Stoic) and Epictetus were popular authors, much commented upon and often imitated by moral essayists like Francis Bacon. And to that extent Ricci was very much an intellectual of his generation when he chose to adapt the *Enchiridion*. Spence's analysis of Ricci's classical and humanist tools and materials is welcome and perceptive. But only a far more detailed study—one that concentrates not only on the curious and fascinating art of memorization that Ricci practiced so successfully, but on all aspects of his grammar, rhetoric, and exegesis—will really enable us to compare him with Western scholars of the time, Catholic and Protestant, who had more normal careers.²²

Ricci's enterprise in fact fitted well within the norms that governed Renaissance scholars' dealings with ancient ethical texts. Consider Justus Lipsius, just mentioned. Lipsius was an influential Louvain professor and

notion that Eastern peoples (Egyptians, Chaldeans, Magi)—like the Chinese—had an intellectual tradition older and richer than the West's. The best survey remains P. O. Kristeller's collection of articles, ed. M. Mooney, *Renaissance Thought and Its Sources* (New York: Columbia U.P., 1979); the deepest study is J. Hankins, *Plato in the Italian Renaissance* (Leiden, 1990).

¹⁸ See Young, *Confucianism and Christianity*, and Bettray, *Die Akkommodationsmethode*. A large work on the "accommodationist" side is George Harris's "The Mission of Matteo Ricci, S.J.: A Case Study of an Effort at Guided Cultural Change in China in the Sixteenth Century," *MS* 25 (1966), pp. 1–168, one of the first modern attempts to get a better picture of Ricci through the Italian originals, not through Trigault. Cohen has discussed Young's work in placing in his review of Gernet's *China and the Christian Impact*. He is correct in placing Young generally in the "non-compatibility" group (*HJAS* 47.2 [1987], p. 675), and in identifying Young's concern with Confucianism.

¹⁹ See vol. 2, part 2 of Donald Lach, *Asia in the Making of Europe*, (Chicago: U. of Chicago P., 1977), and David Mungello, *Curious Land: Jesuit Accommodation and the Origins of Sinology*, *Studia Leibnitiana Supplementa* 25 (Leiden: Franz Steiner, 1985). Mungello's specialized journal *China Mission Studies (1550–1800) Bulletin* (in the future to be called *Sino-Western Cultural Relations (16th–18th Centuries)*) has published works that successfully examine the habits and toolkits of Jesuit humanists. See, e.g., Knud Lundbaek, "The First Translation from a Confucian Classic in Europe," *China Mission Studies Bulletin* 1 (1979), pp. 1–11, and idem, "Chief Grand Secretary Chang Chū-cheng and the Early China Jesuits," *ibid.* 3 (1981), pp. 2–11. The journal also occasionally reprints Chinese-language articles otherwise hard to acquire.

²⁰ Spence, *Memory Palace*, p. 141.

²¹ See in general G. Oestreich, *Neo-Stoicism and the Early Modern State* (Cambridge: Cambridge U.P., 1982).

²² There have been earlier forays into the field of the Jesuits' humanist toolkit in China. See under Fang Hao and D'Elia in the bibliography of Paul Rule's *K'ung-tzu or Confucius? The Jesuit Interpretation of Confucianism* (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1986). However, Fang and D'Elia made no attempt to put Ricci's use of text in a pedagogical, prosopographic, or other social context. Gernet, at the opening of his review of Spence's book (see n. 5, above), credits Spence for attempting to look into humanist tools and praises the highly informed and careful Western side of Spence's research. But he criticizes Spence's weaker cultural history of the Chinese side.

On European Jesuit pedagogy, see in general G. Codina Mir, *Aux sources de la pédagogie des Jésuites: Le 'Modus Parisiensis'* (Rome, 1968); F. Dainville, *L'éducation des Jésuites XVI^e–XVIII^e siècles* (Paris, 1978); A. Lynn Martin, *The Jesuit Mind: The Mentality of an Elite in Early Modern France* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell U.P., 1988); and Peter Dear, *Mersenne and the Learning of the Schools* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell U.P., 1988).

historian; he published a grand edition of the philosophical works of Seneca in 1605. Lipsius knew perfectly well that Seneca had not been a Christian, that his Stoical system had elements that no Christian theologian could accommodate but also had moral teachings that most Christians could use. After all, Seneca, like other Stoic sages, treated suicide as not only a right but in some circumstances a duty—and one that Seneca himself had carried out. But suicide was forbidden for Christians. Lipsius made this and many related points in a series of detailed monographs on Stoic teachings, richly supported by direct study of the classical sources.²³

In his edition, however, he sought to provide not philological insight into the historical peculiarities of Seneca's theories but philosophical insight into those tenets of Stoicism that could help his readers deal with external calamities. Accordingly, he deliberately presented the texts as unproblematic. Instead of offering detailed commentaries that might raise awkward questions, he put brief hortatory summaries at the outset of each of Seneca's letters. These praised Seneca's teachings and urged readers to try them in practice: "Haec diffuse, distincte, pulchre. O legamus, & aptemus." ("He makes these points at length, with discrimination, beautifully. O let us read and apply.")²⁴ When the texts argued the morality of suicide and other uncomfortable points, Lipsius glided past the contradictions between Stoicism and Christianity without calling attention to them.²⁵ In his introduction he did everything he could to present Seneca as not only a wise pagan but one who had virtually converted to Christianity. He quoted the medieval writer Otto of Freising, who had remarked that "Seneca should be called a Christian rather than a philosopher," even though he knew that Otto had not had his own keen sense of the cultural distance between Stoicism and Christianity. He even insisted that Seneca, as the Fathers had claimed and the Middle Ages believed, had corresponded with Saint Paul. True, the extant letters between them were spurious; but that did not mean the lost ones

had not been genuine.²⁶ Lipsius, in short, retrofitted Seneca to meet the needs of Counter-Reformation Catholic intellectuals around 1600, offering them a meticulously modern text of a Seneca restored to his medieval status as a Christian sage—just as Ricci reworked Epictetus for the Chinese.²⁷

The Jesuits in particular were probably Europe's leading specialists in forcing texts to send messages and serve purposes that their authors had never intended. The Order realized early on that founding rigorous, excellent schools would provide a way to recapture the allegiance of local elites who had converted to Protestantism but needed their sons groomed in the classics. The sons would learn their Latin and ballistics—the arts a Renaissance nobleman needed; but they would also be disciplined and wooed back to the Catholicism of their grandparents. The Jesuits framed a new pedagogy based on the direct study of classical Latin texts but designed to produce active, faithful Catholics.²⁸ To realize this double aim they had to perform massive exegetical surgery on their texts, sometimes by excising parts or whole works that could not be made to fit, sometimes by allegorical discovery of Christian messages in pagan texts and myths. The Jesuits steeped their young pupils in a nominally Greco-Roman culture "emptied of everything specifically Greek or Roman. It became a kind of unreal, idealized environment peopled by personalities who had no doubt historically existed but who were presented in such a way that they had . . . nothing historical about them. They were now simply figures betokening certain virtues and vices, and all the great passions of humanity. Achilles is courage, Ulysses is wily prudence . . . Such general and unspecific types could easily be used to exemplify the precepts of Christian morality."²⁹

To make the ancients safe for their students the Jesuits would brave any text. For example, Nicolas Caussin and Athanasias Kircher (to whom we return below) detected in the hieroglyphics of the Egyptians the relics of a primitive monotheism that correct (that is, far-fetched) exegesis could retrieve. Another, Pierre Gautrouche, made Greek mythology safe for schoolboys by arguing that the earliest Greeks too had once possessed—but sadly lost—a monotheist revelation, which their myths destroyed.³⁰ Ricci's enter-

²³ See S. L. Saunders, *Justus Lipsius: The Philosophy of Renaissance Stoicism* (New York: Liberal Arts, 1955).

²⁴ Seneca, *Opera, quae exstant omnia*, ed. J. Lipsius (Antwerp: Plantin-Moretus, 1605), p. 495.

²⁵ See, e.g., his argumentum to ep. 70, which sums up its message thus: "Death should not be feared, or desired, or chosen, except sometimes. And when? When reason, not impulse, shall persuade you. More very fine things to this effect"—hardly a full commentary. In a note on the same letter he discusses Seneca's remark that a lancet could set one free: "That is, by cutting a vein. This was a common method for dying in Seneca's time, and was Seneca's own"—again, hardly a full treatment of the issues. Ibid., pp. 505, 507. See also Saunders, *Justus Lipsius*, pp. 111–16, and H. Ettinghausen, *Francisco de Quevedo and the Neostoic Movement* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1972).

²⁶ Seneca, *Opera*, ed. Lipsius, xx, xxv.

²⁷ See K. A. Blüher, *Seneca en España*, trans. J. Conde (Madrid: Gredos, 1983).

²⁸ In addition to the works cited in n. 22, above, see M. -M. Compère, *Du collège au lycée (1500–1850)* (Paris: Gallimard/Julliard, 1985), and G. Snyder, *La pédagogie en France aux XVII^e siècles* (Paris: P.U.F., 1965).

²⁹ E. Durkheim, *The Evolution of Educational Thought*, trans. P. Collins (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1977), pp. 250–51.

³⁰ E. Iversen, *The Myth of Egypt and Its Hieroglyphs in European Tradition* (Copenhagen: Gec Gad, 1961); D. C. Allen, *Mysteriously Meant* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins U.P., 1970); and R. J.

prise, with its effort to find points of contact with Christianity in the oldest texts of the Chinese by stripping away their more recent layers of superstition and blasphemy, had obvious parallels with the efforts of his colleagues in the West. A full study of Ricci's work will have to compare it with that of the Jesuits who interpreted the ancient Near East for contemporary Westerners with equal dexterity and, no doubt, greater success among their readers.

Ricci also drew on far older traditions, traditions as old as Philo and Augustine—traditions that held that a classic with problematic features of tone or content should be modified and adapted to meet the needs and tastes of a modern audience. Already in Christian Byzantium, an unknown scholar had begun the process Ricci would later carry further in his Chinese *Twenty-five Sayings*. This unknown reader brought the *Enchiridion* up to date for his time by summarizing it in Christian rather than strictly Stoical terms. He warned the exegete, for example, to avoid too much pride in his explication of the Bible, lest he become *grammatikos* rather than *hesychast*—a grammarian rather than a mystic.³¹ Epictetus thus survived less like a fly preserved in amber than like a pebble moved and eroded by a glacier. Neither his text nor his situation remained static for long.

Allegorical and violent forms of updating (in a sense forms of accommodation) were long accepted in the West by Ricci's time. He used the most traditional of humanistic assumptions and techniques to make the Western classics live in China. In fact, modern scholars of the Jesuits in China who are concerned with "accommodationism" as a historical explanation should take note: updating texts and history itself began with the Greek readers of Homer and the Greek and Latin fathers of the Church; and their rediscovered method found its way easily into the schooling and rhetorical styles of sixteenth-century reformers like the Jesuits. We should contemplate such textual revampings not as thought-out "policies" in an accommodationist masterplan, but as traditional, pedagogically acquired reactions that seemed absolutely standard as textual tools to Ricci and his contemporaries.

More serious—because they involve genuine misconstruction of the documents—are the defects in Gernet's treatment of Ricci's Chinese program. Ricci believed that the earliest Confucian classics were far more compatible with Christianity than the later Chinese interpretations of them. In the *Four Books* he found many passages that favored the teachings of Christianity, but in contrast he criticized the later Chinese commentative

literature as vast and sterile.³² So far so good; all humanists reject the gloss for the text, as Petrarch rejected medieval glossators for the history and beauty of Rome and Roman literature.³³ But Ricci went further. He admitted that he exploited specific passages in the classics that Confucius had left ambiguous, intending "to draw over to our opinion Confucius, the principal of the sect of the men of letters, by interpreting in our favour certain doubtful writings left by him." And he thus found clear references in the classics to a single God in heaven and a counterpart to heaven above in a Chinese hell below.³⁴

Gernet takes these admittedly dubious procedures as typical of Ricci's scholarship. Ricci, he argues, deliberately misdated the late Confucian beliefs that he disagreed with to very recent times, only "fifty years" before his own arrival in China. And he described his own interpretations of the classics as designed "to turn" Confucian texts into Christian ones inconspicuously, "so that we appear not so much to be following Chinese ideas as interpreting Chinese authors in such a way that they follow our ideas."³⁵

The problem here is simple. In the passage in question, a Latin letter to the general of his order that is published in D'Elia's compendium, Ricci described one of the most prominent of the later Confucian ideas that he rejected, that of *t'ai-chi* 太極, an early metaphysical term rooted both in astronomical thinking—the axis of the North Star—and in Taoism's "great ultimate," later coming to mean the generator of the world. However, Ricci had dated its appearance quite accurately, describing it as "nova . . . et quingentos ante annos data" ("modern and established five hundred years ago").³⁶ In fact the later philosophical sense of *t'ai-chi* (generator of the world) had caught on powerfully in the eleventh century, exactly where Ricci sets it. And he described his own procedure in terms as complex as his dating of the *t'ai-chi* was exact:

Quare satius esse duximus in hoc libro impugnare, quam ea quae dicuntur, congruenter ad Deum detorquere, ne videremus nos magis sequi legem sinicam, quam facere et interpretari sinicos autores ut sequantur nostram legem. (Hence I thought it more proper to attack in

³² See Gernet, *Christian Impact*, pp. 23–28.

³³ For the humanist program, see Kristeller, *Renaissance Thought*.

³⁴ Gernet, *Christian Impact*, p. 26.

³⁵ Ibid., p. 27. For Gernet's contention that "fifty years ago" was a deception on Ricci's part, see his n. 51, *ibid.*, p. 253.

³⁶ Pasquale M. D'Elia, S.J., ed., *Fonti Ricciane* (Rome: Libreria dello Stato, 1942–49) 2, p. 297.

this book, rather than to twist what is said to make it fit God, lest I find myself following the Chinese law instead of interpreting the Chinese authors so that they follow our law.)³⁷

Gernet, apparently convinced that no "Aristotelian" Westerner—so much for Bruno and Campanella—could grasp the Chinese cosmology,³⁸ has twisted Ricci far more than Ricci twisted Confucius. In fact, Ricci here makes clear that only a certain degree of modernization and interpretation was acceptable to him. Some Chinese texts could not be made Western or Christian except by distorting their entire fabric of assumption and argument; to do that was inevitably to risk taking over some of the very views one needed to refute.³⁹

PROBLEMS IN THE DESCRIPTIONS OF RICCI'S LINGUISTIC TOOLS

Gernet's interpretation of Ricci's Chinese translation and hermeneutic skills reveals further problems. For example, in his emphatic last section,⁴⁰ based on arguments concerning the structural differences between Indo-European and Chinese language families, he deduces the impossibility of transmitting important pre-Socratic concepts like "being" or "substance" into Chinese.⁴¹ However, studies by A. C. Graham and Richard Robinson have shown that Chinese in the past have consciously adapted their concrete language to suit abstract contexts like these.⁴² Furthermore, such argumen-

³⁷ Ibid., p. 298.

³⁸ See Gernet, *Christian Impact*, pp. 209–10, for a reductionist account of Western philosophy as simply Aristotelian.

³⁹ Rule, *K'ung-tzu*, pp. 51–55, also reasons that Ricci and his colleagues could not—lest they risk their Christian principles—have become too syncretistic or too accommodationist.

⁴⁰ See Gernet, *Christian Impact*, sect. "Language and thought," pp. 238–47.

⁴¹ See *ibid.*, esp. pp. 145, 192, 212, 218.

⁴² A. C. Graham, *Later Mohist Logic, Ethics and Science* (London and Hong Kong: Chinese U.P. and London U., S.O.A.S., 1978), esp. pp. 22–58. Graham shows with convincing paleography that in ca. 4th–2d centuries BC changes in the literary language were made by a group of writers in order to postulate concepts of space and form (*ibid.*, esp. pp. 301 ff.). Graham even apologizes to non-"sinologists" (*ibid.*, p. xiv), but he needn't. Richard H. Robinson, *Early Mādhyamika in India and China* (Madison: U. of Wisconsin P., 1967), demonstrates how early medieval classical Chinese evolved so as to convey the much more florid logical style of Indian *śāstra*—multiple-lemma argumentations based on ideas of nothingness and emptiness (Ch.: *k'ung* 空; Skt: *śūnyatā*). Robinson's brilliant study of textual adjustments by proselytizers in China counters Gernet's "non-compatibility" theory.

Paul Cohen's review (*HJAS* 47.2 [1987]), pp. 677–79, usefully demonstrates that Gernet's assertions about non-compatibility, while perhaps true, cannot be demonstrably true. They are ultimately circular arguments. Cohen shows that in some cases Gernet believes his Chinese sources perhaps too fully. (He refutes Gernet's assertions that the Chinese were

tation is easily seen, although in not as florid a form as early Buddhist *śāstra*, directly among the intellectuals of Ricci's time. For example, Ku Hsien-ch'eng 顧憲成 (1550–1612) once explained Wang Yang-ming's philosophy of *hsin* 心 by using epistemological and cognitive terms to analyze the differences between moral qualities' attaching, adhering, or inhering in people. Although this is not a new argument in Chinese intellectual history, it is important to point out that early models (both Mo-ist and Buddhist) had not been forgotten.⁴³

Any theory that challenges the possibility of one culture's understanding another's language and ideas must rest on solid coverage of both cultures' terms and lexicons. Gernet refers several times to the concept *shang-ti* 上帝—rendered by Ricci as "*dio/deus*"—in his attack on Ricci's borrowing classical Chinese terms to stand for Christian concepts. However, Gernet's etymological review of the term is too brief and one-sided to convince us fully.⁴⁴ He should have explained that any criticism must rest on modern discoveries, not on what Ricci (or the Chinese of his time) knew. In fact, we know more about the ancient social context of *shang-ti* now than at any earlier time because of twentieth-century archaeology and philology.⁴⁵ Ming-dynasty literati could not possibly have known the details of late neolithic religious rituals recorded in and revealed by the oracle bones. Furthermore, the Chinese classics state only briefly what *ti* said to men, but in no way show what *ti* was like. Nor do they agree on the etymology and semantic kernel of the graph *ti*.⁴⁶ Western records of communications with spirits and gods are more loquacious; they record personal struggles between men and their gods with much detail. For Gernet's type of thesis, one needs to categorize such Western divine communications and then deduce

entirely averse to the Jesuits' conceptions of monogamy and chastity.)

⁴³ Ku's exegesis of Wang Yang-ming is translated by Busch, "Tung-lin Shu-yüan," pp. 107–10; for Wang's entire remarks, see William de Bary, ed., *Sources of Chinese Tradition* (New York: Columbia U.P., 1960) 1, pp. 522–23 (citing Wang-ming *ch'üan-shu* 陽明全書, ch. 2, pp. 4b–5a).

⁴⁴ Gernet, *Christian Impact*, p. 193.

⁴⁵ See, for example, David Keightley's *The Sources of Shang History* (Berkeley: U. of California P., 1978), a background for Shang language, which exists today mostly as epigraphic remains of divinations. Also see *idem*, "The Religious Commitment: Shang Theology and the Genesis of Chinese Political Culture," *History of Religions* 17.3–4 (1978), pp. 211–24. Peter Boodberg (Keightley's teacher), in his "Cedules," once called the *ti* of *shang-ti* "the-arch" or "di-arch." In doing so he was suggesting, valuably, that translating by means of agglutinatives reveals actual tendencies in the political nomenclature of Shang. See Boodberg, in Alvin Cohen, ed., *Selected Works of Peter A. Boodberg* (Berkeley: U. of California P., 1979), pp. 217–20.

⁴⁶ For a similar opinion, see Benjamin Schwartz, *The World of Thought in Ancient China* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard U.P., 1985), pp. 50–51. See also Young, *Confucianism and Christianity*, pp. 32–33.

how they might have been used textually and philosophically by Ricci and his fellow missionaries. We also need to know that on the Chinese side an early split in terminology occurred, making *t'ien* 天 more important by the late ancient period. And *t'ien* is problematic for another reason: it frequently acquired such binomial word-partners as *tao* 道 or *li* 理, or material-metaphysical complements like *ti* 地,⁴⁷ all of which affects the larger argument. Furthermore, Ricci's rendering of *shang-ti* as "*deus*" might have been influenced by mere pedagogical habits. Ricci was still learning the literary language, and a common neophyte mistake is to translate too literally, or to reify needlessly (much as proud beginners in Greek may insist on translating *thermophylae* as "the hot gates").⁴⁸

Many sixteenth-century Chinese literati, stemming at least basally from the Ch'eng-Chu 程朱 tradition, would not have described *t'ien* or *shang-ti* in graphic detail. On one hand, they would have considered the concepts as primary etymons symbolizing a supernal force that assigned men their missions and helped the Chinese people. Yet, on the other hand, literati were increasingly concerned about particulars of society, and *did* want to bring evidence to show why there should have been two terms. Chu Hsi 朱熹 (1130–1200) often thought of *t'ien* and *ti* as supernal forces and no more. Huang Tsung-hsi 黃宗羲 (1610–1695) was known to have been concerned with humanistic explanation for the coexistence of them.⁴⁹ The latter signals a textual way to look into the *shang-ti/t'ien-chu* 天[主] question: did Ricci not understand the terminological differentiation? Did the use of *t'ien-chu* to render "Christian god" needlessly confuse? In other words, was it a

⁴⁷ Julia Ching's *Confucianism and Christianity: A Comparative Study* (Tokyo: Kodansha Int'l, 1977), pp. 112–50, raises these issues.

⁴⁸ Neophyte overtranslation was not the only issue at stake by any means. The ground is aptly, albeit briefly, covered in Ching's *Confucianism and Christianity*, pp. 19–24. She asks the right questions: were Jesuits deceiving themselves by opting for the "purer form of Confucianism" (ibid., p. 16) (perhaps even too bookish for the Chinese), or were they unprepared for Confucianism's maelstrom of synonyms that could force a foreign philosophy into inconsistencies, as it had done to some early Buddhists (ibid., p. 19). Ching avoids the pitfalls of discussions, like Gernet's, that continue to use "*deus*" or "lord" for *shang-ti*. A useful, short summary of the Chinese textual path Ricci took in using "*deus*" is in Young, *Confucianism and Christianity*, pp. 29–33.

⁴⁹ Chu Hsi glossed the *Book of Changes*' use of *ti* tersely; he tacitly accepted *ti*'s priority and importance. See Chu's *Chou-i pen-i* 周易本義 comment to the "Tuan-chuan" 象傳 sect., in Li Kuang-ti 李光地, comp., *Chou-i che-chung* 周易折中 (rpt. Taipei: Chen-shan-mei ch'u-p'an she, 1971), vol. 1, pp. 643–44 [ch. 9, pp. 13a–b]; or l. 2 of hexagram 42, in ibid., p. 443 [ch. 6, p. 10a]. Huang Tsung-hsi once stated that in contradistinction to *t'ien*, which represented an all-encompassing public ancestral cult ("昔者周公郊祀后稷以配天"), *ti* showed deep reverence for the personal connection to a paternal ancestor ("宗祀文王於明堂以配上帝"). See Huang, *Meng-tzu shih-shuo* 孟子師說, ch. 1 (in Huang Tsung-hsi ch'üan-chi 黃宗羲全書 [Hangchow, 1985]) 1, pp. 54–55. We thank Lynn Struve for this reference.

tactical error by the Jesuits? Was a reevaluation of *ti* by contemporary Chinese an aspect of their budding new hermeneutics ("evidential studies")?

In another case of philology gone flat, Gernet presents the term *li* 理 as evidence of insuperable cultural differences.⁵⁰ *Li* itself has had an even fuller and more varied semantic history than *shang-ti*, and the range of its meanings is startling.⁵¹ The earliest sense was graphic: land that was laid out in parcels and ordered and, more abstractly, the benefit derived from "rationalizing."⁵² It also had the sense of "honing or perfecting" oneself,⁵³ and "to make distinctions, or set right."⁵⁴ Well before the Sung era (960–1279) it came to be used as "universal order(ing), or pattern(ing)," "fundamental truth," and even "un pur absolu, idéalisé, intériorisé, à la manière de l' 'ainsité' mahāyāniste (*tathatā*)."⁵⁵ But Gernet's one-paragraph philological summary does not convey any of this richness. When he says that *li* "refer[s]

⁵⁰ Gernet, *Christian Impact*, chap. 5, sect. "Universal dynamism."

⁵¹ Tang Chün-i 唐君毅 and Ch'ien Mu 錢穆 both contributed valuable studies of *li* in *Hsin-Ya hsüeh-pao* 新亞學報 1.1 (1955). Tang's "Lun Chung-kuo che-hsüeh ssu-hsiang shih li chih liu i" 論中國哲學思想史理之六義, pp. 45–71, summarizes Ch'ing k'ao-cheng studies of *li* and makes philosophical groupings rather than historical etymologies. Ch'ien's article, "Wang Pi Kuo Hsiang chu I Lao Chuang yung li-tzu t'iao-lu" 王弼郭象注易老莊用理字條錄, ibid., pp. 138–51, covers only one small period. Wing-tsit Chan's "The Evolution of the Neo-Confucian Concept Li as Principle," *CHHP* NS 4.2 (1964), pp. 123–48 (rpt. in Chan, *Neo-Confucianism, Etc.: Essays by Wing-tsit Chan* [Hong Kong, 1969]), is indispensable for the entire early etymology of *li*. Paul Demiéville's "La pénétration du Bouddhisme dans la tradition philosophique chinoise," *Cahiers d'histoire mondiale* 3.1 (1956), pp. 19–37 (rpt. in Demiéville, *Choix d'études bouddhiques* [Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1973]), also studies the early etymology, but focuses mostly on the transformation of *li* by such early Buddhists as Chih Tun 支遁. For *li* from other viewpoints, see Joseph Needham, *Science and Civilisation in China* (Cambridge: Cambridge U.P., 1956) 2, pp. 472–85, and A. C. Graham, *Two Chinese Philosophers: Ch'eng Ming-tao and Ch'eng I-ch'uan* (London: Lund Humphries, 1958), pp. 9–21.

⁵² See Bernhard Karlgren, *The Book of Odes* (Stockholm: M.F.E.A., 1950), pp. 164 and 190. Also, Karlgren's *Grammata Serica Recensa* (Stockholm: M.F.E.A., 1957; rpt. Taipei, 1966), p. 385, defines *li* as "to make into divisions," and "well-distributed." He shows also that *Chan-kuo* 戰國策 (an important pre-Han source) used the word in the sense of "to cut jade according to its veins."

⁵³ See Sun I-jang 孫詒讓, annot., *Mo-tzu hsien-ku* 墨子閒詁 (rpt. Taipei, 1955), p. 10 (from ch. 3 of *Mo-tzu*). Chan, "Evolution of Li," pp. 47–48, discusses this early step in the history of *li*. However, his translation of Mo-tzu's *li* as "principle" needs clarification: does he put it in the category of empirical, psychological, or moral principle? There is a danger in resolving to use the same English word for one Chinese graph that traverses so much etymological territory.

⁵⁴ See *Mo-tzu hsien-ku*, pp. 182–83; also see *Meng-tzu cheng-i* 孟子正義 (rpt. Taipei, 1974), pp. 452 (from sect. 6A.7 of *Meng-tzu*; trans. D. C. Lau, *Mencius* [Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1970], p. 164). Early on (probably in the immediate pre-Han era) *li* became a technical bureaucratic term for "judge" and "justice."

⁵⁵ For example, see Kuo Ch'ing-fan 郭慶藩, annot., *Chuang-tzu chi-shih* 莊子集釋 (Peking: Chung-hua, 1961), vol. 1, p. 119 (*Chuang-tzu*, ch. 3); vol. 2, p. 424; vol. 2, pp. 584–86. Tang, "Li chih liu i," p. 59, glosses the *li* cited first here as referring to something "empty" and "beyond form," but the Chuang-tzu story supports the sense of "patterns" just as well.

⁵⁶ See Demiéville, "La pénétration," p. 30.

to the idea of the organization of space"⁵⁷ he risks flattening the entire sense to something like a textbook definition, rather than reveal the concrete "plating forth our lands" of the ancient *Book of Songs*, to which he obviously refers.⁵⁸ Further on, Gernet makes the fundamental error of claiming that *li* "is a concept inseparable from that of *ch'i* 氣."⁵⁹ *Ch'i*—a concept first used discursively by Mencius—means something like dynamic, auspicious ether, but with many other nuances. Yet *li* was not joined firmly to *ch'i* in philosophy until the Sung era, and in fact before then binomial combinations like *t'ien-li* 天理 and *tao-li* 道理 did not form dichotomies.⁶⁰

Not giving the full richness of the word *li* is only a technical foul. But it also reveals the flaws in Gernet's game plan. By failing to appreciate that the Chinese literati had not patly decided on one way of understanding or using the word, he has revealed the rigidity of his thesis that Chinese and Western thought worlds were incompatible. Modern scholarship has shown that a famous Chinese glossator of whom Jesuits as early as Michele Ruggieri (1543–1607, who arrived at the Macao mission a few years before Ricci and began to learn Chinese) were well aware had already been adjusting and toning down Chu Hsi's use of *li* in connection with *hsing* 性 and *ch'i* in *Chung-yung* 中庸. This preferred model for the Jesuits was none other than Chang Chü-cheng 張居正 (1525–1583). In the later, matured, Jesuit translation of the *Four Books* (*Confucius Sinarum Philosophus*, published in Europe in 1687) he was openly admired (being called by the unofficial version of his state title—*ko-lao* 閣老, or "Colao"), and his translated glosses were integrated typographically into the format of the Jesuits' new work. *Confucius Sinarum Philosophus* itself drew partially on Ruggieri's earlier manuscript and

⁵⁷ Gernet, *Christian Impact*, p. 206.

⁵⁸ Gernet's footnotes show that he followed the explanation of *li* by Demiéville (see our n. 51, above). But the richness is not carried over.

⁵⁹ Gernet, *Christian Impact*, p. 206.

⁶⁰ When Huang Tsung-hsi says "*li* and *ch'i*... cannot be found in separation" (*Ming-ju hsieh-an* 明儒學案; trans. Irene Bloom, in Julia Ching, ed., *The Records of Ming Scholars by Huang Tsung-hsi* [Honolulu: U. of Hawaii P., 1987], p. 64), he is reading back into the history of the two terms, and implies that they belong together, not that they are always written together. Ch'en Ch'un 陳淳 (1159–1223), one of the first cataloguers of neo-Confucian philosophic terms, did not pair them at all in his section on *li*. (See his *Pei-hsi tzu-i* 北溪字義; trans. Wing-tsit Chan, *Neo-Confucian Terms Explained* [*The Pei-hsi tzu-i*] by Ch'en Ch'un, 1159–1223 [New York: Columbia U.P., 1986], pp. 112–13.) The turning point in the history of *li* before Ricci's time was Wang Yang-ming's influential repositioning of *li* within the mental interior, as part of a naturally moral mind (*Records of Ming Scholars*, pp. 104–6). The Ch'ing scholar Wang Fu-chih later would place all *li* within categories of nature. (See Ian McMorran, "Wang Fu-chih and the Neo-Confucian Tradition," in William de Bary, ed., *The Unfolding of Neo-Confucianism* [New York: Columbia U.P., 1975], pp. 438–39, 444, and Alison Black, *Man and Nature in the Philosophical Thought of Wang Fu-chih* [Seattle: U. of Washington P., 1989], pp. 67–69, 212–13.)

printed translations.⁶¹ There is reason to suspect that Ricci and Ruggieri had access to Chang's exegesis of the *Four Books* in an early edition dated to about 1574, despite the fact that the more well-known editions existed only after Chang's reputation was restored in the 1600s. Chang would naturally have appealed to the two Jesuits because he wrote for a boy (the Wan-li emperor) to aid him in the classics (the exegesis was called a *chih-chieh* 直解, "a colloquial [literally, 'straightforward'] explanation"), and Chang's national stature, political battles aside, made him a good authority for the Jesuits to hold onto.⁶² More important, he was a model that already represented a move, albeit a subtle one, away from Chu Hsi.⁶³

Gernet does not elaborate intricate textual connections of this type, but instead maintains a structural interpretation. He holds that the Jesuits failed partly because of absolute incongruities between the two languages and worldviews, and partly because the Jesuits' product was naïve and grossly self-contradictory in the light of superior Chinese traditions. Thirty years ago, however, Gernet wrote a masterful study of that great medieval precedent for an invasion of China by Western proselytizers—the social and economic establishment of Buddhism. In his preface he related an incident in which a newly enlightened Buddhist merchant sank one of his boats of valuable goods in order to gain religious insight, only to be begged by monks not to sink the other ships, but to use them instead as his "œuvres pieuses." Gernet remarked: "C'est cette liaison et les rapports souvent intimes de l'économie avec des faits de droit, de structure sociale, avec des pratiques et des comportements coutumiers que j'ai voulu analyser... [et] que j'ai essayé suggérer."⁶⁴ He succeeded at this task in 1956. But for the Jesuits' enterprise he does not look at possible connections leading from

⁶¹ See Lundback, "First Translation," pp. 1–11, and David Mungello, "The Jesuits' Use of Chang Chü-cheng's Commentary in Their Translation of the Confucian Four Books (1687)," *China Mission Studies Bulletin* 3 (1981), pp. 12–22. See a summary and slight extension of this line of investigation, and a comparison of Chang's glosses with those of Chu Hsi, in idem, *Curious Land*, pp. 279–82.

⁶² The fact that Chang Chü-cheng was the subject of abusive attacks from important literati in the 1570s and 1580s did not negate his stature. Even Tsou Yüan-piao (whom we treat below), who was beaten and exiled because of his criticisms of Chang, wrote a memorial to restore Chang's family and reputation in 1622. See Robert Crawford and L. C. Goodrich, "Chang Chü-cheng," in Goodrich and Chaoying Fang, eds., *Dictionary of Ming Biography* (New York: Columbia U.P., 1976) 1, p. 60.

⁶³ Mungello, "Jesuits' Use of Chang Chü-cheng," p. 12–13, merely suggests that the 1573 (i.e., original) edn. of Chang's work was unavailable to Ruggieri and Ricci; but the 1651 pref. by a private Chinese publisher in fact discusses "early editions" that he himself was able to see (ibid.). See Mungello, *Curious Land*, p. 281, for the insights about Chang's pedagogical language and the appeal of Chang's national stature.

⁶⁴ Jacques Gernet, *Les aspects économiques du bouddhisme dans la société du V^e au X^e siècle* (Saigon: École Française d'Extrême-Orient, 1956).

textual and literary tools to literati and non-literati reading, and thence to the social structures of religious transfer.⁶⁵

PROBLEMS IN THE DESCRIPTIONS OF TEXTS AND TEXTUAL KNOWLEDGE

Gernet, in insisting that the culture of the Jesuits lacked the wisdom of the East and could not have been explained in the Chinese language, calls on an unusual late-Ming treatise entitled "T'ien-hsüeh shuo" 天學說 ("An Explanation of the Learning of T'ien"). His argument is that the Christian concepts "God" and "heaven" would unavoidably have been misinterpreted by any Chinese literatus who dealt with them, and, perforce, by "T'ien-hsüeh shuo's" author Shao Fu-chung 邵輔忠 (c.s. 1596).⁶⁶ This Shao may have been a partisan of the infamous eunuch Wei Chung-hsien 魏忠賢, who in the 1620s took over the administrative and financial reins of government at the capital and terrorized officialdom while the emperor Hsi-tsung 熹宗 practiced carpentry in his palace. Shao was purged along with many other collaborators when Wei fell in 1627. He has no other known writings, and no official biographical notices other than a note in the section of the *Official Ming History* called "Treasonous Partisans."⁶⁷

The main points of the treatise, not presented in full by Gernet, are as follows:⁶⁸

1. There is a master of *t'ien* (that is, *t'ien-chu* 天主, the Jesuits' later rendering of "God"); it (he) is unitary and coordinates everything.
2. Mathematical astronomy and geometry are connected to the learning of the master of *t'ien*.
3. The ancient *Book of Changes* is the foundation for learning about *t'ien* (here not distinguishing "cosmos" from "on-high"; evidenced by the *Changes*' passage: "The myriad things take their beginning and thus permeate *t'ien*").⁶⁹ The master of *t'ien*, the teachings connected with *t'ien*, and the *Book of Changes* are all interrelated.
4. Ch'ien 乾, the first section of, and the primary figure in, the *Book of Changes*, reveres *t'ien* and understands us humans.
5. "Christianity does not use teachings to enlighten men," but "enlightens their minds with pictures."

"T'ien-hsüeh shuo" thus conflates essential Christianity with the Chinese classic *Book of Changes*. A modern bibliographic survey indicates that other Christian writings on the *Changes* existed at this time and slightly later.⁷⁰ Shao has cited passages from the "Hsi-tz'u chuan" 繫辭傳 portion of that classic, as well as ideas of both Shao Yung 邵雍 (1011-1077), a renowned *Changes* theorizer, and the ubiquitous "Confucius."⁷¹ Thus, we agree with Gernet that the treatise was written by some kind of literatus, that is, someone with at least a mediocre education. But is Gernet's point, that the conflation is in itself the evidence of lack of understanding, valid?

Part of our argument is that textual appropriation, tinkering, and accommodation (as some would have it) constitute a fairly universal mode of cultural transfer. Certainly neither Origen nor Augustine would have rejected someone new to the faith because he claimed to have got his Christianity via Homer — the consummate *theologos* of the pagans. The Jesuits themselves practised such strategies in China; after Ricci, they successfully shifted from translation and discussion of mere terms to the coopting of entire Chinese classics, especially the *Changes*, as Christian vehicles.⁷² If these Jesuits (if not all Christian leaders) expected that the Chinese might thus gain the path to conversion, then why is it necessary four hundred years later to say that it

⁶⁵ Cohen's review of Gernet (*HJAS* 47.2 [1987]), p. 680, also wonders about the shift of strategies by this leading historian of the social contexts of religion.

⁶⁶ We leave *t'ien* untranslated. "God" and "heaven" both were Christian translations of Chinese *t'ien*, which, however, without such context is "the on-high," or "highest authority." Willard Peterson's draft of a forthcoming chapter on the Jesuits, to be published in *The Cambridge History of China*, vol. 8, outlines the different meanings that early Christian missionaries mixed together in "t'ien": (1) god, (2) heaven as *caelum*, (3) astronomic science, and (4) sciences in general. It is easy to see how Chinese might have understood the Jesuits' ideas as something like a system of knowledge about the cosmos and the highest authority, and not specifically about a place of posthumous deliverance that is inhabited by angels and a creator-judge god. (We are obliged to the author for making available his draft.)

Gernet calls the treatise discussed here "anonymous," thus helping set up Shao as a high-minded literatus (Gernet, *Christian Impact*, pp. 195-96). Gernet's opinion about Shao Fu-chung follows that of Fang Hao 方豪, who wrote the pref. to the photographic rpt. of "T'ien-hsüeh shuo" found in Wu Hsiang-hsiang 吳相湘, gen. ed., *T'ien-chu-chiao tung-ch'uan wen-hsien hsü-pien* 天主教東傳文獻續編 (rpt. Taipei: Student Book, 1965) 1, pp. 3-18; the pref. is rpt. in Fang Hao, *Liu-shih tsu-t'ing kao* 六十自定稿 (Taipei: T'ai-wan hsüeh-sheng shu-chü, 1969) 2, p. 2273. But Fang's remark actually suggests that since the only Shao Fu-chung known to history was a partisan of a eunuch faction, then the author of the Christian-minded "T'ien-hsüeh shuo" could not, because of Tung-jin politics at the time, have been he, but rather some unrecorded person. One cannot deduce from Fang's weak speculation that the treatise is anonymous.

⁶⁷ *Ming-shih* 明史 (Peking: Chung-hua shu-chü, 1974) 306, p. 7856.

⁶⁸ See "T'ien-hsüeh shuo" 1, pp. 4-16.

⁶⁹ Rhetorical appeals to this famous passage of *Changes* were common; some of the Chinese who met Ricci used it too. These occasions are dealt with in detail, below.

⁷⁰ Hsu Tsung-tse 徐宗澤, ed., *Ming Ch'ing ch'ien Yeh-su hui-shih i-chu ti-yao* 明清間耶穌會士譯著提要 (Shanghai: Chung-hua, 1949), pp. 133-34.

⁷¹ "T'ien-hsüeh shuo," pp. 6-7, 10, 12-13.

⁷² See Mungello, *Curious Land*, chap. 9. This aspect of the Jesuit program is discussed below.

was, or is, not a correctly Christian expectation? This would be to argue theology rather than history.

Shao's treatise may have been influenced by Ricci's and other Jesuits' use of Christian images and iconography. At the very end he says, in speaking about the efficacy of images, "At present, the teaching of the Master of *t'ien* (that is, Christianity) from the great West seems able to succeed in this aspect (that is, the concerted use of images) in order to teach men that if they would merely study they would then be undeluded and undoubting; they could rise up to the hall of the Master of *t'ien* and enter the house of the Master of *t'ien*."⁷³

We know that Ricci's pictures did in fact reach believing eyes toward the end of his life. Attraction to Christian images—statues, portraits, dream scenarios of the Trinity—figured importantly in the conversions of the influential literati Yang T'ing-yün 楊廷筠 and Hsü Kuang-ch'i.⁷⁴ Shao equated the hoary images of the *Book of Changes* (for example, Ch'ien and K'un 坤) with Christian images, much like late antique and medieval Europeans who translated images and stories of pagan gods directly into Biblical ones. This may have reflected merely a natural association made by the Chinese between representational art and its use in explaining the supermundane.⁷⁵

The prefatory remarks in "T'ien-hsüeh shuo" mention Ricci, and the printed work's format (the lines break respectfully before every occurrence of the word "master of *t'ien*") indicates Christian punctiliousness. In fact, the work, carefully explaining that it fits into a successful genre of picture texts, may have been a book made for merit, one of Gernet's earlier "*oeuvres pieuses*." Whatever the verdict, "T'ien-hsüeh shuo" is rich because it taps several cultural layers—surprising trends in exegesis, religious handbook, and act of devotion or maybe merit. We must only be cautious about labeling it as an ineluctable failure to instruct in the new religion. Gernet's approach in this case suffers from a tendency to make cultural topoi in

China seem not only "fixed for all time,"⁷⁶ but also the same in all parts and social strata of China.

In *The Memory Palace of Matteo Ricci* Jonathan Spence has, like Shao Fuchung, ventured to tell us about halls and images. Spence's multilayered method aims at presenting to the reader Ricci's small pamphlet in Chinese called "Chi-fa" 記法 ("Memory Rules")—meant to be a manual of mnemonic technique and published along with woodblock illustrations of scenes from the New Testament. To do so he analyzes both Ricci's European social and intellectual background and the Chinese one, while narrating Ricci's mission in China and Ricci's own mental processes.

The very title of Spence's work suggests, however, a divergence from these aims. It does not say "The 'Memory Rules' of Matteo Ricci," but the "Memory Palace." Thus, Spence seems to give us a combination of Ricci's "Memory Rules" and his palatial intellectual constructs. Even the cover illustration suggests a noble personage boxed in by symbols and languages of two cultures. In fact, Spence's argument is that Ricci's particular kind of European intellect—linguistically and textually informed, yet raised on intimate and sometimes violent images of political and religious life—evolved sinically in China but remained bounded by his self-designed construct. In other words, Ricci's breakthroughs were not radical enough. We agree with this generally (as discussed below), but find actual, as opposed to impressionistic, evidence for the constraints on Ricci.

Spence's book is quite unlike Gernet's because it *does* view the Jesuits' and Chinese literati's worlds as potentially mutually understandable. When Spence describes Ricci's first choice of illustration to be included in Ch'eng Ta-yüeh's 程大約 volume of graphics, we learn how Ricci adjusted the details of Christian iconography to suit the Chinese context.⁷⁷ In the second image, Spence tells us that Ricci had to adjust culturally to Chinese Buddhism and to China's ethnocentric self-delusion about Moslems and Jews.⁷⁸ Ricci also had to intuit Chinese concerns for printing and books, and for memorizing the canons for examination.⁷⁹ Thus he introduced Western methods for artificially enhancing the memory as a novel and apposite shortcut to the mind-numbing exact textual knowledge required of the Chinese literati; this resulted in his "Memory Rules" ("Chi-fa"), written in

⁷³ "T'ien-hsüeh shuo," pp. 17–18.

⁷⁴ See Peterson, "Why Did They Become Christians?" pp. 141–44.

⁷⁵ See Victor Mair, "Records of Transformation Tableaux," *TP* (1986), pp. 3–43. For centuries, pictures used by storytellers and accompanying written text acted as tools of conversion (*ibid.*, pp. 18, 33), religious explanation (*ibid.*, pp. 14–15), and realistic images of hoped-for epiphanies (*ibid.*, pp. 19–20). Concerning the social context and the ritual use of pictures of hell in China, see Stephen F. Teiser, "Having Once Died and Returned to Life: Representations of Hell in Medieval China," *HJAS* 48.2 (1988), pp. 433–64, esp. p. 453, which mentions new evidence suggesting that as late as the 1300s explicit representations of the Ten Kings of Hell (originating in story and picture much earlier) were being commercially produced in large number by stencil and may likely have retained a catechistic function. The art historical approach to conversion, catechism, devotion, and belief in Chinese religions is discussed below.

⁷⁶ See Cohen's review (*HJAS* 47.2 [1987]), p. 680. For Jesuit-inspired *oeuvres pieuses* and works of Christian merit in late-Ming China, see Nicholas Standaert, *Yang Tingyun, Confucian and Christian in Late Ming China: His Life and Thought* (Leiden: Brill, 1988), pp. 68, 90.

⁷⁷ Spence, *Memory Palace*, pp. 63–64, 83.

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 113–15, 121–22.

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 154–56.

Chinese for the Chinese. However, it did not really win many Chinese converts, but was seen by the Chinese literati merely as a ticket to examination success. Thus, to gain conversions Ricci needed to use the graver, more elite, genres and tools of traditional Chinese textual exegesis. Spence shows, then, that Ricci and the Chinese understood and worked with a shared set of textual and intellectual material, despite expected gaps and incongruities.⁸⁰

Even before putting his "Memory Method" into published Chinese, Ricci had undertaken to translate parts of the Confucian *Four Books*, the latter-day canon of Confucian learning, which figured eminently in literati education. However, a whole world of classics, classical exegeses, and intellectual interest existed in addition to that. Ricci was no doubt aware of the *Five Classics*, because in composing *Twenty-five Sayings* he had executed a brilliant piece of cross-cultural textual reconstruction—an Epictetus that substituted Fu-hsi and the *Book of Changes* for Chrysippus. Thus he knew some of the Chinese territory. He recognized that the *Book of Changes* in particular was virtually the highest text in China and widely considered to be arcane.⁸¹

Spence's chapter "The Second Picture: The Road to Emmaus" discusses the social background of friendships and scholarly *amicitiae* in China. There we learn that Ricci had a skirmish that involved the *Book of Changes*. After his "Chiao-yu lun" 交友論 ("On Friendship") had gained him fame, Ricci began to receive letters from friends of friends; his network was broadening. One letter came from Tsou Yüan-piao 鄒元標 (1551–1624).⁸² The letter

⁸⁰ Spence astutely shows us that the Chinese, like Westerners, had had famous examples of text, arithmetic, and chessboard memorizers (ibid., p. 157). But Ricci's first customers for the "Memory Rules," Governor Lu's sons, indicated that the system was good, but (ironically enough) involved too many rules to remember (ibid., p. 4). A translation of those sections of the "Method," the eight long-winded rules in its section five (in Wu, gen. ed., *T'ien-chu-chiao tung-ch'uan wen-hsien* 天主教東傳文獻 [Taipei: Student Book, 1964]), would have been welcome. The rules are written in good Chinese parallel prose, even slightly rhapsodic. But in fact they may have been too explicit for functioning in the Chinese handbook genre. (Peterson, draft chapter, sect. 2, p. 3, explains that the "Memory Method" contains many difficult Western terms and proper names, as well as ambiguous philosophical propositions.) Chinese handbooks often have as their aim the restatement of commonplace philosophical maxims in the context of a few technical terms. For example, the figurations and graphic material that are found in the *Book of Changes* loosely framed 17th-c. treatises on art in this way; see Richard Edwards, *The World around the Chinese Artist: Aspects of Realism in Chinese Painting* (Ann Arbor: U. of Michigan P., 1989), pp. 120–21.

⁸¹ Ricci also used the powerful cachet of the *Change's* chief images, Ch'ien and K'un, in packaging his explanatory work on geometry and astronomy, *Ch'ien K'un t'i-i* 乾坤體義 (see Hsü, *Ming Ch'ing chien Yeh-su*, p. 312).

⁸² See Charles Hucker's biography of Tsou in Goodrich and Fang, *Dictionary of Ming Biography* 2, pp. 1312–14; and Tsou's official biography in *Ming shih* 243, pp. 6301–6. Tsou's letter is included in his collected writings *Yüan-hsüeh chi* 顧學集 (SKCS photo rpt. edn.) 3, p. 39a [vol. 1294, p. 89], but interestingly is not in another full version of his collected writings,

has been examined by several historians since the 1950s. The first was Busch, who considered Tsou to be praising Christianity.⁸³ Donald Treadgold cited and translated the letter, also making Tsou approve of Ricci, and he correctly pointed out that the "Kuo Yang-lao" who had written first to Tsou was a European Jesuit.⁸⁴ Spence missed this fact. Tsou says that on examining Ricci's earlier note (probably Christian philosophy in Chinese transmitted to him by Lazzaro Cattaneo [1560–1640]) he realized that all of Christian teaching was to be found in China's ancient sage teachings. Tsou concludes, "You sir, [may] read the *Book of Changes* [under the] Ch'ien [hexagram], [for which] it is said: '[the starting point of the myriad things] is linked to t'ien.'" But Spence's translation of Tsou reads, "you will see that the hexagram [Ch'ien] is concerned with 'the government of heaven.'" ⁸⁵

What does Tsou mean, and what does Spence mean? Tsou Yüan-piao, like even the less-sophisticated intellectual Shao Fu-chung, would have thought of the entire *Changes* phrase 大哉乾元萬物資始乃統天 as a profound metaphysical explanation of the way that the coming to be of things (or, phenomena) in the world is related to t'ien. To post-Chu Hsi classics readers generally it may have meant something like the following: "The myriad things take as base the [ultimate] beginnings, and at that very point they link with t'ien." ⁸⁶ T'ien thus would have carried for Tsou the implication

Tsou Nan-kao chi-hsüan 鄒南阜集選, in a copy kept at Harvard-Yenching Library.

⁸³ Busch, "Tung-lin Shu-yüan," pp. 160–61.

⁸⁴ Donald Treadgold, *The West in Russia and China: Religious and Secular Thought in Modern Times* (Cambridge: Cambridge U.P., 1973) 2, p. 13, seems to have learned of Tsou's letter from a compilation by Fang Hao, the inveterate Ricci-studies compiler. Treadgold mistranslates ("ch'ien [in the *Changes*] is used to mean Heaven") because he does not see the internal citation of the *Changes*. But a more interesting problem is the friend, Kuo Yang-lao, from whom Tsou has received the initiatory letter. Treadgold says correctly that it is the Chinese name of the Jesuit Lazzaro Cattaneo 郭居靜; 仰老 (see Aloys Pfister, S.J., *Notices biographiques et bibliographiques sur les Jésuites de l'ancienne mission de Chine, 1552–1773* [1932; rpt. San Francisco: Chinese Materials Ctr., 1976], item 15, where its variant is 仰鳳, and Young, *Confucianism and Christianity*, p. 43, who draws on Hsü family letters). Spence, *Memory Palace*, p. 151, without any reason converts "Kuo Yang-lao" to "Kuo Cheng-yü" 郭正域, a well-known Chinese scholar-official who once supported Ricci, and who is not known to have used the sobriquet "Yang-lao."

⁸⁵ Spence, *Memory Palace*, p. 151. This famous phrase of the *Book of Changes* is ambiguous. See Wilhelm, *The I Ching*, p. 370, who translates, "[Ch'ien] permeates all heaven," and on p. 4 Wilhelm comments, "All beings owe their beginnings to [Ch'ien]. This power permeates all Heaven." (The editor notes the inconsistency.) As seen in the following n., Chu Hsi's reading makes the beginning point 始 of things, not "Ch'ien" per se, link with t'ien. Spence's next paragraph quotes Wilhelm's "permeates all Heaven," thinking it to be a different portion of the *Changes*. But it is the same portion, and there should not be a different locution used to translate it.

⁸⁶ See *Chou-i che-chung* vol. 1, p. 620 [ch. 9, p. 1b], which cites Chu's *Chou-i pen-i*: "Yüan means 'to be great' and 'to be the beginning.' 'Ch'ien yüan' means the great beginning of the power of t'ien (i.e., Ch'ien). Thus every one of the myriad appearances of a thing [in the

of a "supernal" that is connected with "things 物." Such associations between *t'ien* and the phenomenal world are even laid out in the *Changes* section called the "Great Treatise."⁸⁷ Tsou is hinting at one or two things in the letter. First, he implies that the Chinese have "always" (here Spence could be stronger—the construction means "never ever not") connected the origin of all elements and things in the universe with the supernal (that is, *t'ien*). Thus Tsou may be kindly offering another datum from China's classics for Ricci's project to find evidence for ancient Chinese belief in *t'ien*. Second, he says that the Chinese and Christian teachings outwardly look alike, but that China's "sages and all the [later] textual interpreters"⁸⁸ have "developed [the ideas] more elaborately."⁸⁹ So, he hints: if you Jesuits believe that we are the same, then you should read the *Changes* (with its exegeses) to learn in detail how it has been so. You need to continue your studies.

Here is a crux in Ricci's encounter with Tsou Yüan-piao, and for several reasons one can assume that the second intention was probably intended, if not entirely excluding the first. Tsou had been communicating with Cattaneo, who opened the door to Tsou for Ricci. Tsou wrote politely in the letter, but it is perhaps a politeness with an underlying strong aim to teach.

world] is based on [yüan] as a beginning point. Also, as the primary one of the four powers (i.e., first among the *Change's* special terms: 元亨利貞), [yüan] links with 貞 the starting points 始 and endpoints 終 of the power of 't'ien.' That is why [the text] says 't'ung-t'ien.'" From this, as well as his ideas in *Chu-tzu yü-lei* 朱子語類 (cited next in *ibid.*), it is clear that Chu prefers not to associate *yüan* too positively with the relatively material "things." But he cannot escape at least some kind of philosophic connection, due in large part to the frank, material-causal interpretation found in the much-hallowed tradition. In fact, Wang Pi (226–249 AD) had defined any form as "an en masse adhering together of things" 夫形也者物之累也. Then he claimed that the "operator" (user 用形者) of the form "signified as" *t'ien* (i.e., *chien* 健) keeps the form eternally in place because it is the primary linker of "things" (*Chou-i Wang Han chu* 周易王韓注, SPPY edn. 1, p. 22).

Not every Ming literati used Chu Hsi's or Wang Pi's glosses verbatim when explaining this phrase—but they would not be far away contextually. Tsou seems to have been conversant with the gloss of Wu Kuei-sen 吳桂森, a follower of the Tung-lin's most revered *Changes* professor Ch'ien I-pen 錢一本 (see Busch, "Tung-lin Shu-yüan," pp. 34–35). Wu said that in the phrase under consideration *t'ung* means *tsung* 宗 ("to treat as ascendant," "to adhere to," thus a kind of linkage); Wu, *Chou-i hsiang-hsiang shu* 周易象象述 (SKCS photo rpt. edn.) 1, p. 7b [vol. 34, p. 381]. Tsou was also an ardent admirer of Ch'ien I-pen (see Tsou's pref. to Ch'ien's *Hsiang-hsiang kuan-chien* 象象管見, in Tsou, *Yüan-hsiieh chi* [SKCS photo rpt. edn.] 4, pp. 142–162 [vol. 1294, pp. 112–13]), and he also happened to have explained the same *Changes* phrase in another writing: "This [means] to follow [adhere with 宗統] that which comes of itself (i.e., the myriad things)" (*ibid.* 4, p. 72 [108]). (See also n. 92 for "t'ung-t'ien" and "tzu-jan.") His having borrowed from Wu for this gloss is not a farfetched assumption.

⁸⁷ See in particular, Willard Peterson, "Making Connections: 'Commentary on the Attributed Verbalizations' of the *Book of Change*," *HJAS* 42.1 (1982), esp. pp. 99–110.

⁸⁸ Spence, *Memory Palace*, p. 151, got this historicism right, unlike Treadgold.

⁸⁹ Treadgold, *The West*, p. 13, got this, but not Spence.

This would fit directly into everything that we know about Tsou, who represents the high-brow literatus that Gernet sees everywhere. He was probably one of the most respected scholastic, pedagogic, and moralistic minds in southeast China as well as the capital, with intimate friends among the original Tung-lin lecturers, and elsewhere. Our knowing, in addition, that he had been learning about Christianity from Cattaneo helps complete in our minds the scenario, one in which an important man perhaps grew amused in a patronizing way at the importuning of the Jesuits and decided to help (read "deflect") them.⁹⁰

Spence continues by claiming that the *Book of Changes* contains ideas about "divine power," "government of heaven," and "holy sages"; and that Ricci thus missed an opportunity to turn these into Christian selling points.⁹¹ But the *Changes* does not talk about creator-judge gods living in a *governed heaven*. Spence may have tricked himself into thinking like Ricci—eagerly imagining that a Chinese literatus was one step away from believing that *t'ien* is ruled by the trinity and the archangels. Here Gernet's general point of view would be more helpful. Gernet would probably agree that Tsou intended the second alternative (although when he insists that all elements of Chinese thought, and all Chinese, would have resisted as did Tsou, then we protest). Gernet would perhaps also agree that there is a primary aspect of Chinese thought that is materialistic, metaphysical, and which claims cognition to be a continuum reaching from man to the cosmos. The *Changes* phrase examined above encapsulates all these aspects into one context. It makes stepping into Christianity very difficult indeed, but not impossible.

Spence is on target when he says that Ricci should have turned to the *Changes* to get more conversions or at least win more arguments. Yes, and in fact the most effective tactic would have been to give one particular kind of audience the symbol Ch'ien as a pictorial, perhaps iconographic, tool in the fashion of Shao Fu-chung. Then Ricci would have had to isolate another type of audience to argue about how Ch'ien actually functions in *t'ien*. He

⁹⁰ Not coincidentally, Cattaneo is recorded frequently as having been the initiator of other contacts for Ricci. Implicit in this teamwork may have been a fruitful method of proselytizing. (For Cattaneo, see Peterson, draft chapter, sect. 1, p. 21; sect. 2, pp. 19, 31–33.) For Tsou's many connections, see Hucker's biography of him (see n. 82); Joanna Handlin, *Action in Late Ming Thought: The Reorientation of Lü K'un and Other Scholar-Officials* (Berkeley: U. of California P., 1983), esp. chaps. 2–3; and Standaert, *Yang Tingyun*, esp. pp. 35–37. Standaert aptly points out that Tsou's much-discussed support of converts like Tung-lin member Yang Ting-yün was probably not out of Tsou's approval of Christianity, but rather part of complex patronage relationships. It is easy to imagine Tsou's having deflected Cattaneo and Ricci, while patronizing his friends who happened to have converted to Christianity.

⁹¹ Spence, *Memory Palace*, pp. 151–52.

would have had to become, however, much more facile in the lexic and terminological, even hermeneutic, skills of China. Still he would not have reached everyone. Many Chinese would have been offended by catechisms that commanded total obedience only to *t'ien*; they would have insisted that all the variations, splittings of terms into binomials, and glosses of "all the textual interpreters (who came after the sages)" should be taken into account. To intellectual groups who viewed themselves as leaders, keeping a keen eye on the history of exegesis meant also the privilege of placing themselves within that history.²²

JESUITS, CHINESE TEXTUALISTS, AND THE BOOK OF CHANGES

Evaluating textual tools and materials is an effective way to understand the people who used them. We have seen that the *Book of Changes*, as textual and intellectual material for the Chinese, was not used exclusively by the highest social and intellectual elite. Ricci himself had known about that classic, claiming that it was "written obscurely." This might seem like a keen observation, since textual travelers who believe that local textualists understand all their own classics can quickly be accused of naïveté. Ricci boldly, and with daring rhetoric, did not hesitate to put himself beyond such accusations. At the beginning of his tour in China his freewheeling style may have been perceived by local textualists as marvelous beginner's insight. But the honeymoon did not last long when he faced *real* exegetical work. The word "real" implies that a barrier continued to exist between Ricci and the Chinese; it consisted of Chinese methods of studying, using, and believing in the Chinese classics. In particular, that portion of the barrier represented by the *Book of Changes* hid from him several things: the unusual tools the *Changes* required; the latter's use for centuries as a background to all kinds of Chinese science and in some respects as the ultimate science itself; its religious implications; and the way in which it figured in the concerns of close groups of men who were trying to heal themselves and China.

²² A late Ming critic of Ricci, Feng Ts'ung-wu 馮從吾 (1556–1627), complained that to concentrate entirely on *t'ien* denies the history of later exegetes' ideas (see Busch, "Tung-lin Shu-yüan," pp. 162–63). Furthermore, Tsou Yüan-piao, elsewhere discussing the very same phrase "*t'ung-t'ien*," mentioned Han Yü 韓愈, Chou Tun-i 周敦頤, and Ch'eng I 程頤, and summarized their views. He concluded, diplomatically, "In our Ming, Kwangtung (lit.: Hsin-hui 新會) calls it (*t'ung-t'ien*) 'tzu-jan' 自然 and Kwangsi (lit.: Hsin-chien 新建) calls it '*liang-chih*' 良知" (Tsou, *Yüan-hsüeh chi* 4, p. 7a [108]), a fascinating judgment of regional hermeneutics.

This section proposes to look at just such aspects of the *Changes* in the China of Ricci's time. The subject is an enormous one and would normally require a monograph by itself. However, there exist small starting points in modern scholarship that should be used; and we look only at a few small sets of men who had direct or indirect contact with Ricci and the Jesuits. We deal with a famous group of friends that became much lauded in history and that used the *Changes* "easily" and to commemorate Confucius in a fundamentalist way. This group was Tsou Yüan-piao's; and we get closer to the reason for our claim that Tsou was trenchantly instructing Ricci in his letter, analyzed above. Another set of men (not mutual friends) knew Ricci for his work in geography: they used the *Changes* in their intellectual toolkits, not to fix geographical knowledge, but because the classic was perceived as the procrustean bed of knowledge about configurations, matrices, and diagrams—the geographer's tools. Finally we deal with an intellectual grouping with the vaguest of relation to the Jesuits: a provincial *Changes* specialist and his later important critic. They are a set not because they knew each other (they were in different generations), but because they each understood the most complex advances in the science of the *Changes* and placed them center stage—in other words they were the most powerful readers of the *Changes* in that critical late-Ming century. They both helped change the way the *Changes* (and by extension all the classics) were perceived later in the trends of evidential study. We end by supposing how Ricci might have tried (and perhaps failed) to understand the *Changes*, and we summarize the superfluous *Changes* scholarship that occurred among Jesuits after Ricci.

The Book of Changes in the Late-Ming Era: The Issues

The *Changes* had always posited something strange: it had words, non-verbal graphs, and numbers, as well as sets, permutations, and symmetries involving those graphs and numbers—and, according to various readers, even involving some of the words. But this is not all. The *Changes* from the beginning had been a technique of supermundane knowledge, got by casting lots to derive corresponding numbers and texts or by manipulating its catalogues of vignette-figures, or both. At an early point it had become one of the most revered of all Chinese books by ascension to the canon of imperial study—the Six Classics—and thus was an item of discussion and education among intellectuals of all stripes.

By the Sung era two phrases—象數 and 義理—became preferred in describing the different functions of the *Changes*: these were "figurate

reckoning" (or "configurations and numbers") on one hand; and "semantic reasoning" (or "meanings and patternings") on the other.³³ The differences sometimes implied mutual exclusion, but mostly it was tacitly allowed that a good commentator addressed both. The urgent issue, as in the discussions of scriptural exegeses all over the world, was whether one distorted the aim and message of the original text, not which side of an interpretive debate one followed. (In fact it would have been impossible, with the *Changes*, to find only two sides.) Critics of exegesis had favorite phrases, borrowed from earlier usage, to describe textual tampering: *fu-hui* 附會 ("superfluous," literally "specious collation") and *ch'uan-tso* 穿鑿 ("damaged," literally "chiseled through"). Regarding the *Changes*, one could do figurate reckoning or semantic reasoning, usually combining them at some level; the point was not to hurt the canon. All of this easily became polemical, because definitions of what was good for the canon were, of course, to a large extent socially determined.

Shao Yung, during the Sung, worked on the *Changes* largely by figurate reckoning. He created matrices the likes of which had never before come to the attention of leading writers. The matrices aligned numerical, semantic, calendrical, and moral-philosophical elements in such a way as to envision a world of moral integrity and epistemic completeness that was accessible to the student of both the *Changes* and his own writings.³⁴ Thus, Shao was intrigued by numbers but not limited to them. Chu Hsi used Shao's vision of the world mainly because it seemed to him to be the most advanced approach to the "figurate reckoning" challenge of the *Changes*. We must

³³ The words "figurate" and "configurations" draw on Willard Peterson's apt suggestion that 象 can be translated as "figure" ("Making Connections," pp. 80–81). We expand this by referring to Pythagorean-type "figurate numbers" (a function of early mathematics both East and West) and to the "configurations" of matrices and diagrams 圖. These words apply well to the *Changes*' spatial arrangements of numbers, vignette-figures (i.e., metaphors of natural phenomena), and words. Because 象 has this role as "vignette" (a "configuration" of natural phenomena), it can mean "picture" or "illustration" in other contexts. Translating Chinese intellectual terms by selecting from a range and not forcing just one word permits Chinese overlaps ("figuration" and "configuration" overlap with "to figure [out]" even in English), homonyms (both 象 and 像 ["to configure, or to make figurations"]), and even intellectual ambiguity, which the Chinese used keenly. Lamentably, many historians have considered 義理 to be "moral principles" in distinct opposition to "images and numbers." Moral principle, as a phrase, might apply to the ideas of specific writers, but should not be the sole translation. Benjamin Elman's "philosophy" is a clear way of expressing the phrase in one important context; see "Philosophy (*I-li*) versus Philology (*K'ao-cheng*): The Jen-hsin Tao-hsin Debate," *TP* 69 (1983), pp. 175–222.

³⁴ See Hou Wai-lu 侯外廬 et al., *Chung-kuo ssu-hsiang t'ung-shih* 中國思想通史 (Peking: Jen-min, 1959) 4.1, pp. 521–32; Wu K'ang 吳康, *Shao-tzu I-hsiieh* 邵子易學 (Taipei: Shang-wu, 1950); and Anne Birdwhistell, *Transition to Neo-Confucianism: Shao Yung on Knowledge and Symbols of Reality* (Stanford: Stanford U.P., 1989).

remember that Chu was an encyclopedist of skills and sciences. He maintained contact with all sorts of analysts and naturalists, calculators and artisans.³⁵ Shao seems to have been his preferred *Changes* man.³⁶

Furthermore, Chu Hsi's *Fundamental Meaning of the Book of Changes* 周易本義 exhorted the classic's ancient ritualistic context of divination, as well as traditional figurate techniques. Also, in *I-hsiieh ch'i-meng* 易學啓蒙, Chu printed several of Shao Yung's diagrams, in essence, circular matrices that showed how the *Changes* hexagrams are naturally ordered.³⁷ In addition to such technical approaches to exegesis, Chu also drew on earlier Sung literati who separated off from the Ten Wings of the *Changes* (that is, the ancient anonymous commentary believed to have come from the hand, or school, of Confucius himself) several phrases and statements that helped authorize discussions of moral perfection and the practice of sagehood. In effect, the *Changes* had been transformed from a work dealing with divination to one on moral philosophy and personal self-discipline.³⁸

Chu Hsi's impact was great. He combined several aspects of the *Book of Changes*, not recognizing "figurate reckoning" and "semantic reasoning" as opposites; and by his editing and definitions he circumscribed the whole field for the centuries of scholars who followed his teachings. By the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries it was of course still common to write about the *Changes*, but issues were separating along further lines. Early in the Ming period, scholars often wrote great compendia and exegeses not just on groups of canonic texts, but also on the way Chu and others had rearranged and delineated the issues.³⁹ Thus, later generations of thinkers in the Ming

³⁵ See Yung-sik Kim, "The Worldview of Chu Hsi: Knowledge about the Natural World in *Chu tzu ch'uan shu*" (Ph.D. diss., Princeton U., 1979), for this aspect of Chu Hsi.

³⁶ This does not deny Chu's intellectual use of Chou Tun-i and Chang Tsai 張載, but underscores Chu's belief that Shao made a breakthrough in figurate reckoning. (See Kidder Smith, Jr., et al., *Sung Dynasty Uses of the I Ching* (Princeton: Princeton U.P., 1990), pp. 224–25.) Chu wrote that Ch'eng I had "only considered principle 理 (and here, specifically, 'principle' applies equally with 'reasoning' or 'patterns') and did not investigate the drawn lines of the hexagrams or the words of the classic . . . I have sought to resolve these doubts with the words of Shao [Yung] . . . and [now] understand that the sages had merely observed the configuration involved in yin and yang's natural continuative production and thus sketched it . . . without conscious arranging"; trans. Larry Schulz (slightly modified), "Lai Chih-te (1525–1604) and the Phenomenology of the *Classic of Change*," (Ph.D. diss., Princeton U., 1982), p. 29.

³⁷ See Smith et al., *Sung Dynasty Uses of the I-ching*, pp. 169–70.

³⁸ An apt conception of how a classic like the *Book of Changes* could act as one element of the religious impulse in China is C. K. Yang's *Religion in Chinese Society* (Berkeley: U. of California P., 1961), pp. 244–57. His notion is that much of traditional Chinese religions was of a diffused nature, without church, priests, and hierarchy, but found in canonic pedagogy, divination, local cults, etc.

³⁹ E.g., Hu Ch'ü-jen 胡居仁 (1434–84) wrote *I-hsiang ch'ao* 易象鈔 and lectured to an

were often both hemmed in by the Ch'eng-Chu phenomenon and unmotivated to write formal exegeses on the *Changes* partly because of the anti-textualist positions expressed by the career events and ideas of the famous Wang Yang-ming and his explicators.

The mid-sixteenth century, however, witnessed a sharp growth in the number of printed works on the *Changes*. One important aspect of this was centered around configurations and matrices. Intellectual experimenters tinkered with those forms and genres. As a way of generalizing, we can say that not only did they seek to clarify Shao Yung's and Chu Hsi's words and proffer new ways of ordering hexagrams and diagramming their theories of how hexagrams changed (in pairs and in the whole sequence), but some also gave places to Sung neo-Confucian terms like *li* and *ch'i* and eliminated whatever was decidedly Taoist or Buddhist. New techniques in illustrated books inspired enormous compendia and explanations of diagrams and illustrations. Some of these authors began to relate configurations (of the *Changes* type) to their own skills in geography, and to philosophy — thus, we even see circular cosmographs featuring *li* in the center labeled as "controller." Such developments indicate that late-Ming literati, aware of the "obscurity" of the ancient sage Fu Hsi's *Book of Changes*, still sought with special jargon and tools to discover and reveal for others the meaning of the universe through that classic.¹⁰⁰

imperial prince about his work; and Lü Nan 呂柟 (1499–1542) wrote *shuo* (discussions, or explanations) of the *Changes*, *Shang-shu*, and *Mao-shih*, as well as *wen* ("questions concerning" — a type of catechism) on the *Four Books* and the *Li-chi*. Although Lü failed the metropolitan examination twice, he maintained a powerful reputation in the National Academy for moral leadership under political pressure. Part of the way early-Ming men wrote and conceived of the classics was shaped by the Ming Academy, in an age before the influence of private academies. In T'ai-tsu's reign this was characterized by great doxologies of Ch'eng-Chu philosophy. On aspects of the Ming Academy, see Mote and Goodman, *Ming Manual*, sect. 1, and Wu Han 吳晗, "Ming-ch'ü ti hsüeh-hsiao" 明初的學校, rpt. in idem, *Tu-shih ch'ü-chi* 讀史札記 (Peking: San-lien, 1956), pp. 317–41; and Jan Hagman, "The National University in the Ming Dynasty" (Ph.D. diss., Harvard U., 1984), pp. 80–82, 294–301. On the *Changes* in early Ming see Schulz, "Lai Chih-te," pp. 37–40, probably the only specialized overview of this topic.

¹⁰⁰ The preceding paragraph draws on Schulz, "Lai Chih-te," pp. 38–45, for the data about an increase in *Changes* books and the trend toward writing about "figurate reckoning" and diagrams. We return, below, to Lai Chih-te, the one who proffered the circular cosmogram. The phrase "controller" 主辛 is a reference to Chu Hsi's *Chu-tzu yü-lei* on the subject of *li* and *ch'i*. E.g., "*Li* is *tao-li* and heart-and-mind is the controller," and, quoting Ch'eng I on the same subject, "For emperors the controller (aspect) is used, for [the power of] Ch'ien 乾 [the aspects] of innate nature and feelings are used." See *Chu-tzu yü-lei* (photo rpt. of Ming woodblock edn. from restored Sung blocks; Taipei: Cheng-chung shu-chü, 1962), sect. "Li ch'i," *shang*, pp. 3a [5] and 3b [6], respectively. There is no *locus classicus* for "controller" other than one questionable phrase in *Hsün-tzu* "Cheng-ming" 正名: 心者道之主辛 (which is changed to 工辛 in the Harvard-Yenching concordance edn., p. 84, l. 40).

It is worth noting that the impulse to preach neo-Confucianism with the aid of graphs, although having originated in China, became international in scope around this time. For example, an elite court-centered Korean, Yi Hwang 李滉 (Toegye 退溪; 1501–1570), was educated in neo-Confucian writings; and such issues as the heart-and-mind and self-cultivation occupied him deeply. But he branched out into the world of diagrams, probably on the basis of those in the compendium of Chu Hsi's learning entitled *Hsing-li ta-ch'üan* 性理大全, and then studied Chu's works on the *Changes*. Toegye's most mature writing was *Sōnghak sipto* 聖學十圖 (*Ten Diagrams of Sage Learning*), written in 1568 and printed several times from 1599 to 1681; it was part of an instructional program for the young Korean king. The work contains ten complex diagrams of philosophic-moral terms arranged in tables, matrices, and configurations to explain visually such concepts as "The Supreme Ultimate," "The Great Learning," "Humanity," and "Study of the Mind." He directed that the Ten Diagrams be made into standing screens for the young king's (and his students') direct contemplation and repeated reflection. This shows the religious aspect of *Changes* diagrams, and the way in which the *Changes*, by the neo-Confucian use of several of its terms and its power to illustrate, could inspire new forms of self-discipline.¹⁰¹

The Changes among Ricci's Chinese Contacts

Shao Fu-chung, although acknowledging Ricci in his written work, fails to lead us toward a Ricci-linked prosopography of *Changes* scholars in late-Ming China. He has no biographical data of any worth, and his writing

¹⁰¹ See Michael Kalton, *To Become a Sage: The Ten Diagrams on Sage Learning by Yi Toegye* (New York: Columbia U.P., 1988), esp. pp. 26–27, concerning the standing screens. Toegye's first diagram features the early neo-Confucian diagram of the Supreme Ultimate, to which Toegye adds a note confirming that it is meant to feature the importance of figuration in the *Changes*. Some of his diagrams as originally printed feature an ancient-form Chinese character in the middle (not borne through in Kalton's edn.), thus appealing to the power of the figure apparent in ancient Chinese script. See Yi Hwang, *Sōnghak sipto*, in ch. 7 of idem, *Toegye sōnsaeng munjip* 退溪先生文集 (Tosan sōwōn, 1599 woodblock edn.; 2d printing), esp. diagram 9, p. 31a. For Chinese antecedents to Toegye's diagrams of the learning of the mind, see William de Bary, *The Message of the Mind in Neo-Confucianism* (New York: Columbia U.P., 1989), esp. pp. 54–67. Another Korean compendium, Yi Su-gwang's 李睟光 (1563–1629) *Chibong yusöl* 芝峰類說 (pref. 1614; rpt. in Segye sasang kyoyang chōnjip edn., suppl. 10; Seoul: Ŭlyu Munhwasa, 1975) 1, p. 559, has a section on the classics in which the few remarks on the *Changes* show no more than a hodgepodge of allusions to traditional Taoist works. There is no indication of deep belief in Ch'eng-Chu Confucianism. Interestingly, Yi's sect. "Foreign States" gives one of the first indications of Korean knowledge of Ricci's arrival in China: Ricci's early years in the south, a synopsis of Ricci's *T'ien-chu shih-i* 天主釋義, and a comment by Chiao Hung, a Ricci admirer (Yi, *Chibong yusöl*, p. 515). We thank both Milan Hejzmanek of Harvard and the Harvard-Yenching Library Korean section for friendly assistance.

received no known rebuttals or comments. But Tsou Yüan-piao opens up a whole network, which we may call the Tung-lin *Changes* group. Tsou was very friendly with Ku Hsien-ch'eng, probably with Ku's younger brother Yün-ch'eng 允成 (1554–1604), Kao P'an-lung 高攀龍 (1562–1626), Ch'ien I-pen 錢一本 (c.s. 1583), and probably Wu Kuei-sen 吳桂森 (fl. 1600–1620).¹⁰²

Ku Hsien-ch'eng and Kao P'an-lung made possible Ch'ien I-pen's influential Tung-lin lectures on the *Changes*, which spanned two months in 1613. Ku leaves us no *Changes* writing, but his preface to the statutes for the Tung-lin Academy includes two sections explaining the benefits and the dangers of having an academy; they are entitled "Nine Advantages" 九益 and "Nine Detractions" 九損, which are references to *Changes* figuration, not its text per se. The statutes, however, do cite *The Four Books* discursively.¹⁰³ These aspects of Ku's preface were not unusual: many Chinese used *Changes* figures and phrases about figures in order to frame their ideas and methods. Here, though, we see the mood of the Tung-lin as so heavily imbued with the *Changes* that Ku Hsien-ch'eng preferred to use its numerology as a framework of the statutes.

Kao P'an-lung has given us a treatise on the *Changes* entitled *Chou-i 'i-chien' shuo* 周易易簡說. The preface explains that the context of the ancient classic was the individual's heart-and-mind 心, and that "all things in the figurations of the Eight Trigrams are before me 于我前 and I am within them." Kao claims that the *Changes* phrase "i-chien" is the key: "Would

that one 'know' that it is 'simple to know.' Would that one is 'able to' 'easily be able.' . . . 'Simple and easy,' so that the *li* 理 of all under *t'ien* is actualable. . . . If one understands [these] words of Confucius, one understands the *Changes*." Thus Kao believes that the message of the classic was inscribed by Confucius, who purportedly wrote the part of the *Changes* Ten Wings that says "i-chien" ("simple and easy").¹⁰⁴ The emphasis on "easiness" and the connection between the self and the "things" of the universe reveal influence from Wang Yang-mingian ideas that Tung-lin men, despite many of their own objections, could not escape. Moreover, Kao's line-by-line comments on the *Changes* explain almost exclusively the Ten Wings portions, not the pre-Confucian layers, indicating that he followed through on his promise to use Confucius' words as the key. He offers little beyond reworking the glosses of Chu Hsi and Ch'eng I-ch'uan.¹⁰⁵ Confucius was the patron saint of the Tung-lin Academy, which instituted rituals in its Confucian temple. Kao's exegesis seems, therefore, to be purely a tribute to Confucius.

We must keep in mind that Ku Hsien-ch'eng and others of the founding group in the Tung-lin Academy felt cut from a special cloth, and they had a mission to bring their learning to the world. In their writings are frequent references to the "great man" and the "small man." There is a tone of vigilance and moral action, and their attempt to remedy the times is manifested in the activities of the Academy they founded. Looking further at their ideas concerning the *Changes* helps to elucidate issues other than commemorations of Confucius — issues involving textual toolkits.¹⁰⁶

¹⁰² For Kao and the two Kus, see Goodrich and Fang, *Dictionary of Ming Biography* 2, p. 1313; for the links with Ch'ien and Wu, see n. 86, above. Tsou, who suffered beating and exile from court, was a Tung-lin supporter, though not one of the founders or participants in the original, local Wu-hsi academy itself. Tsou headed the Shou-shan 首善 Academy in Peking, which Tung-lin'ers attended, but which was a rather apolitical academy. Tsou in fact is not discussed along with Kao, the Kus, and Ch'ien as a Tung-lin'er by Huang Tsung-hsi (*Ming-ju hsieh-an* 58–61), but separately (*ibid.* 23; and Busch, "Tung-lin Shu-yüan," p. 73). For Ch'ien, see *Ming-shih* 231, pp. 6037–42, and *Ming-ju hsieh-an* 59, p. 12; Wu has a biography only in Wan Ssu-t'ung's 萬斯同 version of *Ming-shih* and in *Tung-lin lieh-chuan* 東林列傳, neither of which we were able to consult.

¹⁰³ The section titles refer to hexagrams 42 and 41, respectively. "Nine" is the important *Changes* correlate of yang and the supernal (Busch, "Tung-lin Shu-yüan," pp. 34–35). Ch'ien, well known among this high stratum of literati, lived long in seclusion; he worked on the classics, philology, astronomy, geography, and the *Changes*, as well as having been a prognosticator (*ibid.*). On Ku and Kao, see Ku Ch'ing-mei 古清美, "Ku Ching-yang Kao Ching-i hsieh-hsing shu-yao" 顧涇陽高景逸學行述要, *Kuo-li pien-i kuan kuan-k'an* 國立編譯館館刊 12.1 (1983), pp. 207–24; Rodney Taylor, *The Cultivation of Sagehood as a Religious Goal in Neo-Confucianism: A Study of Selected Writings of Kao P'an-lung (1562–1626)*, American Academy of Religion Diss. Ser. 22 (Missoula, Mont.: Scholars Press, 1978), and William de Bary, "Neo-Confucian Cultivation and the Seventeenth-Century 'Enlightenment,'" in *idem*, ed., *The Unfolding of Neo-Confucianism*, esp. pp. 180–87.

¹⁰⁴ For these comments, see Kao, *Chou-i 'i-chien' shuo* (SKCS photo rpt. edn.), pref., pp. 1b–2a [vol. 34, pp. 68–69]. For the *Changes* phrase "i-chien," see Harvard-Yenching concordance edn., p. 39, rt. (from "Hsi-tz'u chuan," sect. A.1). The entire passage has been translated as "The Creative knows through the easy. The Receptive knows through the simple. What is easy, is easy to know; what is simple, is easy to follow . . . By means of the easy and the simple we grasp the laws of the whole world. When the laws of the whole world are grasped, therein lies perfection." (See Wilhelm, *The I Ching*, pp. 286–87.)

¹⁰⁵ This is based on a comparison of his comments with those of the Sung masters in regard to the hexagram Fu 復; see Ch'ien, *Chou-i 'i-chien' shuo* 1, pp. 61b–63b [99–100].

¹⁰⁶ See, e.g., Ku Hsien-ch'eng's *Ssu-shu chiang-i* 四書講義 (Hsiao-shih shan 小石山房 ts'ung-shu edn.), ts'e 1, pp. 1b–2a, which warns about solipsistic scholarship and the ideas of "small men." His brother Yün-ch'eng is also vigilant; he fears that others want a fatherless and *chün-tzu*-less world and are drowned in self-seeking freedom, while pretending to be concerned with *tao* and other virtues ("Answer to Lo Pu-i's 羅布衣 Letter," in Yün-ch'eng's *Hsiao-pien chai ou-t's'un* 小辨齋偶存 [1887 edn.] 6, pp. 1b and 2a, respectively; see also 7b). The attitude pervades men of this era. See Handlin's *Action in Late Ming Thought*, pp. 116–17; Willard Peterson's *Bitter Gourd* (New Haven: Yale U.P., 1979), intro.; and de Bary, "Neo-Confucian Cultivation," p. 180. Good use of primary material on private academies is found in Standaert's *Yang Tingyun*, esp. chap. 1, where he discusses commemoration and sacrifice as academy activities (see pp. 9–11). (Standaert's book is reviewed by Benjamin Elman, *JAS* 49.1 [1990], pp. 137–39.)

Ch'ien I-pen's *Hsiang-hsiang kuan-chien* 像象管見 (*A Focused View of [I-ching] Figurations*) states that "the *Changes* [means] figures (figurations) and figures [mean] configurations 像 (that is, depictions)."¹⁰⁷ Furthermore, in Ch'ien's view, Fu Hsi had done no more than establish figures, and the following sages (Wen-wang and Chou-kung), as well as later scholars, attempted to use words to explain those figures. Ch'ien rehearses some of the history of how the Ten Wings were first placed amongst the older layers, how later prognosticators like Ching Fang 京房 and Kuan Lu 管輅 trivialized the earlier integrity of *Changes* figurations. Ultimately, he feels, diagrams carefully distinguish "former" from "later" matrices, or "square earth" from "round *t'ien*" configurations, but they are all essentially of a kind.¹⁰⁸

Ch'ien I-pen's scholarship on the *Changes* is also known through other writings. In fact, Wu Kuei-sen thought of his own *Changes* commentary as derived from Ch'ien's.¹⁰⁹ Tsou Yüan-piao's description of Ch'ien I-pen's *Changes* pretty much concurs.¹¹⁰ Ku Yün-ch'eng thought of the *Changes* similarly. He saw, hermeneutically, references in the hexagram texts to the study of heart-and-mind. In his view, when the Ten Wings text brings in ideas about human thought and nature but the hexagram text does not, it is because the latter covertly points to the cultivation of heart-and-mind.¹¹¹ For Ku, the Ten Wings had only done what was necessary to make the main text mean what it should. We can see that the Chinese too were not above whole-sale hermeneutic translation of their canon.

¹⁰⁷ Ch'ien, *Hsiang-hsiang kuan-chien* (SKCS photo rpt. edn.), "General Guide 例略," p. 12 [vol. 33, p. 564].

¹⁰⁸ Ibid., pp. 22-5b [565-66].

¹⁰⁹ His preface extols Ch'ien's scholarship for claiming that the all-important trigrams "Ch'ien and K'un, as two forms of line, are the primary types of humankind, and the eight things [associated with the eight trigrams] are the figures for humankind that are called configurations (depictions) . . . [Thus] one understands that trigrams and lines are the things inside human beings 人身. The verbal descriptions of the lines' figures all concern the highest particulars of human beings"; Wu Kuei-sen, *Chou-i hsiang-hsiang shu* 周易像象述 (SKCS photo rpt. edn.), pref., p. 12 [vol. 34, p. 112].

¹¹⁰ See Tsou, *Yüan-hsiieh chi* 4, p. 142 [112].

¹¹¹ Ku Yün-ch'eng, "Two-Part Letter to T'ang Po-yüan 唐伯元 on *hsin-hsüeh* 心學," in idem, *Hsiao-pien chai ou-t'sun* 6, p. 7b: "Ken's (Hexagram 52) fourth line (probably 'hexagram text,' not 'fourth line,' is meant here) does not mention heart-and-mind, but the '[Ta]-hsiang' [portion of the Ten Wings] says, 'He does not permit his thoughts to go beyond his station'; thus Ken's actual meaning is about heart-and-mind. When it mentions 'perseverance; good fortune' the heart-and-mind of the *tao* is meant." (T'ang was a famous detractor of orthodox Chu Hsi ideas concerning the heart-and-mind. The correspondence between him and both Kus bears further study in order to help delineate the role of textual exegesis in the debate at large. See de Bary, *Message of the Mind*, pp. 103-12, about T'ang and for a translation of correspondence between T'ang and Ku Hsien-ch'eng.)

Wu Kuei-sen's explanatory section, preceding his own commentary, shows that he believed the *Changes* to be reducible to one thing—*li* 理. *Li* is "above form" and thus able to control all figurative aspects of such material things in the *Changes* as *t'ien* and *ti*, and their countless attributes, like lightning, wood, fire, and so forth. It controls and reduces them to one abstraction.¹¹²

Wu works along the same lines as Ch'ien I-pen. For Wu there is a limit to the kinds of figuration that explain the *Changes*. He says that the Ch'eng-Chu school used allying and responding 乘應, *yin-yang* and line positions 爻位, and hexagram change 卦變, but one cannot reliably determine what is auspicious or disastrous from the hexagram line relationships: the sages did not use that method. It would require ceaseless trouble to explain why and when each line could and should change and the need to settle all 4,096 possible changes (64^2 —equaling the permutation of all possible ways all hexagrams can change). Moreover, the more stately and desirable Ch'eng-Chu approach does not employ tools like the use of the central lines of trigrams as determinative, or obtaining further figurations from the inner (that is, "nuclear," instead of the standard two) trigrams, or trying to pre-determine a controlling line for the hexagram.¹¹³ Wu complains about such Ming contemporaries as Lai Chih-te 來知德 (1525-1604) who were deeply analyzing systems of *Changes* figuration and configuration. Men like that, in Wu's opinion, misuse the phrase in the Ten Wings that says "divisions and combinations of the numbers are made" by overworking it in explaining figurations. It is not a legitimate goal of *Changes* study.¹¹⁴

We see several important issues clearly emerging from the Tung-lin group of *Changes* thinkers. One is that the classic was used in the traditions of both the Ch'eng-Chu philosophy of human nature and destiny and the neo-Confucian practices of self-cultivation. We see not only *li* and a fundamentalist belief in the pristine antiquity of the text (paralleling the Tung-lin Academy's agenda to commemorate and support pristine, ancient Confucian ideals), but also a striving to be "a great man" who knows the key of "easiness"—implying a type of internal insight, not that no work is required. In addition, the group shared patronage and knowledge about the *Changes* within itself. The members had an identity as exegetes of a specific text, with a textual mission, and they knew about styles of *Changes* scholar-

¹¹² Wu, *Hsiang-hsiang shu chin-chien* 像象述金針題辭 (SKCS photo rpt. edn.), pp. 112-13 [376].

¹¹³ Ibid., pp. 122-23 [377].

¹¹⁴ Ibid., pp. 132-33 [377]. For the cited phrase, see Wilhelm, *The I Ching*, p. 314. We learn more about Lai Chih-te, below.

ship different from theirs. Criticism of Lai Chih-te, as we see later on, means that Tung-lin men were aware of the *Changes* as a specialist study, because Lai remained off the beaten path intellectually and academically, pursuing the classic in its role as the basis of an indigenous Chinese science. Finally, although Kao P'an-lung's and Ku Hsien-ch'eng's *Changes* writings may have done no more than imbue the Academy with a high tone, other Tung-lin'ers talked about the issue of "figurate reckoning." Ch'ien I-pen and Wu Kuei-sen especially recognized that figurations (and even calculating 數) loomed as potentially reckless activities. The titles of their works mention "figuration 象" but not "calculation" (or, "reckoning"). That is significant. Some figuration was seen as good because it derived from the Ten Wings or was authorized by the Ch'eng-Chu school, but much was seen as bad. Here, then, a preference, not a new one in China, existed for reducing an exacting and expansive art—the *Changes* as a science of symmetry, figurate numbers, spatial relations, and permutation—to an abstract organizing tool. In Wu's case that tool was *li*, which reveals not just wariness of figuration, but a desire to keep the discussion of the *Changes* on the "semantic reasoning" side.¹¹⁵

Ch'ien, Wu, and the others may merely have been attracted to the power of illustrations, configurations, and representation. Ch'ien himself made an "illustrated book of human figures,"¹¹⁶ and titled his *Changes* writing with the analogy of a "focused view," and Ku Yün-ch'eng is recorded in the *Ming shih* "Monograph on Literature" as author of a work called *I-t'u shuo-i yen* 易圖說億言 (*Essays on the Meanings of I-ching Diagrams*). In a time of great achievements in illustrated books, and thus the ability to print *Changes* diagrams and matrices, the art of interpretation itself was being brought up to date. These men may have perceived that problem, but had not begun to rework the specialized material because of their biases about proprieties in *Changes* studies.

When we move outside the Tung-lin group, two writers are particularly interesting. One is Wei Chün 魏潛 (fl. ca. 1610), who published an enor-

mous work on the *Book of Changes* called *I-i ku-hsiang t'ung* 易義古象通. It is prefaced by eight sections of explanation, each dealing with "understanding the figurations" of the *Changes*. He recounts the history of the early split into "figurers" and "exegetes" (that is, *hsiang-shu* versus *i-li*) and strongly attacks Chu Hsi not only for having criticized Ch'eng and others for mis-handling figuration, but also for borrowing Han, Wei, Chin, and T'ang ideas surreptitiously.¹¹⁷ According to Wei, Fu Hsi the sage used figures but did not write about them; only since Shao Yung (who took notions from Han and Wei times) had this become an industry.¹¹⁸ He believes that there are "standard" 正 figurations like *yin* and *yang*, the body, the staple domestic and mythic animals, and the important numbers in the system of numerology and figuring:

Ten must be there for K'un in order to configure the numbers; to choose "state and city" must be K'un's need for an earthly figuration; choosing "setting in movement troops" must be K'un's need for an idea of the masses . . . Those who are enlightened [in this] follow the matter that has been divined and by intuiting it gain access to the particular figuration 其象. This is how to get access to the particular *li* 理.¹¹⁹

Wei also wrote a popular-style gazetteer called *Chiao-nan so-chi* 嶠南瑣記 that criticizes textual and historical sources for local tales and stories. Thus when next we find him criticizing Ricci's cartographic methods, for strongly aesthetic reasons, we should not be surprised. Wei stated, "[Ricci] puts China not in the center but slightly to the west and inclined to the north. This is altogether far from the truth, for China should be in the center of the world, which we can prove by the single fact that we can see the North Star resting at the zenith of the heaven at midnight."¹²⁰ Wei goes on to cite his own empirical and historically derived evidences to demolish the Jesuits' findings about distances and latitudes.

Another geographer, Chang Huang 章潢 (1527–1608), drew directly on *Changes* figurations. His *magnum opus*, *T'u-shu pien* 圖書編, covered, among other things, maps and geographic knowledge; but more important, the preface explained his own work squarely within that branch of figurate

¹¹⁵ Antipathy toward figuration may have stemmed partly from the *Changes*' long association with divination, an art that aroused equivocal responses. Many in the late 1500s, an age of practical *artes*, wrote about divination (e.g., Ch'ien I-pen and Tsou Yüan-piao), but the historian cannot always tell who actually practiced and believed from who mouthed techniques. Ch'ien's reputation for prognostication was mentioned earlier; Tsou is listed in the *Ming-shih*, "Monograph on Literature," as author of *Shih-shih yao-chieh* 筮仕要訣 (*Essential Formulae for Diviners*), as well as a work on the *Changes*, *I kou-t'ung* 易數通. These are not available today. Yang T'ing-yün (1562–1627), another Tung-lin'er, and a convert to Christianity later in his life, also wrote several works on the *Changes*; see Standaert, *Yang Tingyun*, pp. 17–19, who does not clearly indicate if these are existing editions.

¹¹⁶ Wu, *Chou-i hsiang-hsiang shu*, pref., 1b [370].

¹¹⁷ Wei, *I-i ku-hsiang t'ung* (SKCS photo rpt. edn.), "Tsung-lun," pp. 1b–2b [vol. 34, pp. 172–73].

¹¹⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 9b–10a [176–77].

¹¹⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 4b–6a [174–75].

¹²⁰ George H. C. Wong, trans., "China's Opposition to Western Science during the Late Ming and Early Ch'ing," in *Isis* 54.1 (1963), p. 44 (citing the famous collection of anti-Christian essays, *P'o-hsieh chi* 破邪集, *ts'e* 3, *ch.* 3, pp. 37a–b). See also Gernet, *Christian Impact*, p. 46.

numbers connected to the *Book of Changes* known generically as "Ho-t'u 河圖 Lo-shu 洛書." His findings in geography were decidedly anti-Chu Hsi, who, he felt, had speciously decided that the most ancient geographic work in the canons was wrong on many points. Chang was a canonic fundamentalist: the canons were right, but topographies and administrative place names changed, which can be demonstrated by empirical and textual study. Chang met Ricci in the area of his home region of Nan-ch'ang 南昌, where Ricci lived for a time, and published Ricci's *mappamundi* in *Tu-shu pien*.¹²¹

The geographers show us that although much has been said in modern scholarship about Matteo Ricci's (and other Jesuits') "seduction" of the Chinese by means of exact and technological sciences, a finer issue is the way sciences drew on classics and classical exegesis. Chinese intellectuals in this era attempted to work through their native exact sciences—in this case the enormously important material in the *Changes*, which even for them constituted a difficult labyrinth.

Finally, we have the last set of Ming men to be considered here. Lai Chih-te was from an eastern Szechwan family with but a few weak roots in bustling Chekiang; he had no contact with important circles like the Tung-lin group or with the Jesuits, and had little success in examinations. He failed three times (1553, 1556, 1659) and thereafter read the famous Hsüeh Hsüan's 薛暄 *Tu-shu lu* 讀書錄, only to emerge with the express desire: "I wish to emulate Confucius." To do so Lai spent a great part of his life in contemplation of the *Changes*, but merely one special part of the classic's history—its figurations and diagrams. He believed that the *Changes* required special exegetical tools, because while classics like *Shang-shu* described people and events, "the *Changes* have no such occurrences, no such *li*, only figurations."¹²² Lai's commentary, *Chou-i chi-chu* 周易集註, published in 1599, features prominently dozens of diagrams and circular matrices, the first of which is a circle within a circle with the well-known swirling pattern of black and white polar opposites. He labels the "flowing forces as dynamic ether" 氣, the spatial opposition of the forces as "number/reckoning" 數, and the "master-controller 主宰 (the central circle) as *li* 理."¹²³

¹²¹ The preceding draws on Florian C. Reiter, "Change and Continuity in Historical Geography: Chang Huang's (1527–1608) Reflections on the *Yü-kung*," *AM* 3d ser. 3, 1 (1990), pp. 129–41. Chang is also discussed in de Bary, *Message of the Mind*, pp. 114–23, where we learn that Chang devoted space in his huge compendium to configurations of the lines of transmission of the learning of the heart-and-mind, which like problems concerning *Changes* figuration techniques, had orthodox and heterodox models.

¹²² For Lai's life, see Schulz, "Lai Chih-te," pp. 49–56. The quotations used are translated at pp. 63 and 128, respectively. (We have emended Schulz slightly for technical consistency.)

¹²³ Lai, *Chou-i chi-chu* 周易集註 (SKCS photo rpt. edn.), *ch. shou, shang*, p. 17a [vol. 32,

Lai's contributions to the field of figurate reckoning and diagrams are large and convoluted; they cannot be treated in detail here.¹²⁴ Basically, he claimed that spatial and symmetrical concepts in the lines of the *Changes* that were begun in China's antiquity and developed in the late-Han era could be resolved to a much higher degree: "The *li* of *yin* and *yang*'s mutating is understood through inversions and reversions (that is, to turn upside-down and to reverse all *yins* and *yangs*) of the hexagrams."¹²⁵ By doing this he claimed to be able to interpret the standard sequence of the sixty-four hexagrams, as well as some historically difficult phrases in the less-understood parts of the Ten Wings called "Tsa-kua" 雜卦 and "Hsü-kua" 序卦. He created a system of circles and matrices in which all members (that is, all the figures used in a matrical configuration) were diametrically coordinated. In this way, all parts of the *Changes* text, all permutations of graphs, and all hexagrams could be seen as revolving, naturally activated by dynamic ether (*ch'i*). This is encountered, for example, in Lai's matrix "Operating the Circles" 弄圓, which contained cycles of *yin* and *yang*, cycles of mean lunation, the twenty-four annual *ch'i* divisions, and the twelve horary branches.¹²⁶ Proud of what he had accomplished, Lai felt that his diagrams revealed dynamic "natural numbers" that absolutely surpassed Shao Yung's numerical construction of hexagrams—to him merely "dead numbers."¹²⁷ This was the intent of the sages and Confucius that Lai wanted to restore to his contemporaries.

Two years before Lai Chih-te's death his *Changes* opus was recommended to the court in Peking by two scholars, one of whom was an acquaintance of Matteo Ricci.¹²⁸ If only Ricci could have befriended Lai and learned about his science; but Lai was an outsider himself, and living proof that great minds were found outside great capital cities. A careless estimation of the web of Ricci contacts might have it that Ricci was abreast of the greatest of

p. 13]. Lai's works were very popular throughout the 18th and 19th cc., and popular edns. are rife with mistakes, making the SKCS edn. the preferred one. (See Schulz, "Lai Chih-te," appendix A.)

¹²⁴ Schulz's "Lai Chih-te" and Toda Toyosaburo's 戸田豊三郎 *Ekiho chūshaku shiko* 易經注釋史綱 (Tokyo: Kazama shubō, 1968), chap. 5, are the best available accounts.

¹²⁵ Lai, *Chou-i chi-chu*, pref., p. 12 [p. 3].

¹²⁶ See Schulz, "Lai Chih-te," pp. 147–58.

¹²⁷ Ibid., p. 195. Much of Lai's aim was to show that Chu Hsi did not understand important phrases in the Ten Wings (ibid., p. 202). For Lai's references to "natural numbers," see Lai, *Chou-i chi-chu*, *ch. shou, shang*, pp. 29b–33b [19–22], passim.

¹²⁸ This man was Kuo Tzu-chang 郭子章 (1542–1618); see Lin Chin-shui 林金水, "Li Ma-tou chiao-yu jen-wu piao," 利瑪竇交友人物表 in *Chung-wai kuan-hsi shih lun-t'ung* 中外關係史論叢 (Peking, 1985) 1, pp. 117–43 (rpt. *China Mission Studies Bulletin* 9 [1987], pp. 1–27), p. 5. Kuo met him in 1588–89 in Chao-ch'ing.

Chinese learning. In fact, though, he needed many more years to live in order to draw together networks of intellectuals in whose educational experiences and discussions he would have found the special tools for China's unique sciences, the subtle hermeneutic adaptations, and the various aims to correct the times and commemorate ancient sages. Then, and only then, could he have, as Spence implies, found, via the *Changes*, the next part of his plan to convert the Chinese to Confucian fundamentalism on the way to Counter-Reformation Christianity.

Lai's scholarship came under attack both in his day and years later. Although he had denounced fortune tellers like the ancient Ching Fang and Kuo P'u 郭璞, he was mythologized in his home region as a geomancer.¹²⁹ Probably his reputation as a prognosticator burst forth in marketplace prefaces to his works and stimulated techniques of personal astrology. Huang Tsung-hsi's *Chou-i hsiang-shu lun* 周易象數論 (*On Figurative Reckoning in the Chou Changes*), completed in 1672, denounced Lai's untoward and unwarranted *Changes* techniques, perhaps because of the diviner myth. Like some of the men already mentioned here, and no doubt influenced by them, Huang objected to such accretions as obscuring the *Changes*. A preface to one edition of his work insightfully sketches a picture of turnip plants that overgrow a large pine and lead people to think the clinging plants constitute the tree itself. Huang, in this view, would have seen Han-era *Changes* interpretations as the strangling turnip greens; and it is no coincidence that he claims the whole late-Ming generation to have been smitten with figurate reckoning. More specifically, he (and others in his generation) desired to stop the practice in order to save China's own very old arts of mathematical astronomy and mathematics, which had been coming under increasing scrutiny since the mid-1500s. In a sense, as Lynn Struve has stated, he speaks as a historian of Chinese sciences, hoping to stem the influence of Jesuit mathematicians at the Manchu court.¹³⁰ He specifically criticized Lai: "[Lai] did not know that inside the antithesis between odds and evens (that

is, figurate reckoning's *yin* and *yang* lines) deeply inherent opposites (that is, inversions and reversions) do not produce a whole separate meaning."¹³¹

Huang's *Hsiang-shu lun* demonstrates what are "proper" tools of figurate reckoning. To do this he explains meticulously *all* the figuration arts associated with, and, to him, choking, the *Changes*. Huang seems to suggest—and his work bears complete study—that although others have become fascinated with this science, no one heretofore had rounded up all the figurate reckoning systems and laid out each one, subjecting it to historical textual criticism and analysis. He is correct, but he does not abandon figuration entirely in his own approach to the *Changes*. Rather, he pares figurations down to a style reminiscent of earlier times.¹³²

The figurations that the sages revealed were only these seven: the trigrams, the six strokes, shapes of figures, line positions, opposites, directional configuration, and contiguous (nuclear) trigrams. Figuration is expressed completely in these seven. Later scholars artificially constructed figurations like *na-chia* 納甲, moving lines, changing hexagrams, and prior heaven matrices. These number four. And if they are blended so as to be [part of] the seven, then that would be murky obscurity. I have observed that in the sages' "Hsi-tz'u" (section of the Ten Wings) the six lines will certainly contain a general figuration, which becomes a basic tenet. But later, each line [was seen as] containing its own separate figure, which became [just] a thread [in an interpretation]. Students of the *Book of Changes* know in detail these separate figures. But they only have cursory [knowledge] of general figurations. Thus, the earliest intent of figuration becomes murky. Whenever Liu Mu's 劉牧 (Shao Yung's predecessor in *Changes* science) *Kou-shen so-yin t'u* 鉤深索隱圖 discussed a general figuration, he also conflated the four [artificial techniques]. And so he could not avoid the disease of superfluous and damaged interpretation.¹³³

¹²⁹ Huang, *Hsiang-shu lun* 2, p. 102; cf. Schulz, "Lai Chih-te," p. 218.

¹³⁰ See Huang Tsung-hsi, *Chou-i hsiang-shu lun*, in vol. 115 of Yen Ling-feng 嚴靈峰, comp., *I-ching chi-ch'eng* 易經集成 (Taipei: Ch'eng-wen Pub. Ltd., 1971), Huang's pref., p. 22: "The scholars of our generation are devoted in excess to figurate reckoning; they take it to be an ultimate pursuit" (cf. Schulz, "Lai Chih-te," p. 44). Wang Jui-ling's 汪瑞齡 two-page pref. to *Hsiang-shu lun* makes the "turnip plant" analogy. The notion of Huang as one of many who between 1550 and 1680 began to take seriously China's history of mathematics, and in some cases to practice it, is aptly expressed in Lynn Struve, "Huang Zongxi in Context: A Reappraisal of His Major Writings," *JAS* 47.3 (1988), pp. 489–93. Struve carefully points out that although Huang was proficient at the art he criticized, he was not, however, one of the "big three" mathematicians of the century, as has been claimed.

¹³² Huang, *Hsiang-shu lun* 3, consisting of an analysis of each hexagram, actually is reminiscent of Wang Pi's 王弼 *Chou-i t'ieh-li* 周易略例 of the 3d c. AD, which claims that an overall "idea" 義 "rules" 主 hexagrams, and which establishes the "structure" 體 of lines as the key to the self-contained set of vignettes within each hexagram's own timeframe. See Chou-i t'ieh-li, in *Chou-i Wang Han chu* (SPY edn.) 10, pp. 1b–3a; and Howard L. Goodman, "Exegeses and Exegeses of the Book of Changes in the Third Century A.D.: Historical and Scholastic Contexts for Wang Pi" (Ph.D. diss., Princeton U., 1985), pp. 258–59. That Huang might have based himself on such early ideas bears further consideration.

¹³³ Huang, *Hsiang-shu lun* 3, p. 1a. Again, Huang's "general figuration" may have roots in Wang Pi's work (see previous n.), which in part 1 claims that the structure of hexagrams has a "controller" 所由之主者—a principle that the Ten Wings' "T'uan-chuan" addresses.

Our brief history of a Chinese classic at the end of the sixteenth century has shown several things. First, although Matteo Ricci took part in an enterprise familiar among Chinese intellectuals—criticism of the Sung-era programs of exegesis—he seems to have been unaware of the sophisticated way that fields of exegetical specialization worked. A group like the Tung-lin intellectuals patronized each other's *Changes* writings, shared concerns about the classic, and knew about far-flung voices in that field. Not only were they aware of the *Changes* fields of specialization, but they helped delineate the greater from the lesser issues. As a result the special tools of figurate reckoning, diagrams and matrices, and instructive illustrations were being re-discovered by Chinese intellectuals right in their own toolkits: Ch'ien I-pen warned that figurations were pristine remnants of the sages; Wu Kuei-sen placed *li* behind figurations; and the anti-Ricci Wei Chün, whose work entailed charts and diagrams, claimed that *Changes* configurations pointed to normative close-at-hand things.¹³⁴

China of Ricci's day was witnessing a development in canonical thought concerning an extremely important yet puzzling text. The development involved not just terms and glosses, but the wholesale evaluation of a Chinese science, and it stretched roughly from the 1550s to the formative hand of Huang Tsung-hsi in the 1670s. Thus, ironically, the Jesuits were using icons, pictures, and discussions of dreams and memorization to bore holes into the minds of intellectuals, while those intellectuals (even as far away as Korea) were delving into figurations and diagrams—publishing them, breathing dynamic ether into them, and placing *li* at the root of them. If Shao Fuchung's "T'ien-hsüeh shuo" can be interpreted as having been an "*oeuvre pieuse*" that substituted Christ and Mary for the *Changes* figures, then Ricci and other Jesuits surely might have, in response, aspired to Lai's and Huang's important tools of the native *Book of Changes* science.

But although later Jesuits hit upon the *Changes* as an important theater of exegesis, they did not pursue the issues that mattered to Chinese intellectuals. As we learned in an earlier section, Ricci and the first Jesuits seem to have borrowed much from Chang Chü-cheng's "colloquial commentary" on the *Four Books* in their Latin translations. This probably helped the Jesuits

learn the exegetical language, although using Chang might have been a barrier to meeting literati with ugly political memories of Chang's tenure in office. Chang's ideas about the *Changes* come through in his "colloquial commentary," and from them we might begin to reconstruct the basis for whatever ideas Ricci had about the *Changes*. From direct and indirect allusions in *Confucius Sinarum Philosophus*, it seems that Chang felt that the *Changes* was not a book of divination, but one meant to impart knowledge of *t'ien*-bestowed fates and *t'ien* as the "government of the Supreme Emperor." Here we have possibly the very model of the anti-Chu Hsi, *t'ien-as-deus* reductionism used by Ruggieri and Ricci.¹³⁵ But Chang does not treat the issues that the Tung-lin group and others treated later. His exegesis can be seen as court centered and policy oriented, as opposed to the private, socially oriented exegeses of, for example, the Tung-lin'ers. Choosing Chang as a model may have been a wrong turn for the early Jesuits.¹³⁶

David Mungello's work informs us that only sixty or seventy years after Ricci's death the *Book of Changes* was put to use in a Jesuit super-Christianity. Beginning in the 1660s the Jesuits became enthralled by *Changes* paleography: the classic, carrying evidence of Adamic teachings, had purportedly not been destroyed under Ch'in Shih-huang-ti. While other messages (for example, revering *t'ien*) had lost continuity with original Christianity, and had been tainted by the Taoism of later Chinese scholars, the *Changes* remained pure and, of course, encrypted.¹³⁷ Subsequently, Athanasius Kircher (1601–1680), Martino Martini (1614–1661), and Joachim Bouvet (1656–1730) determined a proto-language and proto-mathematics of all mankind and confirmed the role that the *Book of Changes* had in transmitting this basic knowledge into China.¹³⁸ Bouvet would barely mention the *Four Books*, but relied on the *Changes* as the primary way to link Chinese civilization with that of Christian Europe. There is little evidence that he was interested in

¹³⁵ See Lundbaek, "Chang Chü-cheng," pp. 8–10. He claims that this is how Chang read the "Shuo-kua" part of the Ten Wings. Further study must determine whether we are getting Chang's ideas or misreadings by the Jesuits.

¹³⁶ The matter would profit from a complete study, which would look at Chang's *Four Books* and his exegesis of the *Changes*, developmentally in the context of his career and comparatively with others of his intellectual world. According to Lundbaek, "Chang Chü-cheng," p. 4, the only known copy of Chang's *Changes* commentary is in the Bibliothèque Nationale. A copy of the early, 1573, edition of his *Four Books* is in the Library of Congress; see Mungello, "Jesuits' Use of Chang Chü-cheng," pp. 11–13.

¹³⁷ See Mungello, *Curious Land*, pp. 93–94, 100–5, and 127–31, for the preceding remarks, including the ways in which the Jesuits had to juggle conflicting findings in the Vulgate and the Septuagint bibles. Jesuit chronologists of China were many and active.

¹³⁸ Ibid., chaps. 4–5, for Martini and Kircher. For Kircher, see also Allen, *Mysteriously Meant*, pp. 119–33.

¹³⁴ Another believer in the practical message behind the *Changes* and its figurations was Ni Yüan-lu 倪元璐 (1594–1644), whose father was a friend of Tsou Yüan-piao and who also felt himself to be a disciple of Tsou. His commentary to the classic held that the first inventors of the figurations actually contributed practical knowledge and that people should return to that way of using them. See Ray Huang, "Ni Yüan-lu: 'Realism' in a Neo-Confucian Scholar-Statesman," in William de Bary, ed., *Self and Society in Ming Thought* (New York: Columbia U.P., 1970), esp. pp. 416, 431–32, 437.

the issues that inspired private Chinese exegetes — scholars working on their own outside the court; he was in fact a principal in a hotly contested agenda in Europe and at the Peking court: finding foreshadows of Christ's revelation in the most ancient parts of all the world's civilizations. This European intellectual activity (called "figurism") was for a time prohibited by the K'ang-hsi emperor, and Jesuits' writings about the *Changes* could not mention "figurist" theories.

Bouvet carried out a sustained discussion of the *Changes* (including a court-directed commentary) that touched on the Chinese tool of figurate reckoning and figurations. His correspondence with Leibniz has been studied in detail. What is most interesting is the fact that Bouvet's work on the classic was so entirely court-oriented; his Chinese contacts were with the few grandest of appointed editors and compilers, but not with such independent minds as Huang Tsung-hsi, who was working out a complete analysis of figurate reckoning. Bouvet's familiarity with Chinese learning, as in the case of Ricci, did not include the knowledge of local tools, materials, and issues, but merely his idiosyncratic meanings of the classic's words, which he then used to save the Christian phenomenon. Ricci, however, had been directly on the path of learning among masters in an era of private academies, private preaching, and master-student patronage. China's rulers of Bouvet's time had begun to emphasize court learning, and the apostolic overseers had begun to be suspicious of their far-flung proselytizers.¹³⁹

DOES TINKERING WITH IDEAS LEAD TO RETHINKING OF IDEALS?

This slice of the intellectual life of Jesuit and Chinese humanists in the early modern period shows that both sides adapted tools and materials, as well as methods. We do not suggest, however, a sort of mechanistic interpretation of intellectual history. Naturally, it is valuable to be reminded that

¹³⁹ Mungello, *Curious Land*, pp. 307–28. The Leibniz connection has been studied by David Mungello, *Leibniz and Confucianism: The Search for Accord* (Honolulu: U. of Hawaii P., 1977). Bouvet produced a bilingual commentary to the *Changes* entitled in Latin *Idea generalis doctrinae libri Ye Kim*. The life and work of Bouvet has just begun to be studied. See Mungello's recent article, "Unearthing the Manuscripts of Bouvet's *Gujin* after Nearly Three Centuries," *China Mission Studies Bulletin* 10 (1988), pp. 34–61. Mungello (as well as his cited sources) demonstrates admirably some of the historical issues surrounding the shift from Ricci's exegete-centered work in China, to Bouvet's court-centered work (see *ibid.*, pp. 52–54). Also he touches on the historical changes in intellectual and political culture between the 1600s and the 1700s that made for such a drastically different program. Much in this field remains to be done.

technical factors can cause intellectual change (for example, Jack Goody's and Ian Watts' thesis about rational thought, law, and democracy and their direct link with literacy), but caution is needed. We have concentrated on humanists' tools, toolkits, and materials. Yet, not all Chinese who may have been interested in Ricci's (and other Jesuits') teachings would have had the humanist toolkit — they would have had other kits.

One factor of intellectual change and intercultural contact of the type we have been considering is, pure and simple, people's psychologies. Men and women do occasionally decide to change their minds. Paul Cohen has suggested, in his review of Gernet's book, that arguments derived from psychology can help us to see how the Chinese, case by case, chose either to make or not to make Christian and Chinese world systems work in concert. In doing so, he usefully brings to bear philosophical positions that evaluate both the role of cultural relativism as a tool of analysis and its dangers as historical method.¹⁴⁰ Willard Peterson, in an article written several years before Cohen's about the Jesuits' conversions of the Chinese (but published only last year), does not venture into the literature of philosophy, but gathers useful evidence about the ways of thinking of three of the most famous Christian converts in the missionaries' early period. In a sense, he has started the spadework.

From Peterson we learn that the Chinese of Ricci's time who went along the route to conversion did so in various ways. One of them, Li Chih-tsao 李之藻, was attracted to figuring and calculating, having applied his own Chinese interests (of the general type we have seen, but of course more mathematical) to the Jesuits' mathematics and cartography. He was unlike the geographer Wei Chün: because Li appreciated the universalistic power of demonstration that those sciences gave him he followed sequentially to the universalistic ("external") arguments of Ricci's moral teachings.¹⁴¹ Others of Peterson's subjects, for example, Hsü Kuang-ch'i, were convinced (and converted) by the integrity of the Jesuits' ethical teachings: for them Christian morality brooked no exceptions. Or they found something subtly moving and convincing in their own dreams and in the Jesuits' Christian iconography.¹⁴²

First of all, this reminds us of the variety of things that took place in early modern China. Chinese long before Ricci had had dreams of epiphany

¹⁴⁰ Cohen, rev. of Gernet (*HJAS* 47.2 [1987]), pp. 681–83.

¹⁴¹ Peterson, "Why Did They Become Christians," pp. 140–42.

¹⁴² *Ibid.*, pp. 136–37, 143–45.

in which Chinese sages communicated to and blessed them.¹⁴³ They had also had much experience in the practice of iconography for the purposes of religious instruction.¹⁴⁴ They pursued a variety of interests, professions, and personal missions, outside of and unknown to the Jesuits, who were really a drop in an ocean of Chinese humanity. In fact, we could widen the circle of Tsou Yüan-piao. We already saw that his circle was interested in lecturing, moving men's minds, and connecting China's textual heritage with particular hermeneutical adjustments and pleas. They were missionaries themselves, even going so far as to choose different levels of language in which to interpret the classics to general audiences.¹⁴⁵ Others, like Wei Chün, practised an exacting art and used it to criticize Christianity, or, like Ni Yüan-lu 倪元璐, were technique-oriented statesmen who wrote about public works, fiscal statistics, and military strategy. All this alerts us to the way that such men—this wider group who surrounded Ricci's Jesuits, and occasionally knew of or met the Jesuits—competed with the Jesuits as missionaries and priests, competed in arts and sciences, and in healing. It justifies slightly more our interpreting Tsou's reply to Ricci's teachings as a patronization of a newcomer teacher (see above).

But then there are others surrounding Ricci and the Jesuits—and also acquaintances of Tsou Yüan-piao. Lin Chao-en 林兆恩, whom Tsou knew and supported, taught a form of healing. He had perceived that his contemporaries were striving (as he had done earlier in his life) to find release and to heal feelings of inadequacy and self-doubt. He used the *Book of Changes* to invent a system of meditation and belief, almost like a conversion to a religion of the *Changes*, featuring the hexagram Ken 艮, and was fantastically successful in getting adherents.¹⁴⁶ Tsou also knew Lü K'un, constantly communicated with him, and supported his endeavors.¹⁴⁷ Lü practised several skills and had several missions. He wrote instructions for his (and others') family, and manuals for music and for helping the poor. A major concern, something about which he also wrote, was healing, just as with Lin.¹⁴⁸

The historical problem of why Chinese could change their minds about

¹⁴³ See one example, that of Wu Yü-pi 吳與弼 (1391–1469), in Hellmut Wilhelm, "On Ming Orthodoxy," *MS* 29 (1970–71), p. 16.

¹⁴⁴ See n. 75, above.

¹⁴⁵ This in particular was done by Lo Ju-fang 羅汝芳, another literatus who was supported politically and personally by Tsou. See Handlin, *Action in Late Ming Thought*, pp. 40, 49.

¹⁴⁶ For Tsou's recognition of Lin, see *ibid.*, pp. 171–72; and for a complete study of Lin Chao-en, see Judith Berling, *The Syncretic Religion of Lin Chao-en* (New York: Columbia U.P., 1980).

¹⁴⁷ Handlin, *Action in Late Ming Thought*, pp. 13–15, 40, 67, 87–88, 187–88.

¹⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, chap. 5.

their personal horizons needs continued research before (or while) the Jesuits' relations with the Chinese, as well as their tinkering with Chinese texts, is studied. Prosopographical methods work nicely as a foundation, and in fact either a focused world of *Changes* experts, or the world of Tsou Yüan-piao, as suggested in our study, might be reconstructed. Naturally, prosopographies of the Jesuits' contacts, both with the Chinese and with other Europeans working in similar intellectual area, are needed.¹⁴⁹ For, as we discussed above, the roughly seventy-five years after Ricci's death marked an important transition in the shape of the mission and its selection of humanist tools and methods meant to "conquer" the Chinese, as they actually came near to doing. We must not forget that these early modern proselytizers from the West entered a China filled with religious teachers,¹⁵⁰ new religious appeals and soteriologies, iconographies, practical men and women, dreamers, as well as textualists with hermeneutic missions. Studying just textual tools and methods is one step. What about other materials of "converting" and convincing—materials that cut across permeable social lines?

To this end it might be important to analyze the pictorial world of China. James Cahill has researched literati painting in late Ming and early Ch'ing China and has drawn historical links with the Jesuits' skills in representational art. He has shown that someone like Chang Hung 張宏 (1577–1652) was pursuing descriptive naturalism at the time of the Jesuits and was probably influenced by their techniques. Although he lacked evidence that a specific Chinese saw a specific Western painting at a given place and time, Cahill adumbrates convincingly a diffusion, based on anecdotal evidence about the attraction of Jesuit paintings and Chinese awe of Chris-

¹⁴⁹ Some of this was done in the past, focusing only on the Jesuits as a group in China, by Pfister, *Notices*, and improved by J. Dehergne, *Répertoire des Jésuites de Chine de 1552 à 1800* (Rome, 1973). Busch, "Tung-lin Shu-yüan," is a useful start at synthesis; another useful, if not interpretive, prosopography of Ricci's Chinese acquaintances is Lin, "Li Ma-tou chiao-yu." Standaert's *Yang Tingyun* takes a most fruitful tack, with its ample use of both Chinese and relatively unexplored Latin sources (especially the *Litterae Annuae*). Mungello's *Curious Land*, although bringing together analyses of the Kircher, Martini, Bouvet group, does not systematically pose social-intellectual evidence needed for a prosopography. And for the broad European trend toward searching for allegorical meaning in texts, see Allen, *Mysteriously Meant*, which includes some of the Jesuits who served in China or studied Chinese.

¹⁵⁰ Of particular interest is Chu-hung 株宏, the renowned Buddhist teacher, whose reaction to Ricci's teachings has been spotted by modern historians. It elicited from Ricci some neat philosophical work (arguing against Chu's *ahimsa*, or, *pu-sha* 不殺, movement). Ricci dips into Mencius for his authority, and we may well wonder whose commentary on *Meng-tzu* he may have been examining (if any), or how he read the text of that highly revered classic. See Chün-fang Yü, *The Renewal of Buddhism in China: Chu-hung and the Late Ming Synthesis* (New York, Columbia U.P., 1981), pp. 87–88.

tian icons. Chang's technical innovations were startling and much discussed but did not become a trend; Chinese connoisseurs criticized him on traditional aesthetic grounds.¹⁵¹ This type of historical work is carried forward in Harrie Vanderstappen's study of Western influences on Chinese art (pointing out some of the earlier work of Pelliot and Bettray). However, Vanderstappen is convinced that Western methods of representation interested the Chinese only on the technical level, not entering their rethinking or conversions. Both his and Cahill's works and the bibliographies they contain are good starting points for this valuable field.¹⁵²

Art appeals to people's psyches in ways that go far beyond academic categories. One such way leads to philosophy. Fukushima Hitoshi 福島仁 has insightfully traced the way written explanations of Christian figures had to hurdle the problems of what "God" was to be called in Chinese (*shang-ti* or *t'ien-chu*), and then the problems of explaining away both other forms of iconography that the Chinese were used to and Muslim proscriptions of iconography.¹⁵³ Eventually, as Fukushima sees it, with the transition of the Jesuit program after Ricci, stories from the life of Christ became perfect vehicles for what may be considered a subgenre of conversion essay: explanations of figures (or pictures), as pursued by such Catholic teachers as Giulio Aleni (1582–1649).

Another way of including art would be that of art commemoration and collecting. Peterson's study has shown the deep reaction of Hsü Kuang-ch'i and Li Chih-tsao to Christian icon images, both in their waking and in their dreaming lives. Men like these were associated with people who collected

¹⁵¹ James Cahill, *The Compelling Image* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard U.P., 1982), pp. 14–22, 34–35. On the basis of a remark by Chang, Cahill shows that the artist was concerned to paint "relying on [one's] eyes" (*ibid.*, p. 16). From there he introduces startling evidence that Chang's sightlines, horizons, and perspectives may have been influenced by European engravings introduced to China in his time and locale. See also Edwards, *World around the Chinese Artist*, who shows that much of what is contained in late-Ming landscapes is physical actuality, not only stylized shapes.

¹⁵² Harrie Vanderstappen, S.V.D., "Chinese Art and the Jesuits in Peking," in Ronan and Oh, eds., *East Meets West*, pp. 102–26, esp. 122–23. See his notes, as well as those of Cahill, *Compelling Image*, p. 229, n. 13, and p. 233, nn. 1–13.

¹⁵³ Fukushima Hitoshi, "Meimatsu no tenshukyo ni okeru zuzo no mondai: Vatican Library tenshukyo kankeisho chosa noto" 明末の天主教における画像の問題ヲアカニ圖書館天主教關係書調査ノート, in *Kyoto* 汲古 8 (1985), pp. 22–25. He uses the preface by Yang Ting-yün to Hsü Kuang-ch'i's "Tsao-wu-chu ch'uei-hsiang lüeh-shuo 造物主垂象略說, which Fukushima examined in the Vatican (also rpt. in *T'ien-chu-chiao tung-ch'uan wen-hsien*; see n. 80, above). The potential of representation to affect and change people's minds has been demonstrated sociologically and iconographically in the context of the antique Hellenistic world. See Bernard Frischer, *The Sculpted Word: Epicureanism and Philosophical Recruitment in Ancient Greece* (Berkeley: U. of California P., 1982), pp. 67–77, 96–118.

and wrote about pieces of art as part of a long Chinese tradition. Late Ming readers of books were much intrigued with, and devoted creative energy to, their illustrated editions.¹⁵⁴ But collecting art was not necessarily commercial (although that occasionally entered in). It was to gain merit among other collectors and thinkers for having saved part of the past. Recent research has shown that the influential convert Yang Ting-yün was one such connoisseur. Moreover, his connection with the world of calligraphy and representation in China spilled over into his writings about Christianity, which several times treat of icon representation and envisioning as ways toward Christianity.¹⁵⁵

Finally, we have seen the appeal of figurations and diagrams, which can be seen as things "external" and "beyond," especially to those who may have had no training in their technical uses in the *Book of Changes*.¹⁵⁶ Lai Chih-te's circular configuration featuring the controller-li brought neo-Confucian order to a potentially overly sophistic explanation of a hallowed text. While Bouvet was struggling with trigrams and numerical systems encountered in the *Changes*, another Jesuit who joined the popular "figurist" search for a primitive universal language, Athanasius Kircher, constructed his own diagrams and matrices. He sought to explain the basic codes of ancient pictographs (of course including the Chinese) in a demonstration of interlocking meanings that used revolving circles, like star-wheels or slide rules. And in this he had great European models: the matrices of Ramon Lull (ca. 1232–1316), whose tables and configurations not only had applications in mnemonic techniques in his day, but also reflected an epistemological scope similar to that of Shao Yung—of course coincidentally. Yet Kircher's addition of motion was passed by for a more mathematical use, in the hands

¹⁵⁴ See Monique Cohen, "Le livre illustré en Chine des Ming au Qing," in *Revue française d'histoire du livre*, Soc. des Bibliophiles de Guyenne ns 42 (Bordeaux: Soc. Bibliophiles de Guyenne and Centre National des Lettres, 1984), pp. 57–74. See esp. pp. 65–70 for the variety of subject materials for illustration (these represent only what is in the Bibliothèque Nationale), including a portrait of Aleni and portraits of Confucius. See also Frederick Mote and Hung-lam Chu, *Calligraphy and the East Asian Book*, ed. Howard L. Goodman (Boston: Shambhala, 1989), pp. 207–14.

¹⁵⁵ See the valuable explorations into Yang's writings given in Standaert, *Yang Tingyun*, esp. pp. 123–24, and 154 concerning representation. See the following note for further evidence.

¹⁵⁶ Fukushima, "Meimatsu no tenshukyo," p. 24, points this out in relation to the preface by Yang (see n. 153), which says, "The spirit of God embraces what is beyond heaven and earth." Yang's theoretical explication of Christian images is discussed by Standaert, *Yang Tingyun*, pp. 123–24. Hsü Kuang-ch'i, for example, wrote an "Encomium on the Image of Christ"; see Young, *Confucianism and Christianity*, p. 48. The importance to potential Chinese converts of ideas external to their Chinese milieu is a main argument of Peterson's "Why Did They Become Christians," p. 147.

of Leibniz.¹⁵⁷ Here, then, Europe moves past the Jesuits' humanist tinkering to something more exacting, while Huang Tsung-hsi moved China past Lai's complicated dynamic matrices, whose dazzling way of contemplating neo-Confucian *li* could perplex. Tai Chen 戴震, in 1719, expressed such anti-Sung feelings when he found relief from a nervous paroxysm by literally "smashing the Supreme Ultimate Chart of the Sung Confucianists." But more than anything he was attacking the agonizing solipsism that he suffered by too much contemplation of diagrams, not figurate reckoning *per se*. In fact, the earlier, Han-era, achievements of figurate reckoning continued to be explored in fascinating detail by eighteenth-century *Changes* scholars like Hui Tung 惠棟 (1697–1758) and Chiao Hsün 焦循 (1763–1820).¹⁵⁸

On the Western side, Matteo Ricci, as Spence seems to say, may in fact have been locked in by things like Memory Palaces, and too bent on the technical, both in terms of pedagogical techniques (memory for memory's sake) and hermeneutics (fundamentalism that looked old hat to the Chinese with whom he conversed). What we should also explore is the close connections between memory, figuration, spatiality, and pictorial representation. Ricci apparently missed some Western traditions regarding these, for if he had mastered Lullian science he would have recognized several tools used also in the science of the *Book of Changes*.

Could Ricci and his colleagues, in the end, have formulated mental maps of the Chinese intellectual scene that included all these tiny but meaningful features of the landscape? We will never know, but in this connection we might recall another side of the Jesuit enterprise, one less amiable than those we have discussed. The Jesuits hoped to control the thought and culture of their pupils, of members of their and other orders, and ultimately of Catholics across Europe. They prepared not only brilliant textbooks but instruments of intellectual domination like the *Apparatus sacer* and *Bibliotheca sacra* of Antonio Possevino. These books defined the limits of what a Catholic should think and know by determining what he should read, by classifying certain classic texts and modern interpretations as licit and by denouncing exegetes of the Bible and the classics who opposed the Jesuits—often after

filching facts and ideas from them.¹⁵⁹ This was the ultimate response of the Order to such challenges as the provocative Christian humanism of Erasmus or the neo-Platonic natural philosophy of Telesio: not a failure to understand resulting from some pan-Western worldview, but a deliberate refusal to contemplate radical alternatives to the intellectual and moral order of the counter-Reformation. It enraged many of the great Protestant and *politique* scholars of the time, like Isaac Casaubon and Joseph Scaliger, who saw the Jesuits as gross oversimplifiers and amateur exegetes, men not committed to the longterm, no-holds-barred textual studies that the Western classics demanded, and not willing to admit that such studies necessarily resulted in debates and innovations. Perhaps it was not to be expected that any member of such an order, in its heyday of aggression and expansion, could have done justice to the range of positions and problems presented in the *Book of Changes* exegesis of the sixteenth century. (Perhaps, too, it might be useful to compare the Jesuit enterprise of codifying knowledge with contemporary Chinese ones—a more fine-grained way of comparing Eastern and Western mentalities than Gernet's.) For bringing a safe Western message to others the Jesuits had all the talents; perceiving those others as they were was probably not a task fully suited to the men who put themselves, "obedient as corpses," at the disposition of their Order and its initial enterprise.

Ricci's toolkit, aside from these problems, was full and complex; in addition to the much-studied technologies he conveyed from Europe, it also included allegorical interpretation but was hardly restricted to it. And only a study as detailed as Spalatin's of Ricci's use of the Chinese texts he referred to can possibly tell us how far he modernized, or how far rejected, what he found there. Such a study will have to do justice to the full range of interpretative methods Ricci knew—and should contrast his work with that of the equally delicate and perceptive Western readers of non-Western cultures who investigated the New World while Ricci invaded the Orient. Diego Duran, that eager sixteenth-century reader of Mary Douglas and Victor Turner, who brilliantly elucidated the Meso-American divinatory calendar that hauntingly underlay the veneration of the saints in sixteenth-century Mexico, is only one of many individuals who could be used to construct a comparison more subtle than Gernet's. Spence's and Gernet's noble books share the noblest of defects; their reach is far beyond their grasp. If we feel impelled to contest their conclusions, we must also admit that they have

¹⁵⁷ The preceding is based on Mungello, *Curious Land*, pp. 134–67, 175–78.

¹⁵⁸ For this interesting account of Tai's struggles, see Yü Ying-shih, "Tai Chen's Choice between Philosophy and Philology," *AM* 3d ser. 2.1 (1989), pp. 85–87; for insightful summaries of Hui's and Chiao's *Changes* work, see Ch'en Ch'i-yun, "A Confucian Magnate's Idea of Political Violence: Hsün Shuang's Interpretation of the *Book of Changes*," *TP* 54 (1968), pp. 73–76 and the notes given, as well as the biographies of these Ch'ing scholars published in Arthur Hummel, ed., *Eminent Chinese of the Ch'ing Period* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Govt. Printing Office, 1942–43).

¹⁵⁹ See R. de Maio, "Le biblioteche dei monasteri italiani alla fine del Cinquecento: I modelli culturali della Controriforma," in *Magia, astrologia e religione nel rinascimento* (Wrocław: Ossolineum, 1974), pp. 148–62.

transformed the terms of the discussion beyond recognition. Their efforts at crosscultural scholarship may be splendid failures; but in that above all they resemble the enterprise of their protagonists and require the respect of even the most critical readers.